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Abstract 
This dissertation sits at the intersection of critical international political economy and a 
decolonizing, anti-racist approach to empirical political science. Specifically, I examine how 
liberal state forms are presupposed by and premised upon illiberal practices of sorting, policing, 
and defining populations. Rather than view such practices as anomalous to the modern state 
form, I view them as productive. I depart from the dominant literature in this field of study 
(postcolonial theory) with a typical focus on discursive and local practices, and instead advance a 
defense of Marxism rooted in an examination of the material practices of states responding to 
global political-economic pressures. This analytical and methodological focus stems from an 
engagement with the theoretical and empirical work conducted through Political Marxism, and 
through an engagement with the concept of uneven and combined development. 
 
I compare instances of racialized nation-building from the nineteenth century, focusing on the 
ways in which the creation of racialized hierarchies of belonging were seminal to the production 
of liberal state capacity and legitimacy. I examine the cases of Canada and Argentina to explore 
how the dispossession and management of indigenous peoples served to foment vast networks of 
bureaucratic, fiduciary, and coercive state capacities. Such capacities were necessary in the 
project of constructing competitive liberal economies to respond to pressures generated by an 
emergent global market in agricultural goods. This work sheds new light on the role of race and 
racialization in the formation of the nation-state system, while responding to and contesting 
common assumptions about the legal equality assumed to underpin Western nationalism(s). 
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Introduction Racial State Building in Historical Perspective: The Problem of 
the Post-Racial Imaginary 
 
Since the early 1970s, following significant transformationr a post-racial, colour-blind 
rhetoric has come to dominate North American, and more broadly Western European 
understanding of self (see for example Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Goldberg, 2008; Lentin & Titley, 
2011). Whether through concepts such as multiculturalism or the melting pot, a widespread 
belief is that race no longer constitutes a salient category of inclusion or exclusion in Western 
democratic nation-states. While critics of this position emerged early on, the idea of post-
racialism has dominated official policy, media, entertainment, and school curriculum. Over the 
past decade, following the global financial crisis, the spectre of racialized violence and 
oppression has become increasingly visible and is now acknowledged outside of the critical 
circles of academia and activism. Recent developments in Europe (the rise of the far right, racist 
and xenophobic political campaigning in Britain, France, and Greece, among others), in the 
United States (the increasingly publicized murder of black community members by police forces, 
the election of Donald Trump with his promises of border walls and immigration policies to 
deport and detain Mexican and Muslim populations, and the recent white supremacist violence in 
Charlottesville), and in Canada (draconian immigration and deportation policies, white 
nationalist organizing, proposals from Conservative party leadership candidate Kelly Leitch to 
institute a Canadian ‘values test’ for immigrants) have all served as potent examples of the 
virulence of racialized oppression today.  
 However, despite recognition of the contemporary rise in racist and xenophobic 
organizing, there has been a tendency to continue to treat such phenomena as either a) an 
historically contingent development, stemming from the current manifestation of neoliberal 
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capitalism, b) the violence of ‘traditional’ holdovers, or c) the acts of aberrant 
individuals/organizations (the so-called ‘bad apple’ thesis). What implicitly underpins these 
kinds of analyses, however, is the bourgeois assumption that liberal capitalist democracies are de 
facto premised on equality of citizenship—that is, equal political and legal rights and freedoms. 
Thus, when characteristically illiberal practices emerge, they are read as either an individual 
aberration (in the West) or a vestige of ‘backward tradition’ (in the ‘non-West’) (Mann, 2004, 3-
4, 18). Western democracies, however, are steeped in and premised upon fundamentally illiberal 
practices (Mann, 2004, 4). Motivating the historical analysis that will be the subject of this 
dissertation is my strong belief that to grasp the contemporary moment, including the rise of 
overt, xenophobic racism, it is necessary to understand the foundational role that markers of 
political and juridical difference have had in the constitutions of ‘liberal’ forms of rule. It is 
necessary to grasp the violence1 and limitations on marginalized groups’ economic, political and 
juridical freedoms today, not as a rupture in liberal rule, but as continuous with and fundamental 
to the nature of liberal statehood.  
Considering the above, there are two related problems to attend to. The first is to account 
for variability in liberal capitalist state forms,2 while the second is to account for the 
fundamentally illiberal premises that underpin such state forms.  If liberalism is, theoretically, a 
rule that operates from the principle of the freedom and equality of abstract individuals, there is 
limited capacity for the political state to intervene in the social relations and arrangements of its 
citizens, and little political or economic significance attributable to cultural differences (Losurdo, 
                                                     
1 Following Mann (2004, 12), I understand violence to involve not only physical repression, murder, and genocide, 
but also institutional forms of coercion, which in my cases will include things like forced cultural assimilation, legal 
segregation, expulsion, and so forth.  
2 That is, in general, it is necessary to demonstrate how the liberal state form under capitalism has always been 
ideologically and institutionally differentiated. The ‘laissez faire’ model of the state under British industrial 
capitalism has been the exception rather than the rule.  
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2011, 1). Accordingly, should we read those states that manifest politically mediated inequality 
of status amongst citizens as ‘illiberal’? If so, do we then read these spaces as self-consciously 
evoking liberalism while practicing despotism?  
The position that this dissertation takes in response to these questions is in the negative. I 
will argue that ‘illiberalism,’ or violent, interventionist, and coercive state practices to divide and 
order populations, is consistent with, indeed productive of, liberalism. For if the commitment to 
equality contained within liberalism was simply vacuous and insincere, “it would not succeed in 
inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence” 
(Losurdo, 2011, 40). The exclusions, interventions, and inequalities contained within liberalism 
do not indicate a fundamental ‘ruse’ of the philosophy (Uday, 1997, 61). Rather, the idea of 
formal equality has always been presupposed by a privileging of a range of psycho-social 
qualities (i.e. ‘rationality,’ individualism, thrift, market adherence, etc.) (Uday, 1997, 62), and 
the capacity to exert these qualities has itself always been presupposed by the exclusion and 
domination of one group in the service of another (Losurdo, 2011, 35; Mann, 2004, 56; Sayer 
and Corrigan, 6; Uday, 1997, 63).  
Domenico Losurdo’s analysis of liberalism and slavery’s twin birth confirms this thesis. 
Through an impressively researched ‘counter-history’ Losurdo argues that liberalism in England 
and in the US was established through and in tandem with the rise of chattel slavery: “Slavery is 
not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, 
it experienced its maximum development following that success” (Losurdo, 2011, 35). Scholars 
of Antebellum slavery such as David Roediger (2007) and Barbara Fields (1990) implicitly 
confirm this idea. For them, slavery and notions of racial difference developed alongside 
conceptions of liberty for white property holders and later indentured servants. For Roediger and 
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Fields, this duality was owing to a need to break up class collaboration amongst servants and 
slaves, wherein liberty was promised as the exclusive purchase of ‘whiteness’ and as a result led 
to different strategic considerations for black slaves and white servants. For Losurdo, the 
explanation lies in the rise of modern property rights, wherein the erosion of absolute, centralized 
despotic power led to its concentration in the hands of individuals as property owners. This 
allowed for the individual, discretionary exercise of authority over slaves, creating substantive 
distinctions in the liberty of populations (2011, 39). 
At the core of either of the above analyses is the essential argument that liberalism (as 
universal equality) rests upon the fiction of a homogenous population. In the context of real, 
material inequality and difference, liberalism must fabricate its foundational universalism. This 
occurs through violence and coercion, elimination and assimilation (Mann, 2004, 5). 
Homogenization and universalization do not occur in a power vacuum; rather, they always 
involve the elevation of a dominant group’s conditions of rule and consciousness (Sayer and 
Corrigan, 6). In fact, despite liberalism’s fetishization of the ‘individual,’ “the rights and 
regulation of groups have actually been more central for liberal democracy” (Mann, 2004, 5). 
This has meant an inherent formulation of “the citizen body as being internally stratified. Indeed, 
citizens’ rights were at this time also stratified, since the people were entitled to ‘active’ 
citizenship, while the populace enjoyed only ‘passive’ citizenship” (Mann, 2004, 56).  
The arguments addressed above are important in that they weave together ideological and 
material currents of liberalism, class power, property, and production. This is a critical counter-
point to what are, otherwise, potent critiques of political economy, which suggest that 
materialism inhibits anything but a superficial explanation of culture (specifically, I am 
concerned with postcolonial critiques). In this dissertation, I extend these histories of the illiberal 
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constitution of liberalism through an analysis of the settler-colonial Atlantic world. I will argue 
that settler colonies were materially and ideologically condensed through institutionalized 
hierarchies of belonging predicated on ‘white nationalism.’ The formation and policing of a 
white national identity was deployed as a means to liberal capitalist state development, and these 
exclusionary premises of belonging were central to the legitimization, centralization, and 
consolidation of fiscal, coercive, and administrative state apparatuses.  
To accomplish this task, I turn to a comparative study of Argentine and Canadian 
national-state development throughout the nineteenth century. The comparison is instructive for 
many reasons; perhaps most importantly because, despite the fact that both states are founded on 
indigenous genocide and dispossession, and both states erected a racialized conception of 
nationhood vis-à-vis a grammar of ‘whiteness,’ Argentina is often read in terms of the failure of 
liberalism, while Canada is viewed through a framework of liberal triumphalism. For example, a 
seminal historian of Argentine state-building, David Rock (1985), tends to see Argentina’s long 
path of militarism as rooted in the legacy of Spanish colonialism, and particularly, caudillo rule 
read as ‘pre-modern’ power relations, while scholars of Canada, such as Ian McKay (2010), have 
viewed state consolidation as occurring through a form of passive (bourgeois) revolution from 
above. I challenge both of these readings by demonstrating that so-called liberal and illiberal 
modalities of rule have been inextricably bound into the modern project of liberal-state building.3 
                                                     
3 My distinction between liberal and illiberal policies and practices should be qualified. I am of the belief that 
liberalism, from its genesis, has always required illiberal strategies (indeed, I show precisely this in Chapter Two). 
However, my distinction is between the ‘formal’ understandings of liberal/illiberal practice. Thus increasing state 
intervention/manipulation, while consistent with liberal practice empirically, was not formally part of its 
ideological moorings. That state builders in the case studies I examine adopted both formally liberal strategies, and 
combined them with outwardly, formally illiberal practices, is the problem to which I attend. In pursuing a 
developmental strategy that valorized British laissez-faire principles, why was it that these state builders adopted 
strategies fundamentally antithetical to such principles? 
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Moreover, my cases are chosen for the form of state they represent; namely both 
countries can be broadly understood as ‘settler colonies,’ which are instructive spaces for my 
argument. It is in the setter colony that processes of national state and capital formation were 
simultaneous and interpenetrated, in contrast to many of the initial European capitalist states, 
whose processes of nation formation were temporally separated from that of capitalist 
transformation. I will suggest that in the settler colonies, nationalism was advanced as a means to 
capitalist development, with consequences for the ways in which populations were named, 
distributed, differentiated, and governed. Ultimately, nationalism in the settler colony, 
irrespective of purported liberal objectives, was the core of the explicit systematization of white 
racial identities, alongside and in a position of power and privilege to ‘racially other’ identities. 
Though racial hierarchies are not exclusive to settler-colonial states, I will argue that ‘race’ in the 
settler colony is unique in its productive function, and this is because of its simultaneous 
formation alongside the national state form. Thus, while showing how such identities emerged in 
Argentina and Canada, I am more specifically interested in making an argument about the 
productive power of such identities, specifically to capitalist social and material relations. Rather 
than simply cultural or ideological designations, or vestiges of a premodern time, I argue that 
racial designations in the context of liberal state building were productive of the very materiality 
of the modern capitalist state. Furthermore, I show how, despite similarities, the erection of a 
white racial nation contributed to very different material constellations of state power, with 
consequences for subsequent conventions of ordering populations.  
Both Canada and Argentina were settler colonial spaces, populated predominantly 
throughout the mid-late nineteenth century, and integrated into the global economy on the basis 
of staple wheat production. Both colonies perpetrated physical and cultural genocide against the 
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original peoples of the territories, and constituted their national states as spaces of racial 
‘whiteness’. However, while Canada was a British colony, Argentina was colonized under the 
Iberian empire. These distinct origins came to form the generative conditions upon which capital 
and state formation took place. The manifestation of racialized oppression, and the means 
through which ‘whiteness’ was produced, reproduced, and protected, was unique in each space. 
As such, the comparison between Canada and Argentina is a useful one.  
The Canadian state followed a path of legally coded racial hierarchy, a policy of 
apartheid and segregation, with an emphasis on racial difference. Official recognition of 
difference (as threat) meant that racial oppression occurred through explicit and named 
exclusions, set out in legal code and state policy, which involved the erection of significant state 
administrative capacity. This argument has meaningful implications for the present; it has meant 
that legal and constitutional challenges to the state constitute the primary means for challenging 
racialized and racist practices. This path is particularly complicated for indigenous groups, for 
whom the only means for accessing redress and demanding change is through the affirmation of 
the state, whose very existence is contested.  
In Argentina, the state produced racialized subjectivities—or one subjectivity, namely 
‘racial whiteness’—through processes of assimilation (predicated on hierarchies of civilization), 
erasure, and domestic tactics of exclusion, which required far greater investment in the 
centralization of coercive state capacity, rather than administrative powers. In denying the 
existence of difference, the Argentine state produced very different obstacles for populations that 
were subjected to racialized oppression. With a state that officially recognized only sameness 
(coded as whiteness), populations subjected to differential, exploitative, and oppressive treatment 
have lacked the bureaucratic and legal pathways to challenge such treatment. These differences 
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can be seen, furthermore, in the different tactics of census collection in each space. In Argentina, 
every census between 1895 and 2010 has omitted any racial designation, relegating all peoples to 
either argentinidad or foreigner (Demuro, 2017, 548). In Canada, on the contrary, every census 
collected since Confederation has included a category for recording racial (later termed ethnic) 
origin (Prevost & Beaud, 1996). 
The intervention that I make through a comparative analysis of these two case studies is 
to demonstrate the ways in which such ‘illiberal’ practices of exclusion were not simply 
anomalies, or purely cultural legacies of a pre-modern politics, but constitutive, as they continue 
to be, of the very materiality of the liberal state. In Argentina, the creation and policing of racial 
whiteness led to an accumulation and centralization of state coercive capacity, as well as its 
external legitimization vis-à-vis foreign investors. In Canada, the production of racial whiteness 
led to the establishment of a vast centralization of bureaucratic and fiduciary state power. 
Alongside each of these, importantly, the state legitimized itself to domestic populations through 
the consolidation of a national project.  
The External Limits of Liberal Equality? Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities 
  
 If my argument is that the liberal settler colonial state was constituted and sustained 
through an internal hierarchy of racialized belonging, it is necessary to first deal with literature 
that has understood formal equality amongst internal populations to be the constitutive feature of 
modern liberal states. Perhaps one of the strongest statements of this nature is Benedict 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities. If the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the 
era of nation formation, and nations were understood as bastions of (at least formal) horizontal 
camaraderie, then the historical process within this timeframe has been one of progressively 
perfecting the liberality of rule in the modern world. While Anderson’s work is seminal in 
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contemplating the structuration of inequality and exclusion between territorialized configurations 
of identity, he nevertheless encounters substantial difficulty in accounting for inequality within 
such spaces (Miles, 1987a, 24).  
Anderson’s work has been essential in that it decisively demonstrates how ‘nations’ are 
actively constructed and central to the modern capitalist world. Whereas dynastic polities were 
consumed with the expansion of power through increasing control and authority over greater 
populations—achieved through territorial expansion (though not necessarily contiguous)—and 
the formation of allies through strategies of intermarriage and military conquest, the modern 
political state is concerned with the enclosure of peoples and territories over which a bounded 
sovereignty is to be enacted. The protection and management of a bounded territory of property, 
resources, and population, rather than perpetual expansion, is what characterizes the modern 
state. In this process, the modern state has presumed, or at least aspired to, the enclosure of a 
largely homogenous population (Anderson, 2006). Such an argument has been essential in our 
capacity to debunk the myth of an historically given ‘people’, and instead historicize the 
generation of politically and culturally bounded territorial units.  
Despite such central contributions, however, Anderson’s work is itself mired in a form of 
mythologizing that is central to liberal capitalist modernity. That is, the fiction that the modern 
state is in fact a state of formal juridical equality. This implicit assumption in Anderson’s work 
has been aptly identified by nationalism scholars such as Rogers Brubaker, Neil Davidson, and 
Claudio Lomnitz, as well as critical race scholars such as Robert Miles, David Theo Goldberg, 
Michael Omi, and Howard Winant4. For all the essential historical and theoretical groundwork 
laid by Anderson, his work ultimately supports this liberal myth and thus suggests that states not 
                                                     
4 Significant works bringing together the study of race and nation include Bauman (1989), Mosse (1995), Balibar 
(1991), and Miles (1987b). 
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undergirded by the national myth and formal juridical equality are somehow anomalous to or 
outside of modernity. Indeed, Anderson is perhaps most controversial for his insistence that 
racism and nationalism are mutually incompatible forms of marking ‘peoplehood’ (Miles, 1987, 
24). Anderson suggests that nations cannot be conceived of on the basis of a racialized order as 
the former’s underlying logics are antithetical to those of the latter: “The fact of the matter is that 
nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal 
contaminations. . . . Niggers (sic) are, thanks to the invisible tar-brush, forever niggers . . . . no 
matter what passports they carry or what languages they speak and read” (Anderson, 2006, 149). 
It appears that for Anderson membership in the nation anticipates a ‘choice’ made by the 
participant (whether real or implied) to join the community based on shared cultural, moral, or 
political qualities, whereas race is denoted by ‘unchosen’ traits that acquire an aura of 
naturalness and are thus positioned outside of history and human agency.  While the nation 
suggests a chosen path of fulfillment and destiny, race is said to condemn and contaminate the 
destiny of particular groups. As a result, race is said to deny the very idea of the nation.  
The near hegemony of Anderson’s work has made it, in many ways, difficult to 
conceptualize and theorize the relationship between modernity and internal social closures. 
While it is broadly accepted that the modern state posits an external form of social closure 
through the evocation of a border and national peoples, it is tacitly accepted that within the state, 
formal equality prevails, and where it does not, it is owing to the persistence of pre-modern 
predilections, or ‘tradition.’ The conundrum that is presented is thus: is the nation-state an apt 
model for understanding dominant modes of politically configured belonging, given the clear 
prevalence of politically mediated hierarchies of subjectivity that have permeated states 
throughout the modern period? Can the near hegemonic understanding of modern political 
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association qua the nation-state be accommodated and adapted to the realities of racialized and 
stratified membership, or do we require different conceptual tools to make sense of variable 
political formations within capitalist modernity? 
It appears there are two possible paths through which to respond to this query. On the one 
hand, it is possible to problematize the national-state’s equation with universal, homogenous, and 
consensual membership. To this end, it becomes necessary to parse out the relationship between 
liberal and illiberal practices and political forms. On the other hand, perhaps it is more 
instructive to think in terms of alternative state forms to be considered alongside the national-
state, in light of the argument that the nation-state form cannot conceptually account for the 
totality of models of political-territorial organization and membership. In this case, it becomes a 
matter of accounting for ‘modern’ political configurations that are distinguishable as either 
liberal or illiberal forms. This path acknowledges the modernity of ‘illiberal’ state forms and 
practices, but effectively separates them analytically from ‘liberal’ modes of rule.  
To begin, it is instructive to ask what, for Anderson, the national community provides an 
answer to. To what ends are nationalisms pursued? These are different questions than what 
makes possible the nation, and quite often the answers provided for the latter tend to overshadow 
those provided for the former, in assessing Anderson’s contribution to an understanding of 
nationalism. To begin with Anderson’s ostensible birthplace of nationalism, nationalism is said 
to be deployed and developed in the Americas by creole intellectuals as a means of effecting and 
uniting anti-colonial independence movements against the Spanish Crown. While capitalism is 
implicated in these processes, in so much as print capitalism is a condition of possibility for 
national consciousness, capitalism is itself not responsible for nationalism in any clear fashion. 
For Anderson, Spain’s ‘recolonization’ of the Americas through its Bourbon Reforms (decidedly 
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non-capitalist practices) generated ‘emotionally plausible, and politically viable’ communities 
based on colonial administrative units, which were given broad common psychic experience 
through print capitalism and the territorial limits of economic life, connecting and binding a 
‘people’ (Anderson, 2006, 64). These increasingly plural American identities would then come 
to form independence movements in the rejection of Spanish dominance, forming nation-states 
throughout the early nineteenth century. Nationalism, then, is at root a cultural development, the 
spread and territorial reach of which is influenced by capitalism and colonialism, but the content 
of which appears decidedly apolitical and dematerialized. In Europe, similarly, many early 
incarnations of nationalism emerged, unconsciously often, through the combination of emergent 
administrative vernaculars and anti-dynastic revolution. The result of such revolutions was a 
political entity bound together and imagined as common in historical spirit, through territories 
demarcated by their respective administrative vernacular (Anderson, 2006, 81).  
The first issue that needs to be raised, then, is that Anderson fails to consider the impact 
that exogenous material developments have on the specific content of nationalism. Exogenous 
factors, for Anderson, influence the replication and territorial reach of nationalist articulations, 
but do not specify or influence its internal symbols, coherence, or criteria of membership. Rather 
these things are ostensibly already at hand, and what is imagined is the way these cultural 
materials and symbols are attached to a particular, delimited population and given social 
meaning. By abstracting the cultural content of nationalism from political-economic histories, 
focusing on sociological or local-level causation to the exclusion of global processes, Anderson 
is able to posit, seemingly unproblematically, his definition of nationalism as characteristically 
horizontal and fraternal.  
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However, capitalism did more than provide a material-temporal expedient for the 
transmission of nationalism’s cultural content. According to Neil Davidson, the politics of 
nationalism’s cultural content can be found in the fact that nationalism provides an answer to—a 
psychosocial compensation for—the disruptions and alienations created by capitalist 
transformations. Importantly, for Davidson, nationalism was a vehicle by which non-capitalist 
state forms were overcome, providing the material through which the variety of oppositions to 
dynastic and absolutist rule could be brought together. Thus, the content of nationalism had to be 
something that could bind together a socially disparate group on the basis of, quite often, the 
lowest common denominator (Davidson, 2016, 56). Of course, this never erased a very real and 
visible social hierarchy, though it did present a form of imagined interests and common frame 
through which to bind exploiter and exploited under capitalism (Davidson, 2016, 71). Once state 
transformation had been achieved, nationalism continued to function to provide states with 
citizens to pay taxes and conscript to armies, because of the belief held by the masses of workers 
that they had more in common with those who exploited them at home than they did with any 
exploiters or fellow exploited abroad. Once established, this means of unifying an economically 
divided population in order to consolidate state apparatuses and finances could then be adapted, 
borrowed, and combined with a range of existing social contexts and their particular patterns of 
internal fissure (Davidson, 2016, 75). 
What forms of real and visible social hierarchies persisted in the first nationalisms? 
Perhaps the most obvious would be the status of women and children who, while not presenting 
as full members of the nation-state, nevertheless identified with the nation. To this end, Claudio 
Lomnitz’s definition of a nation is useful: “(it is) a community that is conceived of as deep 
comradeship among full citizens, each of whom is a potential broker between the national state 
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and weak, embryonic or partial citizens whom he or she can construe as dependents” (2001, 
338). This definition serves to further buttress Neil Davidson’s assertion that it would be wrong-
headed to suggest that the existence of other partial interests within the nation somehow 
disproves nationalism, since nationalism is simply a means through which other partial interests 
are advanced. What gives the nation its distinctiveness is that it fabricates a common experience 
that is felt and articulated through an identity of interest amongst some and against others 
perceived as holding different interests. When this common experience and interest are 
articulated within territorial political and economic configurations, a nation-state emerges, but 
this of course does not mean that it eclipses any or all other partial interests within the territory; 
only that the dominant glue that comprises the common national interest is hegemonic.  
Having thus argued that the nation does not necessitate deep horizontal fraternity, but in 
fact is complicit with multiple internal heterogeneities and hierarchies of subjectivity, it is now 
necessary to ask how race is understood in relation to nation. Can the nation be racially defined 
and stratified? If not, is it more appropriate to speak of racial states in addition to nation states? I 
will suggest that the answer is yes—but a qualified yes. The content of the nation is not 
determined a priori. All that is necessary is that it provides that ‘glue’ which can fill the 
psychosocial needs of an alienated population to find a common frame for experience, or for 
ruling classes to provide some means of generating common interest amongst exploited and 
exploiting classes within the territorial state to facilitate centralized fiduciary and administrative 
capacity (Davidson, 2016, 75; Omi and Winant, 2015, 76). Race can be created for and yoked to 
these very ends. Indeed, as David Goldberg suggests, “race and nation overlap, more or less 
isomorphically” (2002, 247). 
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Now, for Anderson, the main objection to race being a defining feature of the ‘nation’ is 
the alleged voluntarist versus ascriptive qualities of culture and race respectively. The nation, 
Anderson argues, allows for the naturalization of individuals (regardless of the practical 
limitations of such processes) while race, by its nature, prohibits entry into membership. Race is 
a reduction to determined physiognomy, while nation is chosen. This qualification, as I will 
show in subsequent sections, is rife with historical-factual and conceptual errors. Race is not 
reducible to physiognomy—the physical markers of race are historically and socially constructed 
and thus changeable. History is rife with examples of the racially othered ‘becoming white’ 
(Bonnett, 1998; Ignatiev, 2008).5 Race is a moving marker and cannot be assigned to the kind of 
unmovable destiny that Anderson makes of it. Beyond this, however, is the critical problem that 
attends to Anderson’s voluntarist understanding of ‘nation.’ For Anderson, the markers of nation 
are of ‘cultural’ content. These can only be assumed to be voluntary and inclusive if we evacuate 
culture of its political and economic moorings. To draw out this point, it is useful to turn to 
Rogers Brubaker’s work on ethnic versus cultural or civic nationalism.  
For Brubaker, there is a tendency within the scholarship on nationalism to distinguish and 
dichotomize nationalisms on the basis of their purported ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ bases. The former is 
thought to be egalitarian, democratic, inclusive, and acquisitive, while the latter is predicated on 
illiberal, ascriptive, and exclusive characteristics. The former more readily aligns with 
Anderson’s understanding of nationalism, while the latter tends to encapsulate those qualities of 
mass political and cultural membership that deny or override ‘nationness’ (2004, 133). As 
Brubaker aptly demonstrates, what is ‘ethnic’ (and I will argue to extend this to ‘racial’) is not 
                                                     
5 Alistair Bonnett provides a comprehensive overview of how ‘whiteness’ historically became the exclusive identity 
of Europeans, while Noel Ignatiev provides an account of the transition the Irish experience, from racialized other, 
to ‘white.’  
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common descent, but precisely a shared (whether exogenously imposed or endogenously 
identified) common culture. At the same time, if civic nationalism is purely liberal, voluntarist 
culture, its existence is almost defined out of history, as very few nationalisms have ever been 
fully universalist and voluntary (Brubaker, 2004, 136-139). Indeed, while the basis of civic 
nationalism might ostensibly be moral or political creed, morality, political creed, rationality, and 
so forth are frequently racially coded (Brubaker, 2004, 142). Thus, rather than thinking in 
binaries of culturally or ethnically ordered polities, Brubaker argues that “in fact all 
understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and 
exclusive. What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but 
the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion” (Brubaker, 2004, 141). From this vantage point, 
there is no reason to deny that race may be constructed as the basis upon which national 
inclusion is articulated.  
Though there is nothing necessarily inclusive or fraternal about nationalism, if race as a 
criteria for nation building is theoretically compatible, it is still worth exploring whether it might 
be more analytically and conceptually productive to think in terms of different modern state 
forms—national states, racial states, and so forth. The question, then, is whether we should 
distinguish between ostensibly liberal (as national) and illiberal (as racial) state forms. In 
addressing this question, I turn to the work of David Theo Goldberg, who has been foremost 
amongst those developing an understanding of ‘racial states’ (2002). While the ‘racial state’ 
concept is crucial in drawing attention to the relationship between state-making and race-making, 
it does not itself do away with the need to understand nationalism as a potentially racialized 
phenomena, and the ways in which illiberal politics are productive of liberalism itself.  
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For Goldberg, the idea of the racial state is synonymous with the modern state: “Race 
marks and orders the modern nation-state, and so state projects, more or less from its point of 
conceptual and institutional emergence” (2002, 234). However, Goldberg distinguishes among 
historicist and naturalist racial states. The former conceptualizes race on the basis of historical 
stages of development, thus holding out the possibility of full citizenship acquisition should the 
subject in question ‘acquire’ the necessary skills, etc., to be conceived of as a fully modern 
political member, whereas the latter conceives race as a biological or genetic disposition that 
precludes the acquisition of full citizenship rights indefinitely, and speaks to projects of racial 
segregation and exclusion. Goldberg further goes on to suggest that racial states can be either 
active in sanctioning racist practice, or passive in turning a blind eye to such practice, though the 
two are likely to comingle in any given state (2002, 239-244). These distinctions are useful; 
however, I argue that racial nationalism requires analytical distinction precisely because of the 
overwhelming imbalance towards active racist state policies in some modern states under the 
guise of liberal order. In other words, the idea that the nation can and has been formed through 
an understanding of ‘racial’ identity remains crucial to understanding specific modern nation 
formations.  
The cases I will review below, though through various methodologies of racial imagining 
(naturalist and historicist), were active in promoting and producing a ‘white’ state predicated on 
a racial founding mythology. While nationalism is the assumed or assigned cultural marker that 
indicates common origins or belonging, and race may be one conceptualization of that imagined 
marker, not all states (irrespective of their racial projects) are tied to an understanding of a 
peoples bound together by race. This is a deliberate practice and distinction that merits its own 
analysis, and thus I contend that while the concept of the racial state is analytically useful in 
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understanding the pervasive relationship between race-making and state-making, it is 
conceptually too broad to distinguish those states with implicit racial projects from those whose 
very formulation is existentially tied to racial subjectification. This distinction is imperative for 
understanding the materially productive role that ‘race’ has played in the constitution of liberal 
settler states. Thus, it remains fruitful and necessary to explore the particular historical milieus 
within which racism and nationalism congeal to produce racial nationalism. 
Marxism’s Liberal Assumptions? 
 
 While the dominance of a bourgeois understanding of the ‘nation’ has done much to 
frame liberalism as de facto a system of non-coercive rule over juridically equal individuals, 
Anderson and liberal nationalist discourses are not alone responsible. Indeed, it has been 
vociferously argued by postcolonial theorists that this is precisely the kind of problematic 
reading of modernity that many Marxist theories provide. In other words, because of Marxist 
political economy’s emphasis on coercion and exploitation occurring within the labour process 
rather than through political relations, there is no room or capacity for Marxists to account for 
the vastly differential experiences of modern polities. Where overt political coercion and 
inequality prevail, postcolonial theory argues, Marxists are too ready to relegate such practices as 
indicative of ‘tradition’—they are not read as part of capitalist social relations.  
 The accusation of liberal assumptions within Marxist theory is perhaps most heated and 
contested within the field of so-called Political Marxist (PM) theory. Referring broadly to the 
work of Robert Brenner (1982) and Ellen Meiksins-Wood (2002), PM is a variant of Marxist 
theory that is rooted in an historical understanding of the relationship between social property 
relations, reproductive strategies, and ‘market-compulsion.’ Because Brenner and Wood identify 
market compulsion as the central referent of capitalism, which in turn hinges on ‘market 
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dependence,’ it is often claimed that PM can only account for exploitation within wage-relations 
(or the ‘economic realm’); it cannot account for forms of politically mediated surplus extraction. 
Thus, for example, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu (2015) have argued that, in 
focusing on ‘market compulsion,’ Brenner prioritizes too narrow an event—the freeing of 
labour—in too local a context—rural England—such that the subsequent understanding of what 
capitalism is becomes wholly dependent on an assumed universalization of the liberal political 
subject, ‘free’ from political coercion and engaged in ‘free’ waged labour. To this end, in the 
remainder of this introduction I critically review some of the postcolonial arguments offered as 
an alternative to Marxism. This is done in advance of and in justification for the content of the 
next chapter, in which I begin to outline how practices of political coercion within liberal 
capitalist states are, in fact, quite capable of being explained through PM, which provides a more 
fulsome account than the postcolonial alternative. I address these critiques thematically, as they 
will form the basis of each subsequent chapter.  
 Broadly speaking, postcolonial theory sustains a critique against Marxist political 
economy on the basis of its historical methodology, which is said to subsume all phenomena 
under a totalizing, progressive narrative rooted in Western categories (Bhabha, 2004; 
Chakrabarty, 2000; Young, 2004). If this is the case, Marxism is critically flawed in: a) its 
incapacity to theorize rupture and discontinuity, instead tending to read back into history a linear 
developmental trajectory, and b) its incapacity to deal with contingent and local developments, 
once more subordinating these to the deterministic and higher order mechanics operating at the 
level of total capital (Anderson, 2006, 158; Chakrabarty, 2000, 6). More specifically, the critique 
is that deviations from bourgeois liberalism (read as the apolitical rule of abstract, formally equal 
individuals) are relegated to a historical past, mere tradition (including all modes of rule through 
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the politicized hierarchies of domination viz. culture, religion, caste, ethnicity, and race), rather 
than constitutive of liberal modernity in their own right. A perceived inability in Marxist political 
economy to account for variation and contingency in the formation of modern polities and 
cultures has thus manifested in four related foci in the postcolonial canon. First, at a general 
level, there is the presentation of multiple modernities as a solution to the totalizing history of 
capital. Second, there is the presentation of nations/nationalisms as fractured processes of 
political Westernization articulated with cultural localism. Third, there is the critique of 
Marxism’s inability to account for subjects who cannot be captured by the wage-relation, and the 
forwarding of the category of the ‘subaltern.’ And finally, perhaps the pièce de  résistance of 
postcolonial critique, there is the hybrid figure; that is, the subject who is not fully subordinated 
to the demands of modern exploitative power (especially colonial and bourgeois power), 
asserting agency in equally ambivalent and potentially threatening ways, to occupy spaces that 
are neither subject to total control nor total agency.  
In one of the seminal texts in postcolonial studies, Provincializing Europe, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty develops a critique of historical materialism that has become a central text in the 
critique of Eurocentrism, a bedrock for postcolonial and subaltern studies. Provincializing 
Europe begins with a definition of political modernity as “the rule by modern institutions of the 
state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise” (2000, 4). Chakrabarty argues that the contemporary 
state of academic and philosophical thought makes it impossible to think of any space in the 
world today without reference to these categories, which in themselves rely upon a secular-
universal vision of the human (Chakrabarty, 2000, 4). It is argued that contemporary analyses of 
modernity must be structured by categories such as citizenship, the state, and civil society, which 
are of necessity characterized by their secular universality (or impersonal equality). Political 
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modernity, in other words, is always viewed from the vantage point of the absence or presence of 
these categories. Where they do not exist, they are explained away through history (which is 
understood as a totalizing and teleological force).  
 Now, Chakrabarty’s understanding of historical materialism is bound into notions of 
teleological progress—an understanding of history that is by no means universally held by 
Marxists (more specifically, those engaged with the concept of uneven and combined 
development, which I attend to in the next chapter). It is suggested that to account for difference 
Marxists need to posit it as premodern in the march of historical progress. In more sophisticated 
variants, it is argued, uneven development is invoked. However, this still assumes an historical 
trajectory of progress that makes it possible to identify some elements as archaic. For 
Chakrabarty, the peasant, for example, is not premodern or archaic but a constitutive part of 
modernity. The political organization of the peasant around religion, ethnicity, caste, etc., is not 
pre-political but thoroughly political. This, of course, is true. But it does not follow that this 
expression of modernity cannot be accounted for through historical materialism.  
 While, to be sure, there is much historical materialism6 that posits an ‘outside-in’ model 
of causation, whereby all localities follow slavishly to the beat of global capital, the postcolonial 
position, too frequently, fully neglects the global level, insisting on the relatively insulated 
operation of colonial contestation and culture within the locale. In other words, methodologically 
a tension is presented whereby in the first instance, international levels of causation are 
privileged, while in the second case, sociological levels are given primary consideration. This 
methodological division, furthermore, manifests in what Radhika Desai has called an intellectual 
or disciplinary division of labour whereby the study of capitalism as a global or international 
                                                     
6 For example, World-Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 2004) and Dependency Theory (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; 
Frank, 1966) 
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force is given to the discipline of political economy, while the more local study of 
nations/nationalisms are studied as purely cultural phenomena. It is easy to see how this kind of 
divisionary analysis would result in the kind of liberal/illiberal binary that sits at the core of this 
dissertation. Political economy and capitalist social relations, absent a consideration of local 
specificities and cultural (understood broadly) proclivities, can abstractly be understood through 
the kinds of universalizing liberal rhetoric that is so readily critiqued. Similarly, localist analyses 
can readily be tangled in a narrative of culture to the exclusion of political economy, when the 
relationship between the local milieu and international processes is foreclosed. It is for this 
reason that Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler call for the treatment of global metropoles and 
colonies within a single analytic field, fostering a more dynamic relationship between analyses of 
culture and of political economy. To do so is to recognize that both global processes and local 
struggles are constitutive of social transformation (1997, 3).  
Recognizing that capitalism has universalizing tendencies, which nevertheless do not 
necessitate repetition and replication, is at the core of uneven and combined development, which 
I attend to in Chapter 1 (UCD). However, at an abstract level, Vivek Chibber makes the 
argument that the universalizing tendencies of capitalism do not mean: a) capitalism will 
replicate a particular sequence of development in all places, and b) that capitalism can and does 
tolerate differences in institutions, culture, subjectivity, etc., so long as these do not threaten the 
basic premise which is universalised—that is, the conditions necessary for the production and 
accumulation of surplus value (Chibber, 2013, 110). The spread of capitalism encounters infinite 
variations in social, cultural, and political organization.  
 
. . . . the social whole—the ensemble of social relations in any geographic region—
need not be subsumed under one particular set of rules. The various practices that 
comprise the whole can be governed by very dissimilar internal logics, even as 
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capital universalizes . . . . practices necessary to capital’s reproduction will fall under 
its sway. . . . But there will continue to be practices that retain their integrity . . . . 
Hence, theories affirming capital’s universalizing drive do not have to efface 
historical diversity (Chibber, 2013, 239). 
 
Furthermore, where local practices do internalize the logics of capital, it is not necessary that 
these then become mirrors of European institutions. Within Europe there exists a variety of 
institutional configurations of capitalist modernity. Europe’s transition to liberal and capitalist 
arrangements involved concerted forms of state intervention and assistance, contrary to the oft-
cited understanding of these politico-economic arrangements as inherently ‘laissez faire’ (Davis, 
1997, 75). That capitalism spread through political mediation is, in fact, the result of capitalism’s 
internal tensions and contradictions. In managing these contradictions, capitalism was 
externalized, and in so much as this occurred, it was through combined development, a form of 
directed political intervention to manage internal development in the face of competitive 
pressures, that capitalist globalization was realized (Desai, 2015, 453;  Teschke, 2003, 265). The 
interaction between the universalizing drive of capital and local conditions, consequently, is how 
variable forms of capitalist organization were produced (Chibber, 2013, 239). “The individual 
political and economic circumstances of separate states meant that, one way or another, there 
were endless derivations in the way liberalism, and commercial liberalism developed” (Davis, 
1997, 80). 
 Thus, in Chapter 2, I engage with precisely these internal tensions that produced the 
uneven and combined spread of capitalist social relations globally. In so doing, I emphasize, 
firstly, the historical and geographical contingency of the ‘classic’ liberal subject in England. I 
demonstrate how, rather than a natural accompaniment to capitalism, it was only the conditions 
of possibility that capitalism provided. Ultimately, it was through deliberate political 
intervention, specifically the 1834 Poor Law Reform and the ‘Revolution in Government’ 
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occurring through the 1830s and 1840s, that anything resembling a politically disinterested, 
formally equal and transparent liberal state and subject emerged. Once consolidated, however, 
British capitalism was faced with the fundamental contradiction posed by the mode of 
production: the inevitability of market gluts. The resolution to this tension, as I argue, was 
through the global expansion of capitalist social relations.  
 Now, as I have alluded to above, and will develop more thoroughly in Chapters 1 through 
3, polities outside of Britain sought to erect and legitimize a national state capable of directing 
development and regulating land, population, and taxation in response to the geopolitical and 
competitive pressures unleashed by a globalizing capitalism. The global rise of the ‘nation’ was, 
in many ways, a strategy of combined development. That the nation, analytically, has been cited 
as explanatory of variation between territorial states is something we have dealt with above, 
through Anderson. However, for postcolonial theorists, the nation was also a means to explaining 
internal variation in the operation of political rule. Rejecting Anderson’s explanation of the 
nation as a form of civic, inclusionary, horizontal equality with limited modular forms, 
postcolonial critics instead sought to argue that nationalism, outside of the colonizing core of 
Europe, was productive of internal stratification. It is to this argument that I now turn.  
Chatterjee, Nationalism and Colonial Difference 
 
 The most explicit postcolonial engagement with nationalism, vis-a-vis Anderson, is 
provided by Partha Chatterjee, whose The Nation and its Fragments critiques Anderson’s 
suggestion that early nationalisms formed modular templates to be replicated throughout the 
world. Chatterjee objected to this claim, noting that “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have 
to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to 
them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (Chatterjee, 1993, 5). 
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Crucially, Chatterjee argued that the replicability of older nationalisms does not accord “with the 
evidence on anticolonial nationalism . . . . (which was) posited not on an identity but rather on a 
difference from the ‘modular’ forms of the national society propagated by the modern West” 
(1993, 5). In India, for example, systems of internal stratification such as caste persisted in the 
modern nation-state, and as a result, Indian nationalism, owing to its organization of internally 
differentiated political subjects, cannot be understood as simply a modular replication of Western 
nationalisms. However, it was not just Anderson’s explanation, but further Marxist attempts to 
understand nationalism that were unable to explain the persistence of formally stratified levels of 
citizenship predicated on a hierarchy of socio-cultural criteria. Both cases presumed, Chatterjee 
argued, that the ‘Western’ model of the nation as internally homogenous could be applied in all 
other spaces. Where Marxism was said to hold on to the model of national homogeneity because 
of the requirements of abstract capital, for Anderson this was owing to the ostensible 
comparative effect of nationalisms that marked off the limit to which departures from the 
dominant models could be affected.  
 According to Chatterjee, the primary problem in both theories was to conflate the 
political-economic dimensions of nationalism with the cultural. Nationalism in the postcolonial 
context, for Chatterjee, is not a purely politico-economic project; it is also a distinctively cultural 
project, and the logics of the latter may at times work in contradiction to those of the former. 
Thus, in the example of India, anticolonial nationalism pursued two distinct paths; on the one 
hand, in the material realm, there was the struggle for identity or sameness, while in the 
ideological or cultural realm, it was difference that formed the basis of nationalism. The former 
was characterized by efforts to obtain equal inclusion in the state and bureaucracy, while the 
latter path was occupied with asserting and valorizing the fundamental differences that 
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characterized Indian peoples. Amongst such differences were those of religion and ideas of 
authority and order. Such a condition led to the paradoxical result of postcolonial nationalism 
combining elements of the modern Western state, yet undergirding this with systemic 
stratification of the citizen population according to caste (Chatterjee, 1993, 16-18). Chatterjee 
argues that it is necessary to regard these differences as issuing from a non-Western history and 
logic, such that they cannot be contained within the history of capitalist universalization. For, if 
modern nationalism is read through the Western history of capitalism, then it becomes necessary 
to account for Indian nationalism as merely a continuity of ‘backwardness’ or ‘tradition’. To do 
so, however, ignores the profound ruptures that colonialism brought about in Indian society. 
Instead, it is preferable for Chatterjee to read Indian nationalism as fragmentary, comprised of 
multiple and at times competing histories and logics, which are not reducible to a single, unitary 
or stable character (Chatterjee, 1993, 26-27).  
 This logic of separating the ‘traditional cultural’ from the ‘modernizing political’ aspects 
of nationalism misses a crucial aspect of national state formation in the context of global 
capitalist social relations and can be traced back to the methodological and intellectual division 
of labour I identified earlier (that of opposing the international as political economy to the 
national as culture). Rather than an ‘either-or’ ultimatum, it is instead instructive to think of these 
levels as mutually constitutive. The spread of capitalist social relations and their attempted 
reproduction has far-reaching consequences for traditional practices of elite reproduction. In 
Ethiopia, for example, Fouad Makki shows how the politically dominant Shewa Amhara sought 
to respond to capitalism’s expansionary dynamics by displacing parcellized sovereignty upwards 
in the form of an absolutist state, while naturalizing its dominance through the politicization of 
its own ethnicity via official nationalism (2011, 277). In this case, centralization of power was 
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fused with politically and ethnically constituted property relations in a way that distinguished 
Ethiopian modernity from modern sovereignty, but which nevertheless transformed existing 
dynastic practices to produce something completely new (Makki, 2011, 268).  Ethiopia’s 
cultural-ethnic aspects of nationalism were inseparable from material practices, demonstrating 
the veracity of Desai’s insistence on the materiality of nations, and the poverty of analytically 
separating political economy from culture in the study of nations (2008, 2013, 2015). 
The spread of capitalism will not necessarily subsume and obliterate all that came before 
it. In many cases traditional practices and institutions of social hierarchy and elite reproduction 
will persist. However, their interpolation with the profoundly altered material environment 
within which social reproduction takes place will also serve to alter these traditional practices. 
The outcome is neither an archaic, traditional and cultural ‘past’ nor an unencumbered, 
homogenizing modernity. Rather, the resultant conceptualization of socio-spatial, economic and 
political organization will represent a combination or amalgam of both. The combination of 
capitalist political institutions and organization with the uneven and variegated social ordering of 
authority, belonging and rights will result in novel configurations of political identity. It is in this 
way that we can begin to grasp how nationalist organization can come to embrace an internal 
heterogeneity of legal and political statuses.   
 If for Anderson, the nation cannot be built upon criteria that posit a de facto hierarchical 
ordering of the national population, for Chatterjee, this condition is an empirical reality, which 
nevertheless cannot be explained through Marxist political economy. Rather, it requires the 
positing of multiple, distinct but interactive histories that are propelled by unique ontologies and 
epistemologies. In Chapter Three, I turn to my case studies: Argentina and Canada. In both 
cases, I argue, the ‘nation’ was a deliberate political construction that affected combined 
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development in the face of growing competitive pressures in the global market for cereals 
production. In each case the nation came to be defined by racial ‘whiteness’, instilling political 
and juridical hierarchy amongst its political subjects. I aim to argue that elite modalities of 
reproduction became fused with so-called modern institutions and practices associated with 
capitalism, leading to a unique configuration of national political identities. Rather than simply a 
vestige of ‘tradition,’ I demonstrate that racial ascription was a modern category of identity 
formation, informed by the locally specific dynamics of social and property relations—
importantly, the necessity of indigenous dispossession, elimination, assimilation, and 
subordination.  
 The differential status accorded to the world’s indigenous populations, notably in settler 
colonial contexts, is a primary example of a subject status that, arguably, cannot be accounted for 
through Marxist class categories. Indigenous peoples in the settler colony were historically 
excluded from burgeoning labour markets and regarded as relics of the past, certain to disappear 
with the march of progress. Indeed, indigenous populations have historically constituted 
precisely the kind of group with which subaltern studies have been occupied. In the next section, 
I critically assess the subaltern position with reference to indigenous peoples in settler colonial 
spaces and establish the argument that I lay out in Chapter 4.  
Accounting for Non-Market Subordinated Populations: The Subaltern 
 
Developing first amongst scholars of India, notably Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak, 
subaltern studies argued that for those ‘left outside the mode of production narrative,’ the subject 
disappears from history (Spivak, 1999, 244). Indeed Spivak argues that “If . . . the mode of 
production narrative is the final reference, these (subaltern) . . . . are insufficiently represented or 
representable in that narration. We can docket them but we cannot grasp them at all” (1999, 
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244). It is thus quite sensible on the face of things to use the lens of subalterneity to look at the 
ways in which indigenous peoples have historically (though not exclusively at all) rejected or 
been excluded from the capitalist labour market.  
For Spivak, the problem with Marxist theory is that “the mode of production narrative is 
so efficient because it is constructed in terms of the most efficient and abstract coding of value, 
the economic. Thus . . . the ground-level value-codings that write these (subaltern’s) lives eludes 
(analysis)” (1999, 244). If this is the case, then how are we to account for those people who do 
not occupy the traditional spaces of the capitalist social relation, as either buyers or sellers of 
labour power? However, this problem is only so with a narrow view to capitalism; it is important 
to see capital as a social relation, in the totality and specificity of each space. Thus, for example, 
indigenous peoples’ experiences and subjectivity can be understood through the referent of 
capitalism, if we understand that what constitutes the capitalist social relation is not limited to a 
dyadic or triadic structure of capitalists, labourers (and landlords). Indigenous dispossession was 
a prior condition for the development of a property regime and the social relations necessary to 
capitalist development, and thus it is impossible to understand indigenous oppression and 
subjectivity outside of capitalist social relations. This does not, however, mean analyzing 
indigenous peoples according to whether they fit into any of the aforementioned class positions. 
Again, this is where uneven and combined development is instructive, as it enables us to grasp 
the variable nature of political and class structures under the capitalist mode of production, as a 
result of capitalist logics and technologies combining with distinct pre-capitalist arrangements. 
The results of these combinations are manifold compositions of political, property and 
production structures.  
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Along with the question of whether the ‘subaltern’ can be adequately analyzed by 
Marxism, Spivak is further concerned with whether the “men and women among the illiterate 
peasantry, Aboriginals, and the lowest strata of the urban sub-proletariat’ are positioned to both 
speak, and be heard” (1999, 269). This too bears resonance with indigenous communities who, 
when seeking redress, are forced to do so in ways commensurable with state sovereignty and 
legal norms. This suggests once more that the terms upon which modern polities (and thus their 
analysis) are predicated are not adequate spaces from which indigenous peoples can speak and be 
heard. If Indigenous peoples can only be heard when speaking through the bureaucracy of alien, 
colonial ‘sovereignty’, this is a profound mis-hearing of indigenous voices and claims 
(predicated, as they are, on a rejection of colonial sovereignty). Among those who, cautiously, 
find that the category of the subaltern has something on offer for critical indigenous studies are 
Jodi Byrd and Robert Warrior. For them, the category of subalterneity is one that allows for a 
heterogeneous understanding of the temporal, spatial and ontological/epistemic location of 
marginalized and excluded voices.  
The idea of the border as it relates to the subaltern, in postcolonial thought, is also a 
pertinent concept to critical indigenous studies, as Kevin Bruyneel, Walter Mignolo, and others 
have attempted to show. More specifically, what Mignolo has called ‘border thinking’ has been 
deployed to examine the possibilities and spaces opened through a rejection or provocation of the 
fault lines that exist at the border between the subaltern and the dominant classes (2001, xxi). In 
indigenous studies, these fault lines appear at the literal and figurative border of the colonial 
state, where simultaneous claims to sovereignty and citizenship confound and protest the 
traditional understanding of these concepts, forged as they were through an inside/outside, 
foreign/national dichotomy of colonial national state formation. As Bruyneel suggests, the 
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position of subalterneity from which indigenous peoples are said to come allows for a refusal of 
these dichotomies as false choices. There is a ‘third space of sovereignty’ that is defined both by 
‘colonial impositions and postcolonial resistances’ (2007, 217). This is to say that, contrary to 
those who would like to claim that indigenous peoples, in making fiscal or representative claims 
to the state, while also claiming sovereignty, need to ‘choose’ whether they are inside or outside 
of the state, the colonial impositions that have degraded the resources and conditions of 
indigenous livelihood necessitate claims to citizenship or state resources without delegitimizing 
simultaneous assertions of sovereignty.  
This solution is not one that is foreclosed out of hand by Marxist political economy. For, 
if as I have argued, the national state is bound into and premised upon the racialized subject 
status of indigenous peoples, it can be acknowledged that indigenous peoples have a rightful 
claim to sovereignty while also attending to the ways in which the colonial state is responsible to 
these same communities owing to its ongoing tactics of dispossessing and demolishing the very 
resources that are fundamental to political, cultural, social and biological reproduction. The idea 
of the sovereign settler colonial space is a fabrication built upon the destruction of indigenous 
peoples and their livelihoods, but the fictitiousness of the settler sovereign does not erase the 
debt owed to indigenous groups.  
That said, to show that Marxist political economy can account for these problems is not 
the same as demonstrating why and how it should supersede postcolonial analysis. While 
postcolonial analysis and the concept of subalterneity provoke essential questions, I ultimately 
want to argue that the solution is one that incurs more dangers than the potential benefits it 
offers. The problem, once again, is that there is an essential displacement of global processes of 
political economy in favour of an exclusive, localized emphasis on culture.  
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In its attempts to reject universalizing history, post-colonialism’s salve is, instead, a 
radical reinvigoration of the individual. However, in arguing vociferously for the refutation of 
the universal or collective subject, are postcolonial theorists not imposing a universal 
understanding of the ‘right’ kinds of struggle for subaltern colonial subjects? For example, an 
understanding of common and communal tradition, heritage, and identity underpins many 
indigenous groups’ claims to sovereignty, which constitute the backbone of an anti- and de-
colonial praxis. In its immoveable insistence on heterogeneity, however, it appears postcolonial 
theory denies these modalities of resistance (Shohat, 1992, 101; Weaver, 2005, 225). This brings 
to the fore the issue that not all (post-)colonial spaces are the same, and in the settler colony, the 
ongoing nature of colonization, combined with the very particular nature of settler-indigenous 
relations in the process of colonial state formation, may not be best served by the tools of 
postcolonial theory, if they are to deny collective identity.  
A common rejoinder to this critique would be to suggest that the subjectivities of 
subaltern or indigenous groups are imposed by colonial discourse, and to lay claim to these is in 
fact to reaffirm the colonial power of discourse. Thus, for example, the historical demarcation of 
indigenous groups has not accorded with their own understanding of communal identity. Treaty 
relations, blood quantum, and the distribution of identities predicated on distinctions between 
status or non-status ‘Indians’ were all the product of a violent colonial exercise of power aimed 
at the subordination and elimination of indigenous voices. Yet, as Byrd argues, this rejoinder 
poses a great threat to indigenous resistance; if indigenous identities are claimed to be historical 
fiction, government and elites can deny responsibility to and oppose any claims for redress and 
reparation (2014a, xxxiv). In other words, the cultural understanding of indigenous identity is, in 
very concrete ways, woven into material claims around territory and restitution. From this 
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vantage point, the blanket accusation that all prior forms of communal past and identity are 
‘idealizations’ is depoliticizing, and ignores the ways in which such judgements must be made in 
the political assessment of a context’s particular material and power relations. “It is no 
coincidence that just as the people of the Two-Thirds World (i.e., non-First World) begin to find 
their voices and assert their own agency and subjectivity, postmodernism proclaims the end of 
subjectivity” (Weaver, 2005, 225).  
The fundamental danger at hand is that, in much the same way as postmodernism, 
“(postcolonialism) mistakes having deconstructed something theoretically for having replaced it 
politically” (Weaver, 2005, 226). To deconstruct and delegitimize indigenous identities, without 
also providing an alternative means to collectively assert sovereign rights to land and redress, is a 
dangerous proposition that threatens to instead subsume indigenous peoples into a liberal, 
pluralist realm of voluntary, immaterial difference. In Chapter Four I argue that the constitution 
of indigenous identities as subordinate, partial or non-citizens can be understood through a 
political economy grounded in uneven and combined development. Specifically, I argue that 
indigenous peoples’ differential incorporation into the settler-state served a very material end—
the policing and denial of indigenous practice and culture provided the settler state with the 
conditions and legitimization for the generation and centralization of the material, coercive and 
administrative powers of the state. Once centralized, the state became an effective agent in the 
direction of competitive agricultural development.  
If indigenous peoples were not, in the majority, subordinated and politically constituted 
through labour relations, it remains necessary to examine how politically stratified categories of 
belonging are structured around those who are contained within the labour relation. In the settler 
colony, the labour market was populated through a variety of forms of immigration, all of which 
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were allotted to differential political status on the basis of so-called race. In the next and final 
section of this introduction, I turn to the now ubiquitous concept in immigration studies: post-
colonialism’s hybridity.   
Hybridity as Banality? 
 
The writings of Homi K. Bhabha have been central to postcolonial attempts to locate the 
particularities and differences of colonial identities. Moving through a series of developments, 
Bhabha aimed to replace universalism (understood in reference to capitalism) with multiplicities 
(understood in localized and cultural contexts) and thereby provide the basis for understanding 
modernity as heterogeneous. Through the concept of enunciation Bhabha argued that the power 
of discourse is in its active communication. The meaning and power in discourse arise at the 
moment of communication, defined by the relation between the speaker and the listener. Every 
speech-act, in other words, takes place within and constructs unique structures or (im)balances of 
power. As a result, there can never be a single instrumental intent on the part of the colonizer, 
nor can there be a singular subject formed through a given discourse. In contrast to the general 
pantheon of philosophy rooted in the Enlightenment, Bhabha constructed what he would suggest 
is a radical plurality, which is never fixed and which furthermore cannot be subjected to a single, 
linear history but instead is constitutive of diverse histories and temporalities (2004, 128).  
In part, the context for enunciation is influenced by what Bhabha referred to as mimicry. 
Mimicry is that process wherein the colonizers attempt to impose their own form of knowledge 
in a space radically different from where that knowledge emerged—and in this attempt to 
recreate or mimic the colonial culture, it is radically transformed and reflected back onto the 
colonizer. The process of mimicry gives rise to ambivalence in the process of colonial 
subjectification, reconfiguring each enunciation of colonial discourse. In seeing the colonial 
35 
 
subject ‘mimic’ the culture of the colonizer, the colonizer is shaken and unsure about the 
superiority of those very practices that were assumed of a higher order (i.e. if the ‘barbarian’ can 
speak the tongue of ‘civilization,’ how superior is the culture of the ‘civilized’?). Mimicry serves 
to alter the balance of power between speakers, such that the colonizer no longer speaks with the 
same authority, opening space for resistance and manipulation by the colonized.  Ultimately, this 
idea of mimicry is hinting at what for Bhabha is the central effect and contradiction of the 
colonial project: hybridization (2004, 128). For Bhabha the colonial subject is a hybrid subject in 
so much as this process of mimicry brings with it the introduction of ‘outsider’ forms of 
knowledge and discourse that are then reflected onto the colonizer. The introduction of these 
new forms of knowledge undermines the central authority base of the colonizer (its 
epistemological dominance), which can lead to a strategic reversal of power and open up 
grounds for intervention (2004, 129-130).  
Robert J.C. Young, an adherent to postcolonial theory himself, has undertaken a 
considered reading and critique of Bhabha. Young identifies a methodological problem with the 
concept of enunciation, which is difficult for Bhabha to escape without some recourse to the very 
forms of historical method he rejects. For if enunciation is the source of discourse’s power in a 
given moment, whose enunciation are we to privilege? The enunciation of the historian (Young, 
2008, 190)? Surely this is not Bhabha’s intent. However, in attempting to articulate the position 
of the colonizer and colonized, removed from that moment, does the interlocutor not have to fall 
back on some creeping historicism to provide the material grounds for understanding that 
moment?  
Furthermore, in the concept of hybridization, Bhabha is equally prone to universalisms. 
As Young points out, the idea of hybridization assumes some a priori discrete and pure form of 
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culture/knowledge that is fixed and thus temporally universalized at a given moment (Young, 
2008, 190). This furthermore requires falling back onto history as Bhabha must locate the 
moment of rupture or contact from which hybridization springs—this being the colonial moment 
that brings us back to the timeline of History.  
Critical race scholar David Goldberg extends this line of critique and argues that the 
concept of hybridity not only assumes a priori fixity, but this assumption of monocultural 
priority itself would have to rely upon histories of repression—monoculturalism is always 
bought at the price of repression (Goldberg, 2005, 73). Hybridity cannot be understood only as a 
modern and active rejection of the colonial encounter because its absence is historically the 
product of coercive containment and repression. To restrict the temporal location of 
heterogeneity or hybridity, as the postcolonialists do, is to ignore the ways in which “modern 
states have predicated themselves on racial differentiation and racial exclusion and exploitation. 
Thus modern states fashioned themselves, not as heterogenous spaces, but as homogenous ones, 
falsely” (Goldberg, 2008, 74).  
Bhabha’s deployment of the concept of hybridity is itself a universalization of the 
experience and ideology underpinning hybridity. That the concept is one that long predates the 
colonial encounter, while its meaning has shifted from a justification of racial categories to a 
celebration of cultural difference, suggests that hybridity needs to be contextualized by material 
and power relations for it to tell us anything of use. Absent such contextualization, hybridity is 
an historical banality, a descriptive device that could apply as far back as the first human 
migrations. Thus, as Shohat argues, there is a need to distinguish between modalities of 
hybridity; when does hybridity function as force, cooptation, conformism, and creative 
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resistance? These issues cannot be given by the concept alone, but must be informed by the 
historical and material context within which it is situated (Shohat, 1992).  
This brings me, finally, to Acheraiou’s (2011) argument that Bhabha’s methodological 
individualism, his focus on the subject alone, prevents him from understanding the geopolitical 
context within which hybridity is situated. Bhabha’s ‘third space,’ the ostensible location 
between Manichean binaries that allows for the negotiation of hybrid identities, is not neutral. 
Rather, the ‘third space’ is always conditioned by ideological power, itself premised on 
universalist assumptions which then determine the framework for cultural exchange. Regardless 
of the abstract aspirations of Bhabha’s hybridity, the material and geopolitical world continues to 
operate along binaries, myths of purity, and rigid demarcations of inside/outside. Failing to 
acknowledge this, the concept is politically neutered; at best, it is ignorant of the continuing 
operation of oppressive subject constructs (e.g. race, nationality, gender, class), and at worst, it is 
directly complicit in maintaining such constructs.  
The colonial construction of difference must be situated within its socioeconomic and 
geopolitical context for us to be able to grasp anything beyond the mere fact of ‘difference.’ Why 
are some constructed as acceptably different, and thus positioned as capable of such ‘creative 
hybridity,’ while others are deemed dangerously different, whose very prospect of hybridity is 
viewed as visceral threat? What are the different spaces within, and tools with which, such 
patterns of difference are constructed, articulated, and reproduced? It is with these questions that 
the final chapter is concerned. I argue that the ways in which hybridity is construed for different 
populations must be understood within the material and ideological framework established by the 
uneven and combined development of national configurations of political economic power and 
population.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation makes four key contributions to sociological, political and international 
literatures. In the first instance, I contribute to a range of scholarship that asks the question: how 
do we understand the relationship between violence and the modern liberal-capitalist state 
(Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Brubaker, 2004; Giddens, 1985, 1987; Losurdo, 2011; Mann, 
2004; Marx, 1998)? Are we to understand violence as a vestige of, or return to, pre-modern 
political practice? If not, are we to view liberalism’s commitment to equality and consent as 
simply a ruse? As I argued above, neither of these positions ultimately satisfies. Rather, I will be 
arguing that state violence is a constitutive aspect of modernity, and that all liberal democracies 
are critically underwritten by periods of violence and exclusion (Mann, 2004, 3,4). However, 
departing from some of the aforementioned scholars, I will argue that this ‘illiberalism’ is more 
than simply a founding moment to liberal polities. Where, for example, Mann suggests that the 
recourse to such violence marks a breakdown of liberal democracy (2004, 4), I argue that the 
relationship between illiberalism and liberalism is enduring. This is even more so for the settler 
state, in which case state consolidation is an ongoing, contested project.  
 Related to this first contribution, then, in the second place, and more pointedly, I 
contribute to a body of scholarship on nationalism that debates the relationship between nation 
and race. Specifically, I intervene to contest Anderson’s insistence that nationalism and racism 
are discrete and incompatible modalities of social identification and organization. Throughout 
this study I draw on the examples of ‘white’ Argentina and Canada to show how nation became 
irrevocably defined through racial ascription. This level of argumentation relates to the first 
inasmuch as, ultimately, Anderson’s inability to capture race as an aspect of national identity 
formation rests on his tacit acceptance of bourgeois liberal mythology, denying the central role 
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that overt inequality and coercion plays in modern liberal polities. However, it is not only 
Anderson who has faced this critique; more broadly Marxist scholarship has been accused of 
denying the salience of overt coercion and violence to liberal capitalist modernity. Marxists 
allegedly too readily accept that under capitalism exploitation is purely a matter of economics.  
 Thus, the third contribution this dissertation makes is a defense of Marxism and political 
economy in the face of these potent critiques. Specifically, I frame this dissertation in dialogue 
with one of the most representative bodies of this position: postcolonial theory. Postcolonial 
theorists have launched a scathing critique of many economistic variants of Marxism wherein the 
assumption that exploitation through the labour process is the only way that oppression occurs 
under capitalism leads to an explanation of non-consensual politics as a resurgence in ‘tradition’. 
In response, however, postcolonial theorists have outright denied the salience of political 
economy and instead turned to the materially emptied category of culture. Drawing on Political 
Marxism and Uneven and Combined Development (UCD), I show that capitalism’s historical 
and geographical specificities cannot be determined a priori, and further, that culture can be 
read, not deterministically, but relationally from the materiality of capitalism. This leads to the 
final contribution I make in this dissertation. That is, a methodological elaboration of the theory 
of UCD to take more seriously the constitutive role that ostensibly immaterial factors (culture, 
subjectivity, ideology) play in the reproduction of capitalist social relations.  
 In this study I use the concept of UCD to show how nationalism and race (seemingly 
cultural factors) were deployed as strategies of late development, or material ‘catch-up,’ in the 
context of an emergent nineteenth-century global agrarian market for cereals. I draw UCD out of 
its Eurocentric moorings by situating the fact of combined development in the contradiction- and 
tension-driven expansion of capitalist social relations throughout the Atlantic. In so doing, I 
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show that capitalism is always, and from the beginning, bound to heterogenous manifestations, 
and that the so-called immaterial practices of identity formation are, in fact, materially central 
and productive strategies for advancing capitalist state development. The concept of UCD allows 
me to respond to the postcolonial critique of Marxist theory, while the content of this critique 
allows me to creatively advance and extend the utility of UCD.  
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Chapter 1  Against the Bourgeois Myth of Capitalism as Homogenization: 
Geopolitical, Spatial, and Historical Heterogeneity in Capitalist Subject 
Formation 
 
 In this chapter I aim to lay out the theoretical premises of this study. To do this I will 
navigate several layers of analysis, moving through the specific, to the abstract, and then back to 
the specific. First, I will establish that Marxist theory is fully capable of accounting for variation 
in the expression of capitalist social relations. Specifically I will point to Political Marxism, and 
argue for its potential in explaining illiberal practices of population management and 
stratification within the capitalist mode of production. To do this, I review Robbie Shilliam’s 
work (2009a), which utilizes the concept of social property relations to argue that the ‘classical 
liberal subject’ of England was a contingent, rather than necessary, product of capitalism. 
Understanding the contingency of the liberal subject, Shilliam is then able to account for the very 
different forms of political subjectivity that developed in France. While not following blindly 
from the English model, the account of French subject formation is nevertheless understood with 
reference to capitalism. This analysis provides, at the most general level, the framework for my 
own examination of divergent and illiberal models of subjectivity in Argentina and Canada. 
However, this initial account from Shilliam is contained within Europe, and tightly bound into an 
understanding of geopolitical relations that were specific to the continental experience. As such, 
I build upon Shilliam’s argument to develop an explanation for the spread of capitalist social 
relations outside of Europe.  
  Underlying Shilliam’s specific analysis of the social property relations attendant to 
continental European subject formation is a unique appropriation of Leon Trotsky’s theory of 
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uneven and combined development (UCD). It is through the theory of UCD that Shilliam is able 
to explain how actors rooted in capitalist and non-capitalist social property relations interacted to 
produce novel, modern forms of political association. In order to move the analysis outside of 
Europe, I too pull from UCD, and thus in the next section I develop my own position within the 
UCD literature, addressing debates as to the causal role of UCD, its potential Eurocentrism and 
instrumentalism. I draw creatively from a number of UCD scholars to advance a framework 
shorn of its Eurocentrism and instrumentalism. 
     In the final sections, I apply the abstract principles discussed in the first half of the 
chapter to the settler colonial context, and propose a broad theoretical sketch of how I aim to 
illuminate the illiberal production of liberal states. That is, I lead the reader through an overview 
of the relationship between racial hierarchies of subjectivity and national-state formation within a 
capitalist world market. My argument is that ‘race,’ as an illiberal mode of political designation, 
was constructed and deployed in the interests of liberal state building.   
Subjectivity and Capital: The Contingency of the Impersonal Individual 
 
 In this section, I examine Robbie Shilliam’s account of the origins of the quintessential 
capitalist subject in England to show that the form and content of subjectivity are not 
functionally determined by the mode of production. Rather, subjectivities are politically 
constructed with the objective of naturalizing the conditions necessary for the reproduction of 
dominant class forces—notably by legitimating the conditions necessary for the accumulation of 
surplus (Sayer and Corrigan, 1985, 6). Bec 
ause the conditions necessary for class reproduction and surplus accumulation are embedded in 
historical and geographically uneven space, there can never really be a singular subject form. 
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This is true even under capitalism, which alongside liberalism relies on the myth of an abstract 
universal subject.  
I will draw out the Political Marxist concept of social property relations, which refers to 
the ways in which the relations amongst individuals (relations of duty, obligation rights, 
reciprocity, etc.) are informed by the societal treatment and distribution of land as property. 
These relations, in early agrarian societies, defined the parameters of social reproduction and 
hence the relationship between political authority and subjects (Brenner, 1982, 87-89).  I hone in 
on how variable social property relations were combined with the imperatives and institutions 
generated by competitive capitalist markets; what emerged were specific struggles and obstacles 
to the consolidation of a national-state in response to globalized competitive accumulation.  
To explain the relationship between property, social reproduction, and political authority 
it is instructive to contrast feudal and capitalist social property relations in England. Within 
English feudalism, the relationship between peasants and lords determined unequal but 
reciprocal rights and duties of both parties. These relations were written into the copyholds of 
each manor, and accordingly, multiple, distinct, and at times overlapping sets of rights and duties 
co-existed (Shilliam, 2009b, 32). In general, peasants were granted access to land in order to 
fulfill their immediate subsistence needs, but subjected to political forms of surplus appropriation 
in exchange for this access. The peasant as a political subject was defined in relation to their 
immediate lord, dictating a differentiated relationship to subsistence and consumption. One was 
born into their rank, which was maintained through illiberal practices of coercion. This meant 
that within feudal England, political status was hierarchically organized, and authority was itself 
heterogeneous. Such arrangements of subjectivity have been understood as antithetical to the 
capitalist mode of production because there was little incentive to increase productive efficiency. 
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While situated in a constellation of political inequality, peasants held access to their basic means 
of reproduction, and so long as this was sufficient to meet their personal consumption needs and 
obligations to feudal landlords, there appeared no compulsion to increase productivity (Shilliam, 
2009b, 31-32). Thus under feudalism the distribution of land (passed on through lineages of 
privilege) ensured that coerced and localized relations of reciprocal reproduction existed (the 
peasant relying on access to land, the lord relying on the production of the peasant), which led to 
multiple, personalized forms of political authority (that were determined between the specific 
lord and peasant). 
 In England, this arrangement of feudal power was disrupted by the Black Death and 
subsequent enclosure movement. The rate of taxation or rent imposed upon peasants was de-
coupled from custom and rose disproportionately owing to the drastic reduction of the peasant 
population. Peasants were increasingly forced to relinquish their tenures, losing direct access to 
their means of reproduction. As such, there arose a radical reformulation of political authority 
and the rights and duties associated with social reproduction. Importantly, land was removed 
from the socialized and reciprocal equation of rights and obligations. As property was 
increasingly privatized, its use was divested of any form of social obligation to reproduction. 
With the reallocation of reproduction away from political authority and onto the market, ‘neutral’ 
and disinterested market mechanisms rather than personalized political power dictated the 
distribution of socio-economic power. This surface-level extraction of political from economic 
power allowed for a potential levelling out of subjectivity, in that individual characteristics and 
qualities no longer formally governed hierarchies of status (Shilliam, 2009b, 33-34). Because 
access to land was no longer bound into political privilege, anyone could theoretically own 
property. Political subjectivity could then be understood through universal rights and obligations 
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to an ‘economically disinterested’ and neutral state (Shilliam, 2009b, 34-35; Wood, 2012, 189). 
The ‘individual’ thus existed in relation to an ‘impersonal’ sovereign—the state. Hence the 
transition to agrarian capitalism in England brought with it the rise of what Shilliam has termed 
the ‘impersonal individual.’  
The levelling out of subjectivity rested upon the positing of a homogenous set of cultural 
qualities that would mark out state belonging. In The Great Arch: English State Formation as 
Cultural Revolution, Derek Sayer and Phillip Corrigan show how moral and cultural regulation 
were important tools used to mark out appropriate expressions of ‘Englishness’ from which 
personal liberty could be experienced (Sayer and Corrigan, 1985, 142). So, for example, 
Englishness rested on assumptions of masculinity, which de facto excluded women from the 
public domain and led to a differential capacity to access the state (Sayer and Corrigan, 1985, 
133). In creating the conditions for formal equality of status, then, the state first had to segregate, 
exclude, and coercively regulate parts of the population. Rather than the ‘free and liberal’ worker 
emerging automatically from reconfigured production relations, the classical model of liberal 
subjectivity in England was itself produced and maintained through illiberal practices. Sayer and 
Corrigan’s argument regarding the formation of public identities, moralities, and state power in 
England resonates with the case studies to follow, with the crucial difference that in the settler 
colony, cultural formation is a thoroughly racialized phenomena. The neutral category, or 
assumed subject, is not only male, but he is white as well.  
Political subjectivity mediates our relationship with historically and geographically 
specific constellations of political authority, modes of production and social reproduction. 
Understanding this allows for a view to the differential manifestation of political subjectivities 
and practices of exploitation that cannot be functionally reduced to an economistic reading of the 
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laws of motion of the mode of production. Thus, while the subject was understood through the 
lens of formal equality in England, modern political power and relationships took on different 
forms elsewhere.  
Uneven and Combined Development and the Jacobin Subject 
 
 One of the ways this differential manifestation of modern subjectivities assumed under 
globalizing capitalist social relations can be seen is in Robbie Shilliam’s analysis of the Jacobin 
subject in France. Shilliam shows how subsequent developments of political subjectivities were 
intimately bound into the geopolitical and economic competitive pressures generated by uneven 
development. The impersonal individual of England was “implicated in the Anglo-French 
colonial contest of geopolitical accumulation, creating a sense of comparative backwardness 
within the French ruling strata” (2009b, 32). Shilliam’s argument about the geopolitical contest 
over colonial spoils between Britain and France rests on the differentiation between sovereignties 
and military capacities possessed by each state.  
In Britain, the depersonalization of politics meant the creation of a sovereign body that 
was divested of particularistic privilege. Thus, rather than the monarch, it was the parliament that 
incurred debt and was responsible for the collection of tax revenues. The collection of taxes, 
shorn of the feudal hierarchy of privilege and evasion, was now relatively transparent and 
systematic. This reliable and transparent system of tax collection lent the British parliament 
credibility when dealing with creditors. As a result, long-term borrowing soon replaced short-
term and debt was accrued on the basis of the state’s ability to pay interest rather than to pay 
back the principle. This type of taxation also served to further entrench the centralization of 
political apparatuses. Geopolitically, this development had consequences for the colonial contest 
playing out in continental Europe. The British state was both financially and structurally better 
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equipped to make geopolitical decisions and finance those decisions through naval and military 
spending, and this would come to exert pressure on the French state (Shilliam, 2009b, 38).  
 In contrast, the French mode of tax collection was still mired in feudal systems of 
privilege, such that the collection of tax revenues was erratic and unreliable. Administered 
through the venal office, taxation was evaded in a widespread practice owing to the highly 
personalized nature of the crown. At the same time, because the collection of tax revenue was 
unreliable, state funds tended to be accrued through the sale of privilege over certain trades. In 
this sense, the colonial contest, rather than managed from a cohesive centre, was inconsistent due 
to the myriad and differential interests represented by each trade. Thus, in France, colonialism 
actually served to further entrench particular interests, as colonial and metropolitan markets were 
not linked in any systemic manner under the French. Finally, given the opacity of taxation and its 
unreliability, the king, rather than the French state, was the major debtor of the nation and this 
largely occurred through short-term borrowing on the basis of repayment of the principle 
(Shilliam, 2009b, 38-40).  
 These differences, revealed in the colonial contest, created within the French state a 
consciousness of its own political disadvantages and generated pressures to reform the system of 
taxation. However, the transparent and systematized taxation of the British state was, in large 
part, owing to the transformation of social property relations and subjectivities that posited an 
impersonal political realm of equality as separate from the economic realm. Thus, taxation was 
administered and collected without the trappings of personal privilege. In the French system, the 
persistence of hierarchical privileges and access to the crown rendered taxation an erratic and 
unpredictable system, creating uncertainty in revenues, hence the borrowing of the French state. 
The French could not, therefore, transition to a British model of taxation without a concomitant 
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reorganization of the underlying social property relations and a universalization of political 
subjectivities. Thus, when the French began to attempt to graft on elements of the ‘impersonal 
individual,’ it was without fundamentally reorganizing domestic social property relations. This 
combined form of development produced an amalgam political subject that Shilliam refers to as 
the ‘impersonal collective’ (2009, 21).  
 Because the French had not yet transformed their property relations, there existed no 
space within which formal political equality could be erected. In Britain, this space was ‘civil 
society,’ the result of the enclosures and the removal of property from the price mechanism 
attached to political privilege and manorial custom. In France, no such space existed in which to 
institutionalize free and equal rights of the subject (Shilliam, 2009b, 43). Thus, the French had to 
perform a substitution, taking the form of the Third Estate. However, the Third Estate was 
nevertheless structured internally by hierarchy: the bourgeoisie, urban workers and peasants 
(Shilliam, 2009b, 44). In order to resolve this contradiction, the Jacobin Constitution of 1793, 
while proclaiming the inalienable rights of property ownership, was nevertheless mediated by 
Robespierre’s conception of the general will, such that property (attached to personalized power) 
was to secure common welfare (collective), and citizenship was therefore defined as separate 
from property qualifications (Shilliam, 200b9, 46). The impersonal individual of England was 
transformed into the impersonal collective of Jacobin France. Thus, in contrast to England where 
property itself constituted the precondition for equal political rights, in France (given the absence 
of mass expropriation) it was the ‘general will’ or collective social obligations which provided 
this precondition.   
 I have argued, through a review of Marxist scholars Shilliam, Corrigan and Sayer, that 
the politically disinterested state and the ‘impersonal individual’ are not the natural outcomes of 
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capitalist social relations; rather subjectivity is politically constituted. In the next section, I begin 
to develop a theoretical framework that extends the geographically limited understanding of the 
uneven and combined development of political subjectivity outlined thus far. To do this, I first 
review the primary and secondary literature on uneven and combined development in order to 
specify my own position within what is a broader debate on the relationship of the concept to the 
capitalist mode of production. Having staked my position, I turn to examine how the globally 
uneven spread of capitalist social relations generated a form of combined development that 
entailed the concerted organization of political subjectivities through national articulations of the 
state. I argue that nationalism, understood as a product of combined development, rather than 
simply as a response to endogenous processes, reveals the ways in which so-called liberal 
political formations are underwritten by illiberal hierarchies of subjectivity, specifically as 
defined by ‘race’ in the settler-colony. 
Uneven and Combined Development: From Trotsky to Rosenberg 
 
In the first chapter of The History of the Russian Revolution Leon Trotsky argued that 
unevenness constitutes the most basic law of human existence; this law was understood as the 
product of differences in geographical, historical, spatial, cultural, demographic and 
technological characteristics. Given this basic law, Trotsky argued that the social development of 
societies would also be uneven, juxtaposing on a world scale the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ 
(Trotsky, 2000). This basic recognition in many ways accounts for the problematic posed by 
postcolonial theory—that de facto, starting points are materially, socially and politically 
different, such that we cannot assume a convergence of development. When situated within the 
capitalist mode of production, such differences are sharpened, and economic, political and 
military pressures to achieve similar patterns and processes of development emerge. For Trotsky, 
50 
 
the coercive power of capital creates a dichotomous image of the world as ‘advanced’ or 
‘backward.’ However, contrary to the postcolonial critique, recognizing this power does not 
necessarily commit us to a normative conclusion about the moral-intellectual value of such 
differences. To suggest that capitalism creates a world in which societies are measured by their 
quantitative output in production and capital accumulation is not to suggest that the valuation of 
societies according to this metric is morally justifiable. Nevertheless, to ignore these very real 
socio-economic, political and military pressures to adapt would be historically ignorant.  
Furthermore, recognizing the dominance of capitalism in the late nineteenth century, and 
its generation of pressures to adapt, does not entail a denial of actors’ agency. While capitalism 
exerts pressures to adapt, it is not the case that all actors respond in a process of automatic and 
unreflective repetition and reproduction. Indeed, Trotsky argued “a backward country assimilates 
the material and intellectual conquests of the advanced countries. But this does not mean that it 
follows them slavishly, reproduces all the stages of the past” (Trotsky, 2000, 2). For Trotsky, 
unevenness laid the foundation for processes of comparison and interaction, which compelled 
those societies whose historical condition was deemed unfavorable for continued production and 
reproduction to adapt the techniques and strategies of the more favourable socio-economic 
systems in order to ‘catch-up’ (Trotsky, 2000, 2). 
 Combined development speaks to the adaptation of ‘advanced’ mechanisms and 
technologies to so-called ‘backward’ social formations, implying that actors respond 
intentionally and discerningly to global pressures. As a consequence, unevenness enables a 
comprehension of differential forms of state formation and accumulation processes within the 
broader history of capitalist development. It departs from the idea that capitalism universalizes a 
particular political form, set of power relations, or production techniques. Instead UCD points to 
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the fact that what capitalism universalizes is a particular model of social reproduction, which is 
rooted in the production and accumulation of surplus value. How this production and 
accumulation are socially and politically organized, however, remains open to historical and 
spatial specification, depending on the conscious and unconscious strategies of local populations 
to prop up or maintain existing cultural, material, political and social institutions or practices in 
the face of pressures to adapt. 
What Trotsky developed through these observations was a schematic for understanding 
the unpredictable and variable nature of capitalist transformations throughout the world, once the 
mode of production had acquired its universalizing tendency. Trotsky’s concept of UCD adds a 
lateral dimension to the explanation of the dynamics of change within capitalist production: that 
of competition (Ashman, 2009, 31). Methodologically this concept is unique in that it recognizes 
the interactivity between domestic and international processes, and it is for this reason that it has 
recently been revived in the field of international relations. 
 Leading this revival has been Justin Rosenberg, with his 1996 Isaac Deutscher memorial 
lecture, later published in New Left Review as “Isaac Deutscher and the Lost History of 
International Relations.” In these pieces, Rosenberg argued for the novelty and ingenuity of the 
concept in the study of international relations. For Rosenberg, the novelty of UCD was its 
potential to move beyond disciplinary silos focused exclusively on sociological or geopolitical 
mechanisms of causality (Rosenberg, 1996, 10). Methodologically, UCD could bridge these 
divides and show how international and domestic social processes interact meaningfully. It is on 
this basis that a robust literature on UCD has been generated. However, Rosenberg later departed 
from this initial argument, creating a rift within the community of scholars working with UCD, 
so I will need to clarify my use of the concept (Rosenberg, 2009. 108).  
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 Rosenberg’s shift was a controversial one in that he sought to move UCD from a 
methodological frame (one that integrates sociological and geopolitical analyses) to a general 
theory. Specifically, he attempted to use UCD to explain the fact of ‘the international’ itself 
(2010, 175). This move required an extension of Trotsky’s concept beyond the capitalist mode of 
production, stretching it to become a generalized, universal phenomena. Because for Trotsky 
combined development occurred as a result of the coercive power of capitalist accumulation 
(Davidson, 2009, 19), many have suggested that Rosenberg’s newest project has emptied UCD 
of any explanatory or illuminating power. Indeed, this is how I read Rosenberg’s recent work, 
and as such it should be clearly stated that my deployment of UCD is one that is firmly rooted in 
an understanding of capitalism as the catalytic element of combined development.  
In their contribution to the inaugural debate on UCD within the Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, Jamie Allinson and Alex Anievas took up the problem of general 
abstractions within Rosenberg’s deployment of UCD (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 49). While 
agreeing with Rosenberg that there is a latent, if mundane, way in which UCD can be read 
transhistorically, the authors firmly argued that its causal significance could only be fully 
activated under the conditions of capitalist competition (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 48). 
Rosenberg’s method of abstraction, the authors argued, was fully at odds with the methodologies 
of Marxist sociological theory. Instead, they argued that as per Marx’s methodology, a general 
abstraction should be utilized as the basis from which to posit a presupposition, which could then 
account for a concrete general condition whose historical form is nonetheless explained by 
further categories and concepts (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 56). In this more nuanced sense, 
UCD can be posited as a transhistoric general abstraction only if it is situated in a mode of 
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production analysis, which gives us the historical material with which to make sense of its 
particular operation within a given historical juncture (Allinson & Anievas, 2009, 55).  
Likewise, Neil Davidson opposed Rosenberg’s extension of UCD, noting that  
Before capitalism all societies, with the exception of those based on slavery, were based 
on variations of the same mode of production involving surplus extraction from a class of 
peasants and taking either a ‘feudal’ or ‘tributary’ form . . . . they were not sufficiently 
differentiated from each other for elements to ‘combine’ to any effect. The very terms 
that Trotsky uses in describing combination . . . were unthinkable until capitalism (2009, 
18). 
 
It was only under the dynamism unleashed by industrial capitalism that combination became 
“inescapable, as all aspects of existing society registered the impact on them . . . of this radically 
new means of exploitation” (Davidson, 2009, 18). Indeed, the early Rosenberg recognized this 
when he suggested that not only did the world change with capitalism, but the nature of historical 
change, its meaning and effects, changed also (Rosenberg, 2007, 456).  
UCD is situated within a contested territory whereby two camps struggle over the 
appropriate interpretation and extension of the concept, and it is within this territory that I must 
necessarily situate myself. My usage of uneven and combined development is in keeping with 
the more limited, capital-centric camp, and as such, is in large part a methodological approach. It 
is a response to some of the critical issues that arise from Rosenberg’s initial intervention, 
namely a tension between sociological and geopolitical levels of analyses. It is also, moreover, 
an engagement with Radhika Desai’s call to move beyond a disciplinary division that has too 
often made analyses of capitalism the exclusive domain of political economy and nationalism, 
that of cultural studies (Desai, 2008, 398). In the former case, sociological forms of explanation 
have tended to assume purely endogenous analyses of development, often neglecting the role that 
inter-societal relations play in sociological developments. This neglect has often been the 
shortcoming of postcolonial theorisations, which view national formulations as purely cultural 
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phenomena responding to internal dynamics. On the other hand, however, purely geopolitical 
forms of explanation often take sociological developments to be the function of instrumentalism 
at the international level (which is in large part the critique levied by postcolonial theorists). In 
this case, the dictates of political economy are supposed to causally influence domestic 
formulations. Rather than take the colony (or nation) and empire (or the international) as distinct 
levels of analysis, it is instructive to follow Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler’s argument that 
both colony and metropole, culture and political economy, national and international, must be 
taken up in a common analytical framework (1997). This is where the import of uneven and 
combined development comes in.  
Despite all of the promise held out by UCD, its dominant use has tended towards 
Eurocentrism and technological instrumentalism. I intend to draw from and develop certain 
critical and creative currents of UCD, found in the works of Radhika Desai, Robbie Shilliam, and 
Luke Cooper, among others. Each takes up Trotsky’s insights as to the nature of intersocietal 
transformation under capitalism to explicate the variation in state and subject forms produced 
under the spread of capitalist social relations.  
Uneven and Combined Development: Re-centering Capitalism’s Contradictions and 
Moving Beyond Technical Combination 
 
In his more recent work, Robbie Shilliam has developed a creative reworking that moves 
away from Europe, and instead posits the Atlantic as a crucial space for the promulgation of 
UCD (2009a). Specifically, Shilliam examines Caribbean colonization and the Atlantic slave 
trade to demonstrate how certain social and cultural developments functioned to draw together 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ making possible diachronous socio-economic and political 
transformations. Indeed, “the development of European settler colonies rarely reflected the 
wishes of the metropolitan powers . . . who expected the European moral and social order to be 
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transplanted unproblematically” (Shilliam, 2009a, 78). Instead, what Shilliam finds are attempts 
to produce identities that articulated autonomy from their old European powers and that 
supplanted indigenous peoples’ claims to ‘nativity.’ These identities coalesced around a racial 
grammar of ‘black’ and ‘white’ in order to give colonial ‘nativity’ a common referent beyond 
‘Europeanness,’ which was conceived in relation to the use of black slavery (2009a, 79).  
 Shilliam’s creative usage of UCD is a necessary departure from what has tended to be an 
often Eurocentric and rather technical debate. That is, most processes of UCD are seen as 
emanating from Europe and resulting in transfers of material technology that directly intervene 
in the class organization of production. What Shilliam advances is a process of UCD that 
emanates from the Atlantic as a space of uneven exchange between Europe, Africa, and the 
Americas. These exchanges, furthermore, entail social rather than material technological 
transfers to indirectly intervene in class organization through the production of subjectivities. 
However, Shilliam’s discussion is limited in its wider application as a result of the temporal 
constraints of his project.   
The placement of the Atlantic as a vector of UCD throughout the eighteenth century 
offers no real ‘whip of external necessity.’ This lack is owing to the relative absence of a 
competitive market or geopolitical competition to act as the impetus for ‘catch-up.’ Up until the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the globe was dominated by modes of production that lacked 
the structural kinds of contradictions that impel expansionary tendencies, and as a result 
‘combination’ could not be in operation. Instead, Shilliam’s Atlantic vector operates in an 
historical space dominated by a slave sugar plantation economy, which is subjected to the 
conditions of mercantilist colonialism. Under this system, the sugar trade was firstly limited to 
export to Britain under the Navigation Acts, which was, secondly, compensated for through a 
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preferential tariff, originating in the 1660 ‘Old Subsidy,’ and which thirdly, was bound into a 
reciprocal guarantee on the part of Britain to provide for the protection of the colony in cases of 
geo-political conflict (Livingston Schuyler, 1917, 432; Semmel, 1970). As such, the British West 
Indies were given a relative monopoly in the British sugar market, and were prevented from 
trading with other partners, meaning there was little incentive to revolutionize sugar production 
under conditions of competitive coercion; there was no impetus for ‘combined’ development. 
Furthermore, owing to the guarantee of imperial protection, the colonies did not suffer from the 
kind of geo-political pressures that might similarly stimulate a need to transform socio-economic 
structures. There was, in fact, no ‘whip of external necessity’ in the Caribbean colonies. 
Nevertheless, with some temporal repositioning, Shilliam’s insights are integral in order to elide 
the scholarly binaries often presented between political economy and culture, national and 
international, while giving life to the Atlantic as a formative space through which intersocietal 
relations take shape.  
To achieve this temporal repositioning, I draw from Radhika Desai and her concept of 
geopolitical economy. Desai’s development of geopolitical economy achieves the kind of 
temporal repositioning of UCD that is necessary for my project. Rooted firmly in the 
contradictions of nineteenth-century British industrialization, Desai’s work shows how Trotsky’s 
‘whip of external necessity’ was produced through a politically mediated expansion of the law of 
value. Focusing on crisis as the impetus behind the externalization of capitalist social relations 
thereby situates capitalist globality in the fact of combination; responses to crisis were sought in 
the extension of capitalist social relations beyond their European core, which would eventuate in 
‘combined’ development.  As I will show in the next chapter, this resolution to crisis was, 
importantly, resolved through an extension of the market throughout the Atlantic world. 
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Understanding capitalist globalization as combined development generates an interpretation of 
capitalist modernity that insists on its heterogeneity, rather than a homogenous liberal form 
(Desai, 2008, 2013, 2015).  
This runs contrary to much of the nineteenth-century historiography (including Marxist) 
that reads the expansion of capitalism as the product of liberal free trade (2008, 398; 2015, 453). 
Instead, Desai identifies the national form as a distinct and deliberate response to the pressures of 
global capital, highlighting the central role of politics in mediating the universal tendencies of 
capitalism (2008, 398). The nation emerged as a strategy of combined development that could 
organize and advance political and economic exigencies, mobilizing legitimacy and support 
through culturalist discourses and claims of territoriality (Desai, 2008, 398). Nationalism in this 
late nineteenth-century period of crisis is thus rooted in the materiality of capitalist social 
relations, which nevertheless takes seriously the political and cultural forms that arise from or 
facilitate such expansion. This is what Desai refers to as the ‘materiality of nations,’ which refers 
to the “material importance of nations to the populations that compose them, to the pattern and 
pace of capitalism’s spread around the word, and to its world order” (Desai, 2012, 48). By 
positioning the nation as a strategic response to the pressures of globalizing competitive market 
relations, Desai is able to connect cultural and material relations without relying on economic 
determinism (2008, 405; see also Teschke, 2003, 265).  
In working through the implications of Desai’s argument for my own interpretation of the 
‘Atlantic as a vector of UCD,’ I am suggesting that the crisis tendencies of British 
industrialization created a centrifugal force in the Atlantic through the emergence of a 
competitive agricultural market subject to capitalism’s coercive pressures of adaptation. 
Specifically, the Atlantic vector developed through the ending of imperial preference and 
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through the emergent specter of U.S. agricultural goods (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, 
Harley, 1980; Semmel, 1970; Rothstein, 1960). The repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) and 
Navigation Acts (1849) brought to an end the era of mercantilist imperialism, and ushered in an 
era of what Gallagher and Robinson (1953) have famously termed the ‘imperialism of free 
trade,’ or which, in a similar vein, Bernard Semmel (1970) refers to as ‘free trade imperialism.’ 
As I will show in Chapter 2, this transformation resulted from Britain reaching the limits of the 
‘field of employment’ for domestic capital and labour, necessitating an outward expansion for 
profitable employment. In other words, the spread of capitalist social relations proceeded not 
through an inevitable superiority, but through a deliberate and political process of managing for 
the contradictions of capitalism itself (Desai, 2015, 453).  
The outward expansion of capitalist social relations found expression in the migration of 
massive quantities of labour and capital across the Atlantic and into the New World, generating 
the first globally competitive commodity markets (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989). To make 
emigrating labour and capital productive meant to impress certain social relations into the ‘New 
World’ such that the expansion of capital was advanced through combined development (Desai, 
2015, 453). Thus, labour and capital issuing from different sets of social property relations were 
combined with New World class and property relations and deployed in a project of socio-
economic ‘catch-up,’ all of which provided the material for the national-state to politically direct 
developmental processes. In general, development in this period could not simply replicate the 
patterns established in Europe, but had to contend with specific local exigencies. In the cases I 
present throughout this dissertation, the central local contradiction was that of indigenous 
priority, which required that the nation be materially formed through practices of indigenous 
dispossession and elimination, and conceptually understood through racial distinctions.  
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In sum, I read the nineteenth-century growth of global capitalist markets as a key site 
through which to investigate the confluence of liberal and illiberal practices, and the material 
relationship between capitalism and the production of cultural and ideological referents for 
subjectivity. In this reading, the nation becomes the political and cultural node of mediation and 
direction, formed through the assimilation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ technologies with the objective of 
socio-economic ‘development.’ 
The ‘nation,’ for Desai, forms a material and ideological basis through which elite classes 
shore up their own reproduction and respond to unevenness generated by international 
competition (2008, 405). Primarily this occurs through attempts to achieve the centralization and 
monopolization of property, coercion, and fiduciary capacity. In the Atlantic context, this process 
occurs alongside the reality of indigenous priority and, as a consequence, nationalism and the 
parameters of ‘liberal inclusion’ have assumed a racial grammar. The modification of ‘liberal 
inclusion,’ however, is not exclusive to the settler colony. The idea of national universal 
citizenship has always been politically mediated by determinations as to who is included, and 
how. Rather, it is that these contours came to be expressed in racial terms, in ways that were in 
fact formative to the state itself, which is unique in the settler space.  
Subjectivities in the Settler Colonial Context 
 
 In this final section I argue that the variable social relations that underpinned the settler 
state (in contrast to continental European states) generated the impetus to a confluence of racial 
and national boundaries. Understood in terms of social relations, settler colonialism is in a very 
meaningful way distinct from both the non-colonial state and the direct colonial state. Patrick 
Wolfe is perhaps the most prominent scholar to articulate this specificity in settler colonialism 
when he argues that the central logic of settler colonialism is elimination; this logic exists 
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because settler colonialism is driven by a thirst for land (rather than labour) (Wolfe, 2006, 388). 
Elimination was thus a material as well as social and relational necessity for the particular form 
of exploitation that settler colonialism embodied, with profound ramifications for the nature of 
state building. 
 This logic of elimination, as Lorenzo Veracini notes, is in sharp contrast to the logic of 
colonialism. The indigenous peoples who are to be eliminated under settler colonialism are 
instead retained and controlled for their labour power under colonialism (2015, 25). Likewise, it 
is important to recall that the expropriated peasants in England were integrated into labour 
markets following (and ultimately as an objective of) their dispossession, which distinguishes 
continental European state-building processes from those in the settler colony. What this means 
is that the types of relations between the exploiter and exploited in these different spaces are 
structurally distinct. While the subordinating relationship between the colonizer and colonized 
under colonialism must be ever-present and explicit, under settler colonialism the objective is for 
this relation to disappear. First, the logic of elimination suggests that the relationship between 
colonizer and colonized is a terminal one. With elimination as its objective, settler colonialism 
presupposes that a colonizer-colonized relation will be superseded.  In the second instance, 
because settler-colonialism seeks to replace and occupy in perpetuity, the establishment of a 
façade of settler indigeneity becomes a necessary objective. This is to say that along with 
elimination, the settler asserts itself as the original inhabitant and hence erases from public view 
the original relation between the colonizer and colonized (Veracini, 2015, 26). The aim, then, of 
the settler relationship is the eventual non- or asymmetrical recognition of indigenous peoples as 
political subjects; either refusing to acknowledge the continuity of indigenous existence, or else 
placing indigenous peoples in a subordinate political relationship to the sovereign (see, for 
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example, Coulthard, 2015). Such refusal or subordination is necessary in the construction and 
maintenance of the settler as a political subject and de facto differentiates indigenous and settler 
political subjectivities. 
 As a means of asserting a sovereign claim over occupied land—a claim that displaces the 
indigenous population—a sense of ‘we’ the settlers needed to be formed over and above ‘they’ 
the indigenous.7 While the precise ways in which the settler population was bound was derived 
from each space’s configuration of social relations and the organization and distribution of 
property, the general condition of dispossession without political-economic inclusion represents 
a common attribute of the settler colony that generates this compulsion. The configuration of a 
‘people’ is intimately bound into notions of economic development that eventuate the need for a 
reliable tax base, state legitimacy and borrowing capacities. A ‘national state’ and ‘national 
peoples’ are, far from simply cultural artifacts, material consequences of a universalizing law of 
value in an uneven and combined international system, as well as the material preconditions for 
specific capitalist formations (Desai, 2015, 451). This nation is all the more necessary in the 
settler context
                                                     
7 Anthony Marx makes this argument in his examination of racial nation formation in the U.S., South Africa and 
Brazil. Marx suggests that a racial grammar of whiteness came to permeate national imaginaries as a means of 
quelling inter-elite conflict and asserting a united front against exploited black populations (Marx, 1998).  
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as settler populations are often spread over a large, infrastructurally and institutionally 
underdeveloped or fragmented territory, while settlers themselves are internally diverse, coming 
from varied European countries and thus lacking a common social bond. Thus, as Fouad Makki 
has argued, “rather than . . . an ancillary outcome of structural transformations, the nation-state . . 
.  came to provide the very basis of state legitimacy (2011, 268). Official attempts to build a 
settler political subject was a tool used by the settler state to establish, regularize and normalize 
the social and material conditions necessary for the accumulation of surplus value.  
In the settler colony, the conditions that had preceded the organization of a national and 
competitive economy in Britain, described by Tom Nairn as characterized by “slow and 
conventional growth” (2003, 7), such as mass expropriation, competitive and marketized land 
distribution, proletarianization, or the erection of a tax base to fund national economic 
development, could not find a universal referent in the way that the English had. Mass 
expropriation in the settler colony did not lead to a common market dependency, but instead 
required a) the non-recognition of the expropriated and their exclusion from the market and body 
politic, and involved b) a politically mediated distribution of land, apart from the market price. If 
broad market dependency as the condition for universal referents could not be attained in the 
settler colony, a process of substitution was necessary. I will argue that the idea of national 
whiteness was substituted as a means to build state legitimacy, the powers of central taxation and 
a monopoly on land (rather than as a condition of those processes, as was the case in England). 
This construction of whiteness would come to bind together settlers in a process of nonreciprocal 
subject formation, over and against indigenous and later immigrant populations.  
Conclusion 
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 In this chapter I have argued, at an abstract, theoretical level, that Marxist theory is not 
bound to a universalizing, economically reductionist reading of capitalism. The problems with 
this kind of reading, as identified by the post-colonial theorists discussed in the introduction, are 
significant. For, if Marxist theory cannot account for variation in the manifestation and 
management of capitalism, it cannot take into account the different ways in which populations 
are violently coerced, the salience that ideological and cultural constructs can play, and the ways 
in which populations are divided by more than just class. If this is the case, then Marxism is at 
risk of replicating that which it was intended to contest—that is, the bourgeois myth of liberal 
affability, freedom and individualism.  
 In my defence of Marxist political economy and historiography I first argued that the so-
called liberal political subject of capitalism, marketization by formal legal equality and freedom, 
was a contingent rather than necessary development. I made this argument through an 
illumination of Robbie Shilliam’s work, which, additionally, demonstrated the ways that 
Marxism, specifically Political Marxism, can account for and explain ostensibly immaterial 
phenomena (in this case, subjectivity). In this section I established the relationship between 
social property relations, modes of production, and subjectivities.  
 I then moved on to elaborate the premise of uneven and combined development (UCD) 
underlying Shilliam’s analysis. UCD, I posited, is necessary to illuminating the global spread of 
capitalist social relations through settler colonialism. Moving from the primary (Trotsky), to the 
secondary (Rosenberg), and finally the tertiary (Desai, Cooper, Shilliam) literature on UCD, I 
traced the evolution of the concept and its debates, offering creative substitutions to ameliorate 
the theoretical problems of instrumentalism and Eurocentrism; namely I drew on Desai’s concept 
of unevenness as generated by contradiction, and combination as realized through nationalism, in 
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order to reposition Shilliam’s concept of the ‘Atlantic vector’ of UCD. This temporal 
repositioning has allowed me to situate settler colonialism and the development of global 
agrarian commodity markets as a mechanism for activating UCD, which functioned as the mid to 
late nineteenth-century ‘whip of external necessity.’  
 Finally, I turned to settler colonial theoretical literature to show how socio-economic 
development in the context of the competitive coercion exerted by globalized agrarian 
commodity markets assumed national and racialized forms. Drawing on Wolfe, Veracini, and 
Coulthard, among others, I have argued that racial nationalism was the fundamental organizing 
principle of settler colonies, and furthermore that these identities were not effects of, but in fact 
formative to, settler state consolidation. In the next chapter I develop the empirical content of the 
first two of these arguments. 
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Chapter 2 From Poor Law Reform to Systematic Colonization: Generative 
Conditions for the Uneven and Combined Development of 
Capitalist Modernity 
 
 This chapter develops the wider context for the case studies that follow. I build up a 
history of capitalist development in England and its subsequent global dissemination, which 
would come to draw in settler colonial states on a sociologically, technologically and 
productively uneven and competitive basis. My central argument is that the height of English 
industrial capitalism realized several related tensions and contradictions from which uneven and 
combined development was generated. It was from the resolution to these internal crises that 
capitalist social relations were increasingly globalized, generating localized strategies of 
combined development through national-state formation.  
In making these arguments I first provide empirical evidence for the claim that liberal 
subjectivity was and is a contingent and politically-led development. Specifically, I examine the 
pivotal role of the Poor Law Amendment Act in realizing the quintessential liberal subject. This 
analysis echoes John Davis’s argument that the form assumed by liberalism in England is a 
unique exception to, rather than the rule for, its broader emergence (1997, 80). I then show how 
these political interventions aimed at the molding of subjectivities were productive of state 
formation. This assertion will become key in the remaining chapters where I show how strategies 
of racialized subject formation were key to the development of national state capacities. 
Following this I advance the claim that the consolidation of the liberal subject and state forms in 
England precipitated both vast improvements in productive capacity alongside a growing reserve 
army of labour, generating a crisis of overaccumulation. The resolution to this crisis was found 
in the global displacement of capital and labour power, creating the so-called Atlantic vector of 
uneven and combined development. This development was the context in which settler 
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colonialism was proposed and realized, as the means to generate a globally competitive market 
in agrarian goods.  
Universalizing Tendencies, Local Conditions, and Contingent Politics: The Production of 
Political Modernity in England 
 
 In the first chapter I argued that the ‘liberal subject’ is historically related to the 
transformation in the conditions of social reproduction away from politically mediated 
reproduction and towards market-based reproduction. Drawing upon Shilliam, I reviewed how 
the enclosures provide the impetus for the generation of wage-dependency, which is said to be 
the central criterion for liberal equality. However, historically it is clear that the transformation 
of social property relations did not automatically in themselves produce a wage-dependent, 
market-dependent class of labourers. Indeed, the relationship between the dispossession of 
peasants from the land and the constitution of a national labour market was (and continues to be) 
far from automatic. To this end, the quintessential labourer had to be made dependent through a 
variety of extra-economic, coercive tactics, which limited and regulated people’s access to non-
market practices and means of (re)production whilst simultaneously endeavouring to instill what 
would eventually become a ‘common sense’ understanding of market dependence. In short, even 
in the quintessential model of liberal political subjectivity, illiberal and coercive strategies were 
necessary preconditions. 
In Rethinking the Industrial Revolution, Michael Zmolek, through an impressive array of 
research, demonstrated that one of the primary differences between the transition to agrarian 
capitalism and industrial capitalism was that of formal versus real subsumption of labour to 
capital. According to Zmolek, what agrarian capitalism achieved most successfully was the real 
subsumption of land to capital; however, the subsumption of labour was a much longer and more 
protracted process (2013, 344). Even as factories came to dominate manufactures throughout the 
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nineteenth century, labour resisted total subsumption to capital, retaining control over the labour 
process in many spaces, owing to the slow pace of dismantling the monopoly of skilled labour 
over the production process. Dispossessed peasants did not automatically transition to industrial 
waged-labour as a consequence of their alienation from the means of reproduction. Rather, 
dispossession, in the first place, led in many places to a rapid rise in rural crime, as a means of 
securing access to subsistence goods. In short, throughout the three hundred years that separated 
the transition to agrarian capitalism and the industrial revolution, the real subsumption (or final 
commodification) of labour to capital was far from certain, and experienced tremendous ebbs 
and flows.  
Zmolek argues that the key to ensuring the real subsumption of labour was the 
consolidation of the state and its combined power to legislate private property relations and 
coercively repress dissent. In large measure, the period of the Napoleonic and French 
Revolutionary wars commenced the consolidation of state power, while in the post-war period, 
the mass of decommissioned soldiers facing unemployment and poverty stoked dissent and 
revolutionary actions amongst the masses, necessitating centralized state action (2013, 260). 
Zmolek’s central argument comes through succinctly when he urges that “one must look at the 
long-term process shaping this moment of transition, one must account for the use of the 
workhouse, the regulation of poor relief and the application of machinery in structuring the 
social relationships in such a way as to allow the ‘invisible hand’ of the market ‘freely’ to 
regulate wage contracts and discipline labourers” (2013, 839).  Central to the process by which 
social relationships could be structured to allow for the ‘free’ operation of the market was the 
project of altering subjectivities. In England, this modification of subjectivities was realized 
through a transformation of poor relief. 
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Poor Law Reform, Subjectification and State Centralization 
 
 In the context of the British transition from agrarian to industrial capitalism, two 
interrelated processes set into motion in the 1830s served to finalize the full subsumption of 
labour to capital. Both can be read as the combined objectives and effects of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834. In this section I argue that the Poor Law Amendment Act was a 
response to the particular conditions of English capitalist development and served two primary 
functions: first, to finalize the project of converting political subjects from peasants with access 
to their means of reproduction to landless peasants, and finally, to fully subsumed wage 
labourers. While the Poor Law Amendment Act did not create the capitalist labour market, it 
was the final, crowning achievement of a long process of transformation and commodification 
(Patriquin, 2007, 150). The second and related objective of the Reform was to produce a drastic 
rearrangement of state power—what some have labelled a ‘revolution in government’—through 
processes of centralization, rationalization and bureaucratization (Parris, 1960, 22). These two 
outcomes, taken together, finalized the transition to wage dependency and the subversion of 
parochial power to realize the consolidation of state power. In response to the problem of 
parochialism and oligarchical political structures, as well as increasing discord amongst 
labourers, the political subject that emerged was one predicated on horizontal, juridical equality. 
This liberal form of equality must be properly understood in its historical, political and economic 
specificity. 
The Problem of Pauperism, Ideological Formation, and the Disciplinary Construction of 
the Capitalist Subject 
 
In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, it was recognized that though the 
‘invisible hand of the market’ or the simple fact of dispossession was not enough to create a 
wage-dependent labour force, sheer compulsion through external coercive apparatus would not 
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suffice either (Polanyi, 2001, 118). In political-economic terms, accumulation cannot proceed 
through a complete dependence on investment of surplus in the coercive apparatus of the state 
(Dean, 1991, 164). Rather than a constant reinvestment in the powers to coerce wage labour, the 
New Poor Laws selectively targeted populations deemed potentially suitable for the exercise of 
liberal status, combining coercive and illiberal measures with productive capacity to educate and 
moralize individuals as citizens and subjects. Such a strategy, reliant on illiberal distinctions 
amongst the population, represented a strategic investment in domestic coercion so as to limit the 
ongoing costs of disciplining labour.  
 In order to make this argument regarding the objectives of the Poor Law Reform, 
however, it is necessary to first undertake an analysis of the Speenhamland system of poor relief, 
which predated the 1834 Reform so as to point to the ways in which this system could be 
perceived as an obstacle to capitalist development. The Speenhamland system of poor relief was 
established as a political response to a crisis of unemployment and the spread of radical ideas 
from the French Revolutionary War (Patriquin, 2007, 124). Speenhamland consisted of the 
provision of relief to anyone deemed to be without sufficient income “to keep them in leisure” 
(Polanyi, 2001, 91). This system was referred to as one of ‘outdoor’ relief and was based on 
supplements to income (regardless of ability or employment status) so as to bring individuals up 
to an established income level, determined by such things as family size, the cost of food, etc. 
Underpinning Speenhamland was the philosophical principle of the ‘right to live’ through its 
generalized provision of grants in aid of wages (Dean, 1991, 157).  
 Polanyi identified the Speenhamland system as a critical moment in the attempt to foment 
a national capitalist labour market, as well as an important obstacle to such a market. According 
to this interpretation, the central referent point is the repeal of the Act of Settlement and Removal 
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1662, which was in operation throughout the eighteenth century and functioned to restrict the 
movement of people to any parish but that of their own birth, excepted only by the presentation 
of a signed letter from parish authorities. Ostensibly this policy was concerned with preventing 
the abuse of parish poor relief through the development of the ‘professional pauper,’ who would 
seek out the parish with the best forms of relief to settle in. With the introduction and 
development of capitalism, however, it became increasingly necessary to restore the mobility of 
labour and thus the Act was repealed (Polanyi, 2001, 92).  Accordingly, the mobility of labour 
introduced new forms of vulnerability to which generalized poor relief was the response—an 
attempt to reassert the primacy of the social over the economic (Polanyi, 2001, 92-3). 
Larry Patriquin has recently contested this interpretation, arguing that the mobility of 
labour under the Settlement Act was not definitively restricted. Rather, the primary intent of the 
Settlement Act was not to restrict the movement of labour, but to prevent claims for relief in any 
but one’s own parish (Patriquin, 2007, 129). In general, labour was not subject to removal, only 
for those deemed a financial burden. Patriquin asserts that the majority of removals were families 
with several small children, pregnant single women, or single/widowed women (2007, 129). In 
conceding to Patriquin’s arguments, then, it becomes necessary to be conservative in how much 
we attribute the formation of national labour markets to the Poor Law Reforms of 1834. For 
Patriquin, the primary motive for the New Poor Law was to “to reinstate an ideologically 
powerful status distinction . . . such that the labourer could be considered ‘independent,’ ‘moral’ 
and ‘industrious’, while those forced to seek assistance would feel unworthy and ashamed” 
(2007, 136). In other words, the objective of the Amendment Act was to mold a new kind of 
political subject, one whose ideological conditioning would produce self-regulation. 
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This attempt to mold the subjectivity of the labourer arose in the context of the English 
agricultural crisis. Throughout the early nineteenth century, capitalist development of agriculture 
and increasing productivity through innovation resulted in declining employment. The 
percentage of the workforce employed in farming fell from 42 percent in 1801–1803, to 28 
percent in 1831. Up until this point, few labourers were completely landless, thus having 
recourse to non-market means of reproduction. The Amendment, in part, functioned to make 
remaining in rural areas untenable by retracting able-bodied relief and encouraging rural-urban 
migration and market dependency (Patriquin, 2007, 149). The Poor Law Reforms, I argue, 
consisted of the unequal treatment of political subjects, directed at those persisting in rural, non-
market production relations so as to coerce the so-called self-regulating liberal labour market.  
 Accepting Patriquin’s argument, it is possible to contextualize the heated philosophical, 
political, and economic debates that were articulated against the Speenhamland system at this 
time. While there were distinctions in each thinker’s take on the issue of poor relief, common 
amongst such individuals as Malthus, Townsend and Bentham was the notion that poverty was in 
fact the motive force behind progress. The problem with the Speenhamland system, then, was 
that it attempted to prevent poverty and thereby stunted progress and growth. That is, conditions 
of equality in access to the means of social reproduction were, in fact, an impediment to the 
realization of liberal order. While differing in their ‘solutions’ to the problem of poor relief 
under Speenhamland, I suggest that these thinkers were nevertheless bound to a common 
objective to alter the conditions under which poverty could or could not exist—to in fact 
politically fomenting inequalities in subject status—and thereby channelling the energies of the 
poor in productive directions.  
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 In The Constitution of Poverty, Mitchell Dean refers to this philosophical position as the 
‘poverty theory of labour.’ According to Edwin Chadwick, a former secretary to Bentham and 
perhaps the primary actor in the conversion of theory into practice, 
poverty . . . is the natural, primitive, the general and unchangeable state of man; that as 
labour is the source of wealth, so is poverty of labour. Banish poverty, you banish wealth. 
Indigence, therefore, and not poverty, is the evil, the removal of which is the proper 
object of Poor Laws (as cited in Dean, 1991, 175). 
 
Likewise, Townsend noted that 
hunger will tame the fiercest animals, it will teach decency and civility, obedience and 
subjection, to the most perverse. In general it is only hunger which can spur and goad 
them (the poor) on to labour; yet our laws have said they shall never hunger . . . . hunger 
is . . . the most natural motive to industry and labour (as cited in Polanyi, 2001, 118). 
 
The sentiments expressed above, however, were most famously advanced in Thomas Malthus’s 
Essay on the Principles of Population. In the Essay, Malthus argued that population tended to 
grow at a rate faster than that of the necessities of subsistence, and as such, the conditions, which 
arose from poverty and induced death throughout the population through starvation and 
pestilence, were simply nature’s checks against the untenable rise in population. The poor, 
according to Malthus, must either learn to become sober, industrial and frugal, thus contributing 
to the overall well-being of the population, or else they must perish (Malthus, 1998, 28). Poor 
relief, as a consequence, would for Malthus disrupt the natural process of balancing population 
with resource capacity; it was only the hunger-induced industriousness of the people that could 
potentially stretch the (finite) limits that land placed on population growth (Dean, 1991, 84-85; 
Malthus, 1998, 27). 
Thus, at the close of the eighteenth century there emerged a philosophical tradition that 
equated poverty with the natural condition of humanity and attributed progress to the motive 
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force of poverty and hunger. From individual advancement under the duress and drive of 
poverty, it was argued that national wealth would flow. To intervene in an attempt to eliminate 
poverty would not only be undesirable but also impossible. Rather, it was the particular quality 
of character that arose from conditions of poverty, which was to be the object of intervention; the 
indigent poor must be made rational, self-fulfilling individuals. Of course, such a conclusion 
required that social policy be selectively applied to a politically differentiated population—the 
‘undeserving poor’. 
  If Malthus was the philosophical architect of the general framing of poverty in modern 
political economic terms, Jeremy Bentham was the father of the administrative architecture of 
nineteenth-century Poor Relief. For Bentham, the outright removal of any poor relief (as Malthus 
would have it) was not necessary or even advantageous. What was necessary, however, was the 
differentiation of various categories of poor, such that the motive force that poverty could exert 
was not repressed. In effect, this meant a complete overhaul of the conditions under which the 
able-bodied8 poor were provided with relief. In effect, the New Poor Laws would seek to harness 
the poor for the general benefit of the nation (Dean, 1991, 117).  
 Bentham’s writings on Poor Law Reform, though scattered and at times 
contradictory, were most influential with regards to his propositions for the workhouse. 
According to Bentham, poor relief to the ‘able-bodied’ should cease to be made in any way other 
than through the workhouse. This relief would be predicated on the practice of less eligibility, 
the idea that relief would never exceed the status of the lowest independent labourers. 
Furthermore, relief would be subject to a myriad of disciplinary measures such that it would be 
                                                     
8 It is important to note here, as Dean does, that the concept and category of ‘able-bodied’ is socially constituted, 
and as such changes throughout spatio-temporal variation. At times the category of able-bodied would include or 
exclude women, children, and individuals based on their so-called race, religion, ethnicity, etc.  
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made far more compromising than independent labour, and as such only the most ‘defective’ 
would be inclined to seek relief (Bentham, 2011; Dean, 1991, 162-63). As an exogenous 
influence, the workhouse served to negatively discipline would-be relief seekers by making 
independent wage labour a far more attractive option. Endogenously, for those ‘desperate 
indigents’ who sought out workhouse relief, a series of disciplinary measures would attempt to 
reform the moral character of the individual in question and promote the desired characteristics 
of a modern liberal subject.  
 Internal to the workhouse, discipline measures in the form of a separation of the sexes (to 
discourage reproduction amongst the poor), the proscription of the use of tobacco or fermented 
liquors, the restriction of mobility outside of the workhouse, and the policing and banning of 
certain forms of celebration and festivals were amongst the most prominent (Dean, 1991, 181-
91). These measures were intended to “improve their industry, [by] increasing frugality, 
increasing their wages, lessening improvident marriages and abating their discontent” (Dean, 
1991, 162). In its disciplinary capacity, the workhouse form of poor relief sought to modify the 
characteristics and behaviours of a population such that eventual self-regulation and reproduction 
would be possible (indeed ‘rational’) without overt political intervention. “If labour was the 
objective expression of the adherence of moral subjects . . . . then pauperism was a site outside 
that act of moral constitution . . . . which presaged the demoralization of the individual and the 
fall of civilization into the abyss of inertia” (Dean, 1991, 176). The moral and behavioral 
‘defects’ of the pauper, then, became the primary site of intervention.  
 In sum, I have argued that in the context of Britain, the early transformation of social 
property relations did not automatically produce wage dependency. On the one hand, wherever 
possible, individuals divorced from their means of (re)production would in many instances seek 
  75 
out alternatives, including parish relief. At the same time, the Speenhamland system of poor 
relief undermined the logic of market discipline by guaranteeing a minimum income to all 
individuals, irrespective of capacity to work; Speenhamland enabled a relatively equitable level 
of access to the basic means of survival. These two factors continued to undermine the full 
subsumption of labour to capital, making industrialization partial and protracted until the 
nineteenth century.     
The Poor Law Commission, and most importantly Chadwick, seized upon the discoveries 
of Bentham, which understood that a continuous and elastic supply of labour required a self-
regulating subject, incentivized to waged labour and unattached to any particular locale, owing to 
the existence of poor relief or land. The Commission, as a result, sought the forcible 
manipulation and transformation of subjectivity itself through its amendment. The workhouse, as 
poor relief, achieved a re-modelling of subjectivities through both positive and negative 
mechanisms of discipline, simultaneously encouraging ‘proper’ behaviours that inclined the 
individual towards personal achievement through labour and deterring improvident actions by 
making the conditions of workhouse relief so abhorrent that wage labour seemed the most 
attractive option. Finally, by attempting to present labour as an apolitical, rational universal, the 
1834 Reforms began to break down the parochial divisions of populations predicated on 
personalized parish politics, instead transferring such powers, and the identities produced from 
them, to the level of the (increasingly national) state. Thus, at the same time that the Reforms of 
1834 enacted a politically coercive policy of controlling specific bodies, they contributed to the 
more conventionally liberal ends of centralizing, neutralizing and anonymizing the political 
powers of the state. It is to this process of state formation that I now turn.  
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The Dissolution of Parish Politics and the Amplification of Central State Power  
 
 In addition to the formation of a political subject conditioned by the ideologies and 
practices of labour commodification, the exponential accumulation of British capital and its 
subsequent deployment in a concerted project of industrial development required a powerful 
state capable of ensuring the stability, transparency and financial resources necessary to assure 
potential investors and creditors. The administration of public policy in England until the 1830s 
had largely proceeded in a disorganized, often decentralized, fashion, either delegated to parish 
officials for interpretation and enforcement, or else altogether left to the parish to determine and 
devise its own policy (Roberts, 1959, 196). Nowhere was this more evident than in the provision 
of poor relief. Until the Amendment Act of 1834, more than 15,000 separate units administered 
poor relief, while in London alone, over 105 different acts governed the criteria and processes for 
relief disbursement (Driver, 1989, 271; Green, 2010, 87). This situation continued the dominance 
of the oligarchy in British politics, as local landed interests controlled the development of policy. 
Multiple, divergent, and predominantly agrarian interests could not establish the basis for a 
program of mass industrial development.  
 Edwin Chadwick was a vocal critic of the parochial administration of poor relief, and it 
was Chadwick who pushed forward the enactment of the reforms proposed in 1834. Chadwick 
preferred a more centralized and depersonalized administration of poor relief, through a Board of 
Governors (removed from the local politics of the parish itself), a systematized mechanism of 
accounting, a professionalized and routinized bureaucracy overseeing the construction and 
operation of workhouses, special schools for pauper children, and asylums, and as mentioned 
above, the consolidation of administrative units into a single Union. From the Poor Law Reform, 
under Chadwick, a revolution in administrative capacity served to both consolidate state power 
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and its institutional capacity, as well as undermine the oppositional power of the landed classes, 
consolidating bourgeois power within the state. As Driver has argued, regardless of academic 
disagreement over the extent to which the objectives of the 1834 Report were realized, its effects 
on administrative revolution are difficult to contest (1989, 275). 
 The first major institutional effect of the Reform Act was the consolidation of parishes 
into 630 unions. In this process, parish overseers were stripped of their responsibility for the 
disbursement of poor relief. Instead, they became agents of transmission, affecting the collection 
of rates, relaying such monies to the union treasurer, and completing various administrative 
forms (Care, 2011, 128). The goal was to mitigate the fracturing of politics within England, 
based on local ideological proclivities, and move towards a nationally consolidated politics of 
industrial development. This move elicited significant backlash from parish landowners who 
viewed the transformation as a shift to taxation without representation. Nevertheless, for the 
Reformers, the increases in both population and unemployment necessitated the 
professionalization and homogenization of rate collection and relief disbursement.  
In addition to the consolidation of parishes into Unions, the Poor Law Commission 
further undermined the fracturing of power by condemning the old parish workhouses, which 
numbered around 2,000 with a capacity of 20 to 50 inmates each, and replacing these with new 
workhouses, holding as many as 200 to 300 inmates and numbering around 750 total (Driver, 
1989, 272). As new workhouses would often straddle not only former parish boundaries but also 
those of the unions, the lines of parochial power over populations were further destabilized. 
At the same time, the enlargement of the establishment of the workhouse and its inmate 
population allowed for a standardized implementation of moral reform and workhouse discipline.  
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  Finally, the Amendment Act also introduced a formal requirement for the replacement of 
personal (parochial) accountability with systematic reporting and recording, through a centrally 
administered program of double-entry bookkeeping. Systematic bookkeeping required the full 
settlement of accounts in cash before a file could be closed, which in turn necessitated extensive 
documentation and explanation of debts, increasing the accountability and transparency of public 
officials (Care, 2011, 124). In undermining the system of personalized accountability under 
parochial interests, the changes in accounting introduced under the Amendment Act transformed 
administration into a practice predicated on ostensible equality before the law and impersonal 
rule. At the same time, the process of relaying information up a chain of command made The 
Poor Law Commission a central administrative hub and furthered the consolidation of state 
administrative power. It established a hierarchy of bureaucratic administration, with paid 
officials operating at the Commission itself, at the level of the union, in the Board of Governors, 
throughout the workhouses, and eventually in the collection and remittance of rates (Care, 2011, 
124). This move both built the necessary institutional and infrastructural capacity for central state 
administration, and served to ostensibly neutralize and equalize the politics of relief and 
administration throughout the country. In attempting to modify and regulate subjectivities, then, 
the Poor Law Reforms were further productive of state power and economic capacity. The 
argument I am making here points to the ways in which identities (or cultures), economics and 
politics are interwoven into complex relations of mutual causation rather than existing as 
discretely interacting spheres of sociality. The realm of (potential) illiberality (culture) is 
constitutively interwoven with that of ostensible liberality (political economy) under capitalism.  
 The above description of the ‘revolution in government’—the transition to impersonal 
and systematized rule—emphasizes the contingencies of local political organizations of power 
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and administration rather than abstract laws of the capitalist mode of production. It was in the 
effort to undermine the power of an existing elite, whose conditions of reproduction ran counter 
to those of industrializing capitalists, that the formal machinery of the state sought to erect itself 
upon the idea of equality before the law and impersonality of rule. While the transformation of 
subjectivities and the reorganization of political power are necessary aspects of the capitalist 
mode of production (otherwise, on what grounds could we posit capitalism as a distinct mode of 
production?), the content of these transformations must be situated in their histories of class 
struggle and (re)formation, rather than assumed. In the next section, I further this line of 
argument by suggesting that these historically specific processes in England established, in turn, 
the groundwork for the uneven and combined spread of capitalist social relations, such that, 
contrary to Chakrabarty, we cannot posit the universalization of the political forms associated 
with capitalism as a consequence of their universalism. Rather, following Desai, I read 
capitalism’s global spread as the product of its systemic contradictions.  
The 1840s Recession and the Transatlantic Escape Valve 
 
 In many ways, the Poor Law Amendment Act was a success. From the mid 1830s, as 
Zmolek shows, Britain experienced a massive upturn in capital formation, while rural labour was 
increasingly migrating to urban areas, owing to the final subsumption of labour that workhouse 
relief engendered. The boom in capital formation throughout the mid 1830s had many 
contributing factors, such that it is difficult to identify a single causal mechanism. However, it is 
likely that the amendment played a significant role in this, along with the contingencies of 
favourable harvests from 1830 to 1837. The amendment contributed to this boom in its provision 
of a massive urban labour force to be mobilized according to the requirements of rail 
construction, which had come to occupy a space of utmost priority at this time, serving to absorb 
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the overabundance of incomes accruing to wealthy elites. At the same time, throwing an 
increasing number of people onto the market likely created a significant increase in the demand 
for consumption goods, while the enormous supply of labour would have pushed down wages, 
allowing for a massive increase in the rate of surplus accumulation. This upswing, however, was 
short-lived (Zmolek, 2013, 742).  
 In 1837, harvests were poor and rail speculation experienced a bust, throwing many into 
unemployment. The mechanization of agriculture, which began to pick up pace in this period, 
was also responsible for the ejection of large swathes of agricultural labour from the rural 
economy (Hobsbawm, 1999, 134). In response, many fled the rural economy for urban centers, 
yet the industrial economy had not yet developed to an extent that could adequately absorb this 
increased labour supply (Hobsbawm, 1999, 126). In addition, the period leading to the 1830s 
witnessed a massive increase in the number of handloom weavers, but as McMichael notes, from 
the 1830s onward, a shift from the industrialization of textiles to the production of capital goods 
gutted textiles, throwing many in the industry out of work. This was the beginning of a recession 
that would peak in the early 1840s, generating massive social upheaval (Davis, 1997, 69; 
Hobsbawm, 1999, 114; McMichael, 1984, 175). By 1838, the price of bread began to rise, 
placing further pressure on the meagre-to-nonexistent wages of the labouring populations. 
Discussions of repealing the Corn Laws began at this point, anticipating the eventual transition to 
free trade.  
 In 1836, as the first signs of crisis were being felt, the London Working Men’s 
Association was formed. In 1837, the People’s Charter was formed and began acquiring public 
support along the way (Zmolek, 2013, 749). As conditions worsened, the People’s Charter was 
transformed into the broader Chartist Movement, and by 1839 its Charter petition had acquired 
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1,283,000 signatures, and was delivered to Parliament. Public demonstrations and protests 
became commonplace throughout this period, and the move to free trade, along with an 
extension of franchise, was more frequently discussed to quell the masses. By 1841, the 
recession was moving into its worst period, and depression set in, while the Chartist’s National 
Petition grew to 3,317,702 signatures (Zmolek, 2013, 750, 764). Continued failed harvests, 
overcrowded workhouses, shrinking wages and the rising price of bread culminated in the 
general strike of 1842, with strikers demanding, among other things, the restoration of wages to 
pre-recession levels (Hobsbawm, 1996, 169). The creation of new jobs, however, was 
increasingly difficult in Britain, as the area of land under cultivation had nearly reached its limit 
by the 1830s, and capital increasingly accumulated in the hands of the business and elite classes, 
with few options for profitable investment (Manning Ward, 1976, 221). Indeed, Hobsbawm 
estimates that by the 1840s the annual surplus of capital needing investment was around £60 
million (1999, 142). The rail boom in England, in part, mitigated this trend, absorbing around 
£200 million and providing as much as 200,000 jobs at its peak towards the end of the 1840s 
(Hobsbawm, 1999, 144). However, such job creation was by no means a total solution, and 
increasingly it was the global economy from which solutions were sought. By 1845, public 
disorder and deteriorating economic health were joined by the Irish potato blight, and Parliament 
began to strategize two related solutions to the social and economic crisis: the freeing of trade, 
notably through the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the settlement of temperate colonies in order to 
offload excess capital and population, thereby stabilizing the British economy. 
 The road to these practices, however, was not, during the crisis years, a foregone 
conclusion. Intense debates existed where there were those, on the one hand, following older 
schools of political economy, in the tradition of J.B. Say and (earlier) James Mill, and those, on 
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the other, developing a radical position in response to crisis conditions, later to be dubbed the 
Philosophical Radicals. Say’s Law stipulated that gluts would not occur under conditions of 
market freedom as industrial production would always correspond with levels of production. As 
a result, those wedded to this physiocratic argument denied the need for government intervention 
in the promotion of foreign trade and emigration (Semmel, 1970, 9). Then there were the 
Philosophical Radicals, picking up and developing from the works of Malthus and Ricardo, both 
of who saw the inevitability of overaccumulation, at least in the national context (Semmel, 1970, 
10).  
 In this latter position, Richard Cobden advanced the doctrine of free trade as an inevitable 
and necessary solution to the problem of national gluts. Foreign markets, it was argued, could be 
obtained by Britain if it provided a consumer base for the raw materials and consumption goods 
of the agricultural nations (Semmel, 1970, 159). Furthermore, Cobden argued that under the 
Corn Laws, workers’ wages declined owing to the exorbitant rent accrued by landowners, such 
that the move to free trade would reduce this parochial drag on development and quell social 
unrest. In the context of the general strike in 1842, and the threat of popular revolution, this 
Cobdenite position, under Robert Peel, became a matter of necessity (Davis, 1997, 69; 
Williamson, 1990, 125). Thus in 1842, Peel began, contrary to his agrarian roots, to roll back 
tariffs, introducing a sliding scale on the corn tariff (Zmolek, 2013, 777; Williamson, 1990, 125). 
In 1846, under Peel, the Corn Laws were formally and finally abolished, under a plan of gradual 
reduction, culminating in their full abandonment by 1849. According to Zmolek, the repeal 
marked a cornerstone in the development of capitalism. Where prior to this, the economy was 
one of agrarian capitalism with an industrial sector as its complement, the repeal led the agrarian 
sector to be subsumed by a broader system determined by the full commodification of land, 
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labour and money, and the regulation of the market (2013, 777). However, the Philosophical 
Radicals were not limited to Cobden, and there were those who viewed his singular focus on the 
Corn Laws as shortsighted. Primary amongst those were Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Charles 
Buller, who argued that free trade alone could not restore Britain’s stability and prosperity. 
Rather, this measure had to be complemented by what he termed ‘colonization proper’ (Semmel, 
1970, 169).  
 For Cobden, the idea of colonization was anathema to the goals of free trade capitalism. 
Colonialism was a drain on the public coffers, a strain on military resources. For Bentham, high 
administrative costs and the tendency to foment higher investment in military apparatus tended 
to encourage despotic forms of rule, running counter to the Utilitarian premises that underpinned 
much of Britain’s administrative reforms throughout the 1830s (Pitts, 2003, 206-8). However, for 
Wakefield, Buller, and the rest of a group emerging from the Philosophical Radicals known as 
the Colonial Reformers, if the repeal was not complemented by a plan of emigration and an 
extension of the ‘field of employment’ for both capital and labour, a glut would be an inevitable 
recurrence (Semmel, 1970, 169; Wakefield, 2001, 24). Free trade, it was argued, would stimulate 
trade and manufactures and increase competition amongst capitals, which itself would again 
drive down wages, reduce employment, etc. Furthermore, the continental reality of continued 
economic nationalism required seeking this field of employment outside of Europe.  As H.G. 
Ward commented in 1839, “have we markets enough? Have we employment enough? Are wages 
high enough, and profits high enough? Is there no political discontent—no physical suffering? . . 
. . Is it not desirable, and wise, to open a safety valve . . . . promote the welfare of many millions 
of human beings” (Semmel, 1970, 172). The Colonial Reformers, then, saw in capitalism the 
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inherent tendency to produce an oversupply of labour and capital, and sought to remedy this 
surfeit with a new form of colonization.  
Though Wakefield did not specifically use the terminology ‘settler colony,’ he was 
explicit in his writings that his view of colonization was fundamentally different from what was 
commonly understood to be colonization. In A View of the Art of Colonization Wakefield argued: 
By the word colony, I shall not mean such a country as either British India, which is a 
great dependency, or the Mauritius, which was a colony of France, but is only a 
dependency of England . . . . Of colonization, the principle elements are emigration and 
the permanent settlement of the emigrants on unoccupied land. A colony therefore is a 
country wholly or partially unoccupied, which receives emigrants from a distance . . . . 
To the process by which the colony is peopled and settled, and to nothing else, I would 
give the name of colonization (2001, 11-12).  
 
Following this, Wakefield went on to argue that the subordination of the colony to the 
government of the ‘mother country’ was neither essential nor desirable. In this way, too, the 
differences between the settler colony and the dependent colony were established, and the 
concerns of Cobden, Bentham, et al. could be assuaged. It was not the dominance of the existing 
population by a coercive extension of the mother-government, but the replacement of an existing 
population with that of the mother country along with the self-government of the settlers 
themselves (Wakefield, 2001, 12-13). Settler colonialism, then, in a very concrete way 
exemplifies Desai’s argument that capitalism’s global spread and reproduction were produced 
through endogenous tensions and resultant processes of combined development (2015, 453). As I 
argue in the next chapter, in the settler colonies, this process marked a radical transformation of 
colonial practice and local conditions. In the settler colony, attempts to erect peripheral regions 
of agricultural commodity production for a globally competitive market were layered onto 
existing colonial configurations of feudal practices along with indigenous forms of political 
organization.  
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If the objective of colonization was to relieve industrializing spaces of the pressures 
incurred by the excesses of capitalism and to reproduce the social relations of capitalism in ‘terra 
nullius,’ Wakefield was nevertheless cognizant of the difficulties presented by this task 
(Pieterberg & Veracini, 2015, 460). Wakefield—very much in line with Bentham’s thought—
found the replication of the social relations of the mother country to be difficult in the absence of 
interventions aimed at the political subjectification of the masses. Primarily, he was concerned 
that, despite the immediate condition of dispossession faced by emigrant-settlers, land was 
available in a cheap abundance throughout the colonies, and as such, resulted in the dispersion of 
populations and the prevention of ‘capitalist civilization’ (Pieterberg & Veracini, 2015, 462). 
Against laissez-faire assumptions, Wakefield argued for the need to apply an aggressive form of 
market interventionism by imposing an artificial floor on the price of land. In this way, settlers 
could not transition directly to becoming owners of capital, but rather would be required to 
acquiesce to the discipline of wage labour for several years before they could expect to own land 
themselves (Kittrell, 1965, 34; Pieterberg & Veracini, 2015, 463). Furthermore, the artificial 
price of land would enable authorities to amass a capital fund to pay for the costs of emigration, 
thus relieving the motherland of its economic burden in administering settler colonization 
(Kittrell, 1965, 34). However, given the different colonial conditions and processes of indigenous 
land theft that characterized each region under this schema, the actual policies developed to 
subordinate emigrants to waged labour were variable, and resulted in a differential consolidation 
of subjectivities and state institutions to this effect. 
The Export of British Capital  
 
By 1846, the election of John Russell as Prime Minister and George Grey as the 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies clinched the pro-colonization position that became a 
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matter of state policy. Thus, by mid-century, flows of capital and labour to the Atlantic world 
reached unprecedented heights that remained largely constant until the onset of war in 1914. In 
this section I argue that the massive flow of British foreign capital functioned to create the first 
nationally competitive global market, generating a strong impulse to reorganize, centralize and 
nationalize the settler state apparatus and populations, suited to competitive agricultural 
production. In other words, the transmission of British capital and labour over the Atlantic 
precipitated processes of uneven and combined development. 
 Once more, recalling the idea that Wakefieldian colonization entailed not simply 
domination and control, but rather the creation of spaces conducive to the absorption of surplus 
factors of production from Britain, which could provide for the foodstuffs of Britain following 
the repeal of the Corn Laws, it is important to note that for Wakefield, colonization was not 
reducible to dominion status (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 372). Thus, included in the concept of 
settler colonization are spaces such as Argentina, Uruguay and the United States, whose financial 
relationship with Britain render them analytically analogous to the British Dominions of 
settlement (the latter of which had formally ended its colonial status in the eighteenth century). 
Between the 1830s and 1870, the value of foreign trade in England increased six-fold 
(Hobsbawm, 1977, 66). In this same period, the export of capital rose exponentially, totalling 
around £4,082 million by the end of the century (Cottrell, 1975, 27). By the onset of the First 
World War, settler economies absorbed almost two-fifths of the global flows of foreign 
investment (amounting to £3.7 billion), the large part of which was coming from Britain (Attard 
& Dilley, 2013, 371). In general, these flows of finance were aimed at facilitating settlement and 
promoting the production and supply of rural products for Britain. As a result, investment in 
government, utilities, and, importantly, rail infrastructure dominated the flow of British capital 
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into the colonies of settlement, which in turn transformed the relationship between colonizers 
and indigenous peoples, leading to genocidal histories of state formation (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 
373). Estimates suggest that on the eve of the First World War, a total £3.7 billion was dispersed 
amongst the settler colonies as follows: approximately £1.5 billion was invested in the US, 
Canada received a total of £791 million, Argentina £606 million, Australia £370 million, New 
Zealand £62 million and South Africa £339 million (Attard & Dilley, 2013, 372). These figures, 
in turn, accounted for the 1,017,000 miles of rail laid in North America, the 54,000 miles laid in 
Australasia, and the 63,000 miles laid in Latin America (Hobsbawm, 1977, 70).  
The massive demand for agricultural goods generated by the industrial revolution and 
complemented by the program of settler colonization was, in the short term, successful. 
Transformations in the organization of the British Empire generated a global system of 
agricultural production, and from 1840 to 1880, world wheat production expanded by 50 percent, 
which Herman Schwartz relates directly to the rise in continental European urban demand (2000, 
106). By 1871, 90 percent of British imports by value were agricultural products (both food and 
non-food), and by 1890, 84 percent of its wheat, 37 percent of its beef, 47 percent of its mutton 
and 53 percent of its dairy and poultry was imported. Schwartz estimates that by this point nearly 
60 percent of the total caloric consumption of Britain was imported (2000, 105).   
The combination of agricultural production for international trade and the eventual legal 
separation of the colonies from Britain, were, as Friedman and McMichael argue, the precursors 
to a fundamentally new organization of the world economy, both politically and economically 
(1989). Principally, this period witnessed the emergence and consolidation of the nation-state, 
which we must be clear to distinguish from the state as such (see for example, Lacher, 2006). 
Crucially, a “central aspect of nationhood has always been one or another sort of economic 
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development domestically and its deployment and management in international activity abroad . . 
. . poverty, inequality and backwardness were major motives of nationalisms” (Desai, 2008, 
398). Understanding the specificity of the national-state form, Friedman and McMichael 
advanced the concept of food regimes, which denoted the ways in which the production and 
consumption of food are linked to dominant historical forms of capital accumulation 
internationally, and which therefore, shape forms of political units and relations within the 
system of states (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 1991, 74).  The first food regime 
was argued to have lasted from 1870 to 1914, a period that coincides with our timeline for the 
consolidation of national-state identities and instruments within the settler colonial world. 
Furthermore, as I have been arguing, this first food regime was the product of the full 
subsumption of labour to capital in Britain, wherein the objective was to enable a complement to 
the development of intensive forms of accumulation with an extensive form involving the 
lowering of wage-goods in metropolitan spaces through the outsourcing of agro-commodity 
production in the temperate regions of settlement (McMichael, 1991, 74). While the colonial 
world market had been predicated on a system of production that integrated satellites into 
metropolitan production structures, this new system was one predicated on self-governing states 
with the capacity to regulate their own economies. This reorganization was underpinned by the 
trade in competitive temperate agricultural products and an international division of labour 
whereby settler regions produced the same products for export that had to compete not only with 
each other but also with the technologically advanced agricultural commodities of continental 
Europe and the United States (Friedman & McMichael, 1989, 96). During this period, American 
wheat constituted one of the primary competitive anchors in the Atlantic wheat market, where 
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following the civil war and the end of blockades, American wheat flooded the market as exports 
soared from 40 to 150 million bushels (Rothstein, 1960, 402). 
Politically, this transformation contributed significantly to the consolidation of the 
national state system, as competitive production necessitated that sectoral relations be 
rearticulated as politically and spatially bounded, and stimulated a pattern of rival protectionism. 
Indeed, continental European states also erected national systems of agricultural protection in the 
face of settler agriculture.  At the same time, in continental Europe, as Lacher points out, the 
national state form began to consolidate around the need to protect absolutist regimes in the face 
of British military superiority (2006, 17). By centralizing and organizing state populations and 
fiscal apparatuses, rival continental states were better able (temporarily) to forestall the erosion 
of absolutist legitimacy. Both in Europe and abroad, the period from the 1860s to 1870s 
witnessed a profound transformation in the nature of state forms.  
Across the Atlantic, the settler colony came to represent both a political territory of 
(assumed) sovereignty as well as a sovereign space of commercialized and integrated sectors of 
production (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989, 100). Its national articulation reflected the 
combined imperatives to form a domestic market and a centralized banking system and to 
organize state resources (capital and labour) towards a common development project 
(McMichael, 1984, 3). This new world order was a contingent and paradoxical development that 
could not be read from some abstract generalization about the capitalist mode of production: it 
was a system of free trade, yet predicated on the concept of international competitive 
specialization, and thus combined with mercantilist principles (Davis, 1997, 75; McMichael, 
1984, 1). Despite these common pressures and developments, however, the settler regions did 
not attempt to reproduce the British liberal state, but rather “in their responses to domestic and/or 
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international politico-economic pressures, they adopted certain constitutional and administrative 
principles that facilitated participation in the international division of labour” (McMichael, 1984, 
11). In other words, as Neil Davidson points out, the invasion of external capital into 
commercially, industrially and productively ‘backward’ spaces affected a subordination to, and 
compulsion to adapt to, a global system of Western finance and banking (2017). In fact, what 
Trotsky noted of later European ‘catch-up’ was already underway several decades before in the 
settler colonies, wherein “Modern forms of production, transport and finance [were] 
superimposed upon and only partially woven into the worn and threadbare pattern of the past” 
(quoted in Davidson, 2017). 
Turning back to the issue of capitalism, universalism, and subjectivity, it is useful to 
recall Sayer and Corrigan’s The Great Arch. According to the authors, the process of state 
building must be understood as a profoundly cultural as well as institutional and economic one. 
State institutions, regulations, and activities are not empty or neutral facts of political life, but are 
profoundly defined through their cultural content. While “social theory, both Marxist and 
sociological, often rests content with the demonstration in general theoretical terms of the 
functionality of the nation state to capitalist production,” the authors argue instead for the need to 
examine the ways in which state development impacts the formation and regulation of identities 
and subjectivities (Sayer & Corrigan, 1985, 2). State activities, forms and institutions will always 
advance partial or differential interests, but attempt to posit those interests as universal—as 
representing an imagined or ‘illusory community’ (Sayer & Corrigan, 1985, 4). This imagined or 
illusory community—the nation—always contains within it the categorization of ‘others,’ both 
internally and externally. Thus, while the national state became an active project in the latter 
quarter of the nineteenth century, its particular form and content could not be determined from 
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the English model. Instead, the legitimization of this particular politico-economic organizational 
strategy assumed novel forms when combined with the extant social class and property relations 
in each unique space. As I will begin to show in the next chapter, these novel forms assumed by 
the state in the colonies of settlement were unique in their explicitly racial definition of ‘the 
people.’  
Conclusion 
 
 I began this chapter with the argument that Marxist political economy in general, and 
Political Marxism in particular, can reveal the ways in which political forms are the outcome of a 
contingent negotiation between abstract laws of development and local realities of the 
organization of power, class, property and production. To make this argument, I examined the 
passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, a piece of legislation that was central in the 
development of the quintessential liberal subject and state form. I argue that the development and 
results of the Amendment Act were not determined by abstract political-economic theory, but 
instead the interaction of these theories with the structural and environmental contingencies of 
the period. Moreover, I argued that the achievement of these liberal models of subject and state 
were presupposed by fundamentally illiberal practices, suggesting that even in the ‘classical’ 
case of bourgeois state development, illiberalism was constitutive of liberal relations.  
 Having demystified the supposed functionalism of juridical equality, rationalization, and 
depersonalization to capitalism, I then argued that there is no reason to expect this model to be 
replicated globally. In doing so, I showed how the realization of the liberal state model in Britain 
achieved the full subsumption of labour to capital, which, along with contingent environmental 
processes, produced a period of protracted economic crisis during the 1830s and 1840s. It was in 
this context that the capitalist mode of production was spread outside of England. In attempting 
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to combat the social and economic crises precipitated by depression, political leaders, at times 
contrary to the interests of dominant classes, sought the implementation of free trade, and an 
international division of production, wherein colonial settlements would produce the 
consumption goods necessary to fuel British industrialization. This implementation occasioned 
the development of the first world market predicated on competitive national production. Yet, 
precisely because this was the way capitalist social relations were extended beyond the 
metropole, the attempt to transplant British social relations onto foreign soil was constantly being 
reformulated, combined and adapted to the ways in which local exigencies were mobilized for 
the competitive agro-economy. This period was the advent of the Atlantic vector of uneven and 
combined development.  
The ways in which states responded to the economic pressures of competitive production 
required a reorganization of social and productive relations along national lines under the aegis 
of market ‘rationality.’ Yet the ways in which such ‘rationality’ was interpreted and developed 
was, of necessity, in dialogue with existing conditions producing novel state and subject forms. 
In the remaining chapters of this study, I undertake a comparative study of settler-colonial 
Canada and Argentina. I explore the processes of state and subject formation in these two settler 
economies, and provide an account for the emergence of a state shot through with coercive, 
personalized power relations based on white supremacy. While making an argument about the 
broader trajectories of racial state formation in the settler colonies, I nevertheless demonstrate 
that the content of ‘whiteness’ as the political subject form and the state form differed 
substantially in each state, owing, in large part, to their uneven and combined integration into 
global commodity market production structures. 
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Chapter 3  Ideas of Backwardness in Settler-Colonial State-Building: 
Nationalism as a Strategy of Political-Economic Catch-Up 
 
 As the British transition to industrial capitalism facilitated the consolidation of the 
modern national state, it became increasingly necessary for emerging economies to adopt a 
centralized and rationalized model of political authority, to assert a monopoly over the lands, 
resources, and loyalties of domestic populations. It was only with the adoption of this model that 
the settler economies could mount a competitive reformulation of their economies that was 
capable of sustaining themselves in the new global food regime. From the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Atlantic became a centrifugal force of uneven and combined 
development whereby the rapidly expanding and increasingly free movement of goods, capital, 
and people created the conditions through which competitive coercion was exerted on the 
Atlantic’s temperate settler colonies. This context forced a reconsideration of colonial state 
structures and an acute awareness of so-called ‘backwardness.’  
Whereas in England state centralization followed the consolidation of a monopoly over 
the land, in the settler economies such political organization was sought as the means of creating 
this monopoly. That is, in order to compete effectively, a central state was required to bind 
together a population and legitimatize and operationalize a sovereign monopolization of territory. 
Whereas in Britain the effective monopolization of land created the conditions of possibility for  
a common political subject, in the settler economies, the rhetoric of a common political subject 
was generated and dispersed in the absence of monopolization; national consolidation was 
deployed as a material strategy to achieve the political-economic structures capable of launching 
a competitive agricultural economy. Furthermore, because this nationalism was to be the means 
to the ends of monopolization, states needed to find a legitimization for the violent dispossession 
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of indigenous peoples. This legitimacy was found by funnelling articulations of national identity 
through a racializing grammar of (un)acceptability. 
In the next section I discuss how the different arrangement of social property relations in 
Argentina and Canada prohibited the operation of a market reliant on production structures. 
Following this, I turn to each of my case studies. Looking at Argentina and Canada, I begin by 
examining the trajectory of political and economic development from initial colonization until 
the mid-nineteenth century. Through this examination, I argue that racialized subjectivities 
cannot be understood as a vestige of ‘pre-modern’ practices but are instead constitutive of 
modernity itself. From here I argue that, in each space coming into the nineteenth century, 
political and geographical factionalism were identified as the primary obstacles to political-
economic consolidation and growth. To this end, nationalism was actively pursued as both an 
ideological and material developmental strategy. Nationalism was to enable and legitimize the 
monopolization of territory in the service of binding together populations and amassing state 
administrative and fiduciary power. Because a central obstacle to the monopolization of land was 
its occupation by sovereign indigenous peoples, nationalism was given shape and legitimacy 
through the language of racial superiority and inferiority. The modern hopes and dreams of the 
nation were counter-posed to the ‘barbarism’ of indigenous peoples as obstacles to progress.    
Social Property Relations, Uneven and Combined Development, and Substitution: Paths to 
Racial Nationalism Under Capitalism 
 
 In the following case studies, I seek to understand the development of nationalism and 
national state organization, articulating legal heterogeneity and racial difference through the 
political economy of social property relations and the uneven and combined development of 
capitalism. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the path to capitalism in England, and to 
the specific forms of statehood and legal-political subjectivity, was a contingent process, which 
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could not be precisely replicated elsewhere. I further argued that, once established in England, 
the conditions of capitalist development began to spread to other parts of the world, compelling 
competitive agro-production in the settler colonies. As the pressures to organize production and 
labour along competitive, market-dependent and capital-intensive methods spread, however, they 
encountered socio-spatial, legal and class relations unlike those that had pertained in England 
during and after the original agrarian transition. In the absence of these original conditions, a 
variety of substitutions were necessary to establish competitive capitalist production. I argue that 
one of these ‘substitutions’ came in the form of racial nationalism, which functioned to stabilize 
and unify the state and population as a precondition for the erection of an effective central state 
monopoly over the apparatuses of coercion, fiscal control, and land. That nationalism assumed a 
hierarchical and racial character was owing to the colonial nature of state formation.  
 In an unpublished dissertation examining the transition to capitalism in Upper and Lower 
Canada, Frantz Gheller gets us some way to understanding the unique nature of capitalist state 
formation in nineteenth-century Canada, which I argue is suggestive of the broader patterns of 
settler colonial state formation. Specifically, Gheller suggests that the fact of colonialism meant 
that settlers faced a very different set of challenges, owing to the nature of property relations 
(2015, 61). Similarly, Fleer and Tobler (2001), Adelman (1994), and Solberg (1987), among 
others, have argued that the nature of colonialism in Argentina established property and class 
relations that made it impossible to replicate either British or American transformations. The 
central challenge Gheller identified in both Lower and Upper Canada was the relative absence of 
the market imperative in order to effect capitalist transitions. This absence was, by and large, 
owing to the low population to land ratio, as well as to the types of activities upon which elite 
classes relied for the reproduction of their wealth and socio-political power (Evans, 2016,141; 
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Gheller, 2015, 62). Similarly, in Argentina, colonialism had established a relatively insulated and 
self-sufficient agrarian elite satisfied with the profits reaped by the carrying trade, and as a result, 
was largely sheltered from any form of market imperative (Fleer & Tobler, 2001).  
The absence of a market imperative, along with the population dynamics endemic to the 
settler state, led to tremendous difficulties in the extraction, organization, and implementation of 
centralized taxation. Given that the transition to agrarian capitalism would require access to 
funds for the purposes of labour-saving techniques, tools, as well as the infrastructure necessary 
to connect agrarian commodities to national and overseas markets, the absence of effective 
administrative capacity and taxation policies in the colony up to the middle of the nineteenth 
century made the organization of competitive commodity production a near insurmountable 
challenge (Gheller, 2015). In the absence of such tools, and facing competitive pressures from 
global markets in the middle-to-late part of the century, organizing production according to a 
national socio-political space became a necessary supplementary strategy.  
 While the Poor Law Reforms of 1834 and centralized taxation, administration and 
bureaucracy were among the chief tools deployed in the English context to bring about the full 
subsumption of labour and production to the market imperative, these options were largely 
unavailable in the Upper and Lower Canadas, and decentralized Argentina throughout the mid-
nineteenth century. The absence of an expropriated peasantry, the presence of an entrenched 
semi-feudal landed elite, and the wide availability of land made the disciplining of subjectivities 
via legislation akin to the Reforms of 1834 an unlikely solution. The arrangement of property 
ownership and distribution along with the productive relations of the population further mitigated 
against the erection of a systemic, centralized and transparent apparatus of taxation (Gheller, 96, 
2015). In the absence of these options, settler colonizers, I argue, turned to the task of actively 
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constructing a national population as a way of fomenting a collective objective and amassing 
administrative capacity and legitimacy through which centralized taxation could be effected, and 
populations could be disciplined, directed and organized so as to produce a competitive market 
economy. The construction of population along national lines, then, became a central tool in the 
project of state building and political subjectification organized around competitive capitalist 
production. In other words, while the organization of capitalist production in England eventuated 
in the centralization of state apparatus along national lines, in the settler colonies, this latter 
stage—that of national, centralized political organization—was deliberately fabricated and 
imposed on colonial territories and populations in advance of, and towards the ends of, capitalist 
production. 
From Colonies of Empire to National Settler Colonies: Examining Argentina and Canada 
 
 In addressing the emergence of national populations in my case studies I want to recall 
the primary problematics that have been established vis-a-vis Anderson and Chatterjee.  First, in 
response to Anderson, I will demonstrate that the development of nationalism in my case studies 
did not sublate racial categorization, but was fundamentally premised upon them. Furthermore, 
in response to the postcolonial critique that nationalism should be understood as a fractured 
process of the political and cultural articulations accorded to bourgeois and colonial classes 
respectively, I show how cultural formulations were advanced in the service of material 
objectives. These objectives were the result of the combined development of social forces. 
Indeed, following the lead of Political Marxists, I show how ideas, culture and politics reflected 
the constraints imposed on class reproduction, such that social hierarchies cannot be thought 
apart from material, political-economic strategies (Gheller, 2015,161). Rejecting cultural 
essentialisms and structural orthodoxy, I follow Gheller, who reads political, legal, cultural and 
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military institutions as constitutive of production; underlying these institutions are relations of 
domination and the rights and powers of property to organize and govern populations for the 
purposes of production and appropriation (2015, 161). Understanding this, I argue that 
capitalism, while marking points of radical rupture, did not simply subsume all that came before 
to the logic of capital. Rather, capital interacted with existing cultural, social, political and 
economic configurations such that a mutual, co-constitution occurred, whereby the operation of 
capitalism, as much as existing practices and patterns of authority and domination, were 
transformed.  
Demonstrating this interactivity, or combination, is essential in understanding the 
particular trajectories of state formation in each space; too often the era of nineteenth-century 
settler state-building has been framed in terms of either the successful dominance of liberalism 
(McKay, 2010), or the failure of liberal institutions to subordinate and subsume parochial power 
relations (Negretto & Aguilar-Rivera, 2000; Rock, 1985). Thus in Canada, the era of state 
building, and particularly of Confederation, is often read in terms of the triumph of liberalism, 
whereas Argentina is viewed in terms of its ultimate failure (despite the efforts of liberal state-
builders). Viewed through the lens of uneven and combined development, however, it becomes 
possible to situate these politically constituted, legally heterogenous processes of capital and 
state formation within the broader liberal context of the nineteenth century, without being reliant 
on a narrative of triumph or failure.   
From Colonial Outpost to Colony of Settlement: The Beginnings of Nationalism in 
Argentina 
 
In this section, I analyze the conditions under Spanish colonialism in the Río de la Plata 
as they relate to national configurations and racial categorizations. I argue that under the Spanish 
colonial regime, there was no systematic ordering of peoples based on racial criteria. This was 
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not to come until the rise of nationalism in the ‘post-independence’ period. I trace these relations 
to show, in later sections, that the articulation of national imaginaries around racial criteria did 
not constitute simply a sphere of ‘cultural difference,’ nor was it purely the result of colonial 
rule, broadly understood as pre-modern and illiberal. Rather, what I will show is that such 
differential sorting of populations was formed under and towards liberal capitalist settler 
colonial relations, a colonial form distinct from the mercantile interests of the Iberian empire.  
 
Prelude to the Settler Regime: Spanish Colonialism in the Río de la Plata 
 
 The Spanish first arrived at the mouth of the Río de la Plata in 1516, attempting to find a 
shorter route to Asia as well as to delay the southward movement of the Portuguese (Scobie, 
1964, 41). Part of the reason that the region remained marginal to the Spanish was because of its 
(relatively) small and dispersed indigenous populations, who were dominantly unsettled and thus 
did not offer the economic incentive that the more populated regions elsewhere on the continent 
did; Argentina was merely a conduit to greater resources, both human and natural. Apart from 
the direct economic incentive of exploiting dense populations, the hunting, nomadic lifestyles of 
many of the regions’ indigenous populations made the establishment of Spanish towns 
difficult—they could neither rely on established agricultural development nor could they easily 
exert control over the land. Indeed, much of the lands of the Pampas, Patagonia, and Chaco were 
controlled by indigenous peoples throughout the colonial period and, even after independence, 
into the nineteenth century. Even the port city of Buenos Aires (the eventual commercial and 
political epicenter of Argentina) was to remain marginal to the colonial regime (despite being 
settled in 1580) until the eighteenth century, wherein the Bourbon reforms and the establishment 
of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776 officially sanctioned the city as the trading hub 
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of the Spanish Empire. Until that point, however, Buenos Aires proved unattractive to traders, 
accustomed as they were to the positions that had been already established along the Panama-
Lima trading route, and owing to the security concerns posed by establishing trade routes 
through the sparsely settled Argentine interior (Scobie, 1964, 40-55; Shumway, 1991, 8-13). 
Furthermore, attempts to ‘settle’ the interior through the granting of indigenous lands and the 
assignment of indigenous peoples to work these tributary lands (what became known as the 
encomenderos) was largely ineffectual given the scope of indigenous sovereignty that remained 
at this time, hence their refusal to submit to Spanish assignment (Zimmerman, 1945, 3). Thus, at 
the end of the colonial period, Argentina remained a scattered agglomeration of isolated 
settlements (Scobie estimates about 14 cities, settled between 50 and 400 miles apart) with little 
to no political-economic infrastructure, and dominated by nomadic indigenous and gaucho 
groups (Shumway, 1991, 12; Scobie, 1964, 62). In effect, there was little socio-economic, 
political or cultural administrative colonial coherence to the region that would later comprise the 
national territories of Argentina. 
 The establishment of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776 was the last and 
shortest lived of the Spanish Viceroyalties and largely came about through an effort to shore up 
Spanish colonial rule in the face of the increasing pressure of Western European states (namely 
the British and Dutch). Long used as an illegal trading port by the British and Dutch, Buenos 
Aires had become a pivotal center around which competing powers were making commercial 
gains on the continent and challenging the Spanish hold on its possessions. In the hopes of 
establishing a bulwark against these encroaching forces, the Viceroyalty was created, making 
Buenos Aires its administrative and commercial capital. In this manner, it was hoped that the 
Spanish could regain control over this neglected but exceedingly important port city. The 
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establishment of the Viceroyalty, in turn, led to the legalization of trade through Buenos Aires in 
1778, giving the interior provinces access to the world market (Tapson, 1962, 16). The opening 
of Buenos Aires to legalized trade with the world market and the interior provinces, therefore, 
generated an unquenchable thirst for arable land, bringing ranchers into direct conflict with the 
indigenous populations—and it was at this point, in the dying gasps of the Spanish colonial era, a 
mere 34 years before the declaration of independence, that any real semblance of an ‘Indian 
problem’ could be discerned. This is to say that the systematized, racial classification and 
subjectification of indigenous groups in the Río de la Plata was not conceivable until the close of 
the eighteenth century. And indeed, this general conclusion has broader applicability in Latin 
America, where most commentators point to the mid and particularly later part of the nineteenth 
century, following the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, as the period for the emergence 
of systematized, legitimized and increasingly politicized racial identities (Graham, 1990, 2). 
Colonial-Indigenous Relations in the Río de la Plata 
 
In part, it has been suggested that Argentina remained marginal to the Spanish colonial 
interest in the Americas owing to the ‘scarcity’ of indigenous labour to be exploited. To be sure, 
the regions comprising today’s Argentina were far less densely populated than other regions 
throughout the Americas. However, it is also worth noting that intense indigenous resistance to 
colonial submission was also a critical factor. It is commonly suggested in the literature on 
colonial Argentina that the largely nomadic indigenous groups peopling the pampas were 
notoriously and successfully resistant to the imposition of personal labour services by the 
Spanish colonists. Indeed, by 1599, there was said to be not a single indigenous person in 
imposed labour service of the Spaniards at Buenos Aires or any of its surrounding environs. 
Indigenous labour was so scarce that when, from 1605 to 1606, the indigenous populations were 
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radically reduced by the spread of the plague, the labour needs of Spanish colonists were so great 
that locals petitioned the Spanish crown in 1607 to be allowed to bring in African slaves from 
Brazil and Angola (Zimmerman, 1945, 4). And yet, this was hardly a solution as the labour 
requirements of the Spanish were dominantly in land intensive production, and thus were 
seasonal by nature. The fixed outlay of capital for a slave was uneconomical, and thus the 
Spanish resorted not to a system of forced labour exploitation of the indigenous, but to a nascent 
system of temporary indigenous immigration from the interior on the basis of wage contracts 
(Saguier, 1986, 72). Not only did this minimize the capital costs associated with production, but 
it also served as an attempt to strengthen ties with internal populations of indigenous groups, a 
necessary condition given the heavy reliance of Buenos Aires on trade routes that traversed the 
interior of the Río de la Plata, extending into the Viceroyalty of Peru.  
Furthermore, the indigenous peoples, as largely nomadic and characterized by non-
hierarchical organization, rendered the control and colonization of labour difficult as the Spanish 
lacked access to leaders with whom to negotiate, as well as settlements to threaten with 
destruction to subdue indigenous groups. In short, the indigenous populations of the Río de la 
Plata did not provide the same kind of labour services for the Spanish that were found elsewhere 
throughout the Americas (Campetella, 2008, 50). While a possible response to this argument 
may well be that Argentina was an exceptional case under the Spanish conquest of the Americas, 
such response would only serve to deepen the argument I am making regarding the necessity of 
linking material practices of production and reproduction to socio-cultural subjectivities and 
stratification. It was, after all, the material organization of labour practices that distinguished 
Argentina’s indigenous populations from many other indigenous populations under Spanish 
colonial rule.   
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 If the colonial relationship between the Spanish and indigenous populations was not one 
predicated primarily on labour exploitation, one might ask what types of relationships did exist, 
and whether the eliminatory drive and racial ordering of a settler colonial relationship instead 
predominated. To this latter question, there appears little evidence to provide an answer in the 
affirmative. Rather, it appears that, though the Spanish interest in the indigenous peoples of the 
River Plate was not predominantly attributable to labour exploitation, the colonial population 
nonetheless exhibited numerous interdependencies with indigenous peoples, and thus sustained 
an interest in protecting, to a limited extent, the continuity of their cultural and physical lives. 
Central amongst these dependencies and interdependencies were relations predicated on 
navigation, security and trade (Schofield Saeger, 1985, 506-508). Such interdependencies, 
furthermore, inhibited the colonial compulsion to ‘civilize’ or ‘fix’ ‘barbaric’ indigenous 
peoples, as the utility of skills that could be provided were more pressing while the nature of 
these interdependencies rendered the bodies of indigenous peoples difficult to subject to control; 
navigation, trade and security provisions often required long periods spent in territories relatively 
unknown to the Spanish (Campetella, 2008, 74). In this way, the Spanish were often forced to 
negotiate under the terms provided by indigenous peoples themselves, a relationship denoting a 
level of implied autonomy and sovereignty rather than subservience.  
 For example, the introduction of feral herds to the pampas and Gran Chaco regions 
transformed the economies of Guarani and Pampas indigenous peoples such that they came to 
rely increasingly on barter for horse and cattle, rather than on traditional hunting and fishing 
livelihoods. These transformations led to adaptations of indigenous peoples in order to procure 
bartering material, one strategy of which was to capture Spanish colonists to trade for European 
commodities (Schofield Saeger, 1985, 496). In this way, extensive (though illicit) trading 
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networks were opened between the Spanish and indigenous peoples of the Río de la Plata, which 
became increasingly interdependent. Furthermore, the early colonial silver trade involved the 
transportation of mules from Buenos Aires to Potosi and silver in the reverse direction, covering 
an interior road that stretched 3,000 miles at an altitude of 12,000 feet in places, through the 
interior of the River Plate region (Wrigely, 1916, 116). In areas nearly inaccessible to the 
Spanish colonists, indigenous peoples were relied on to complete the more arduous and un-
navigable stretches of the trade route.  
 The early Spanish colonists, then, were not engaged in an attempt to eliminate, 
assimilate, or categorize indigenous peoples through immutable categories of racial subjectivity. 
Rather, there was a degree of interdependency, predicated on some semblance of acknowledged 
indigenous sovereignty, which made such practices both undesirable and unrealizable. What we 
see is Spanish colonial rule operating as an external imposition upon and subjugation of 
indigenous peoples’ autonomy and freedom, without an attempt to actively intervene in the 
internal practices of indigenous communities. Spanish colonial rule thus introduced practices of 
violence and oppression, but they did not necessarily mark a fundamental rupture in socio-
economic, political, and epistemic practices. The question of a foreign imposition of violence 
and oppression is not a uniquely modern phenomena. Rather, the relevant question is to what 
ends these practices are aimed and with what outcomes.  
Bourbon Reforms and the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata 
 
 The Bourbon Reforms of the Spanish Crown, throughout the eighteenth century, were 
intended to ‘modernize’ Spanish manufacturing and trade relations, while reasserting supremacy 
over creole populations within Spanish American colonial communities. In many ways, these 
objectives forced a reconsideration of the hitherto forgotten external frontiers and borderlands of 
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the Spanish empire. Through illicit negotiations with creole populations in these frontiers and 
borderlands, Spain’s European rivals had been able to negotiate mercantile access to trading 
ports and interior routes to Potosi and Lima, and it was this access that the Spanish wished to put 
an end to with its ‘re-conquest’ of the imperial hinterland (Weber, 2004, 9). Thus, as was noted 
above, the creation of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata in 1776, under the Bourbon reformers, 
brought the port city of Buenos Aires more firmly under Spanish colonial control, in an effort to 
block the access of British and Dutch merchants to the interior of Spanish America (Campetella, 
2008, 1).  
Under Bourbon reforms there was, as before, no single ‘Indian’ policy (Weber, 2004, 11). 
As previously noted, in many ways the opening of Buenos Aires to legal trade created pressures 
on creole producers to push the frontier further and further inland, coming into direct and violent 
confrontation with indigenous peoples in attempts to seize land for pasturage. However, of more 
pressing concern was the defense of the port city from both endogenous indigenous threats and 
exogenous British invasion, and it was this concern that perhaps led to a policy of prioritizing 
peaceful treaties with indigenous peoples over violent conflict for land (Weber, 2004, 21). While 
the former should not depreciate the severity of the latter, the point is to suggest that as of yet 
there was no systemic policy of elimination and assimilation. Because Buenos Aires became the 
pivotal commercial center for the Spanish Empire, its stability and peace, above all, was the 
central objective (Weber, 2004, 27).  
 With regard to securing peace from endogenous conflict, the Bourbon policy was 
generally one that sought to make peace treaties with the groups whose conquest was not 
immediately and easily possible. For much of the indigenous peoples of Argentina, notably the 
Pampas, this was the case. As a result, a series of peace treaties were negotiated throughout the 
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latter half of the eighteenth century. Such treaties often recognized the juridical equality of 
indigenous peoples and lacked any stipulations regarding mandatory tribute or evangelization 
(Robinson, 1970, 30; Schofield Saeger, 1985, 499-502; Weber, 2005, 10). With many of the 
Pampas, these peace treaties lasted until the end of the Spanish colonial period. 
 The provisions of peace through treaty negotiations were also often bound into 
commercial relations between the Spanish and indigenous peoples, such that during the 1806 
British invasion of Buenos Aires, it was not only the bottom line of Spanish pillage and profits 
that was at stake. Having become dependent upon, and bound into, the commercial trade of 
Buenos Aires, many of the Pampas’ indigenous groups would have similarly been threatened by 
the British invasion. As a result, the Spanish defense of Buenos Aires was in large part secured 
through the assistance (which accounts appear to depict as ‘voluntary’) of the treaty indigenous 
peoples of the Pampas (Weber, 2004, 21). This, of course, is not to suggest that indigenous 
peoples sought to save the colonial regime. Indeed, when creole populations rebelled against the 
Spanish and asserted independence in 1810, there was little in the way of indigenous resistance. 
Rather, it was that the livelihoods of indigenous peoples were intrinsically tied into the 
continuity of commercial and treaty relations with Buenos Aires, and the British invasion of 
1806 posed a plausible threat to this situation. And as has been demonstrated, the stability of 
Buenos Aires in turn depended on the Spanish forming peaceable relations with an indigenous 
population who could not otherwise be colonized. The importance of this analysis is to recognize 
that the early colonial period neither fully subsumed nor ignored indigenous peoples’ practices, 
but rather the indigenous and colonial existed in an often fraught series of interactions in which 
the forcible subsumption of one to the other was not a clear-cut matter.  
Transition to an Independent State: The Nineteenth Century  
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In this brief section detailing the struggle for independence in Argentina, I want to 
demonstrate that there was no automatic or easy transposition of colonial administrative 
boundaries onto the new state (contra Anderson’s account of nationalist development in the 
Americas). Notably, the boundaries of Argentina remained highly unstable and contested owing 
to strategic differences between oligarchical and metropolitan classes until the latter half of the 
century. This suggests that the socio-economic organization of political territory and 
subjectivities that followed independence marked important discontinuities from the colonial 
regime. In other words, the settler colonial regime marked a distinct socio-economic and political 
formation that cannot be simply traced back to 1492. 
As a result of the failed British invasions of Buenos Aires, in 1806 and again in 1807, the 
population of the port city had become highly militarized. Anyone who could bear arms did, 
which provided a significant revolutionary capacity for local anti-crown forces when internal 
Spanish turbulence opened space for revolution in 1810. Furthermore, Spain’s own intra-
European rivalries stoked the flames of revolution in Buenos Aires. Notably, declarations of war 
on Portugal, though largely ineffectual within Europe, led to Brazilian attacks on the Banda 
Oriental in a conflict over supremacy for the River Plate, creating intense pressures on internal 
finances, while the Spanish declaration of war on Britain from 1796 to 1808 led to significant 
blockades on Spanish trade with Buenos Aires, eviscerating customs revenue for the city. 
Increasingly, merchants in Buenos Aires began to turn to Spain’s European rivals for imported 
goods, notably British suppliers (Adelman, 1999, 40-43). It was largely towards an attempt to 
rescue if not accelerate commercial prosperity in Buenos Aires that self-government was seized 
in a junta led by Saavedra, a military official and statesman for the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata 
(Shumway, 1991, 17).   
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On May 25, 1810 independence from Spain was declared by forces in Buenos Aires and 
the first government, La Primera Junta was formed, headed by Saavedra and Mariano Moreno 
(Shumway, 1991, 17). Claiming the date of 1810 as Argentina’s Independence Day, however, 
has been problematized, as the proceeding 60 years were riddled with civil conflict over which 
territories would be contained by the new republic and under what form of political organization 
(Criscenti, 1961, 367). Notably, a significant rift persisted between the Unitarians and 
Federalists, often associated with Moreno and Saavedra respectively. The former was policy-
driven by European (notably British) influence, seeking to unify the River Plate region under the 
supremacy of Buenos Aires, and predicated on a commitment to liberalism and free trade 
(Shumway, 1991, 33; Rock, 1985, 80). The latter position was characterized by provincial 
interests and the fear of Buenos Aires supremacy, as free trade was seen to threaten internal 
production and manufactures, whilst enriching only the port city. The latter was also 
characterized by generally conservative values, and was suspicious of overly friendly and open 
ties with Europe. The relative weight and power of these two positions would vacillate over the 
course of the remainder of the century and give Argentina its peculiar arrangement of social 
property relations.  
Political-economic Vacillations: The Intercourse of Liberal and Conservative Politics in the 
Consolidation of the Argentine State 
 
 Perhaps the earliest and best-known liberal figure associated with the Unitarian position 
was Bernardino Rivadavia. After the fall of Moreno, Saavedra had replaced the Primera Junta 
with the Junta Grande, extending it to include representatives from the interior and allowing for 
provincial juntas to gain recognition and representation (Rock, 1985, 85). However, the eventual 
loss of Peru from the loose federation of provinces under the independence junta led to the 
dissolution of the Junta Grande and its replacement, in 1811, by the First Triumvirate, a Unitarist 
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organization. At this point, only 39, 258 square kilometers were under the direct control of 
Buenos Aires, and it was this problem to which Rivadavia would devote the majority of his 
attention. With the creation of the triumvirate, Rivadavia was appointed to the position of 
secretary and it was in this position that he began to articulate a liberal program, favouring the 
aggressive defense of Buenos Aires and the nationalization of land in order to achieve a ‘settler 
nation’ in the model of America (Rock 1985, 86; Zimmerman, 1945, 8).  
 As secretary, Rivadavia did not hold any voting power in the Triumvirate, but he was 
nevertheless vocal in proposing a system of land colonization through European immigration. In 
September of 1812 Rivadavia argued that any creole or foreigner willing and able to till the soil 
should obtain land from the state (Zimmerman, 1945, 8). Such proposals, however, did not gain 
very much traction in the early days of Argentine independence, and the First Triumvirate fell in 
1812, replaced quickly by the Second Triumvirate, which dissolved in 1814. However, in this 
period, Rivadavia passed his second important piece of legislation, which was to end all special 
privileges that had hitherto governed the distribution and occupation of land (such as titles of 
nobility), and decreed all public lands the property of the nation (Zimmerman, 1945, 9). Much of 
the political turmoil at this time hinged upon the costly war of independence with Spain, 
compounded by civil war with the interior provinces, which rejected the Unitarist stance of the 
triumvirate. Perhaps the biggest reason for this was that the costly wars of independence had left 
the provinces and state bereft of any revenue or means through which to pay soldiers. The only 
resource available to the provincial states was land, and it was through the endowment of titles to 
land to decommissioned soldiers that payment for service was made. In declaring all public lands 
the property of the state, Rivadavia had undermined the capacity of the provinces to manage and 
subordinate its decommissioned soldiers. Indeed, lacking any autonomous sources of revenue, 
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the provincial states also lacked effective monopoly over the deployment of violence, and the 
nationalization of land further emaciated the provinces’ capacities to uphold authority and 
control or limit conflict and political competition (De La Fuente, 2000, 19; Zimmerman, 1945, 
10). 
 In February 1826, Rivadavia was named president of Argentina. Assuming the office of 
presidency, Rivadavia immediately found that the national coffers were all but empty, owing in 
large part to the vast military expenditures that characterized a state of ongoing warfare. Public 
salaries were in arrears, and the treasury was empty, while public credit had all but vanished. The 
solution Rivadavia sought was to turn to London for a loan of 15,000 pesos (Zimmerman, 1945, 
11). However, to guarantee this loan, Rivadavia needed to establish national ownership of fiscal 
lands. This was the context for one of Rivadavia’s most important acts as president, the Law of 
Emphyteusis of 1826. Prior to this, land had continued to be administered in much the same 
manner as it was under the Spanish; titles generally belonged to the state, though private parties 
were mostly free to exploit that land. Following the frontier wars, under Rodriguez, and the 
climbing government debt, however, it became a state imperative to lay claim to, administer and 
adjudicate stolen indigenous lands. Under this law, lands charged a rent of eight percent of the 
assessed value of pasture land or four percent that of crop land—though remaining state property 
could be granted in the form of long-term rights of use and access (Zimmerman, 1945, 11). The 
latent expectation of this arrangement, then, was that granting of land access in the form of long-
term leases would render quantifiable ‘improvements’ to the land. The productivity of ranchers 
and farmers, after all, would ensure the payment of these rents, thus generating state revenue and 
a promising domestic agricultural economy.  
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This being said, Rivadavia’s explicit objectives were mercantile in nature, as it was 
hoped that land rents would offset trade duties, enabling an expansion in national trade. In the 
long run, however, the Law of Emphyteusis was a failure. The administrative weakness of the 
government, along with the provincial-national rifts made the collection of rents difficult to 
enforce (Zimmerman, 1945, 12). Additionally, the law did not specify a limit to the area of land 
that lessees could claim, and resulted in ranchers being able to obtain increasingly large and 
concentrated tracts of land. An estimated 6.5 million acres of land were leased under a mere 122 
emphyteusis contracts (Rock, 1991, 99). Large-scale landowners were interested in two things, 
neither of which accorded with Rivadavia’s objectives: cattle ranching and speculation. In fact, 
while unintended, Rivadavia’s land policy contributed to the rise of a large, concentrated, land-
owning class.  
 In 1827, Rivadavia’s presidency fell and the newly constituted republic (created under 
Rivadavia’s 1826 Constitution) plummeted into two years of civil war, predominantly between 
the Federalists and Unitarists, but also characterized by external wars, notably with Brazil. It was 
amidst the chaos of these two years of war that the dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas would rise to 
power, assuming governorship of Buenos Aires in 1829 and remaining in office (with two brief, 
voluntary retirements) until 1852. To examine the legacy of Rosas is an enormous undertaking, 
and one that cannot be dealt with in any great detail here. For our purposes, however, there are a 
few critical aspects of his term(s) in power. I wish to draw attention to Rosas’s federalism and 
ranching bias, his frontier wars against indigenous peoples, and his introduction of private 
ownership.  
 A self-styled federalist, Rosas reversed the republican designation of Argentina under the 
1826 Constitution through his signing of the Federal Pact of 1831, creating the Argentine 
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Confederation, which officially recognized provincial autonomy. However, this federalism was 
largely a lopsided affair, as his concerns were with the aggrandizement of his own province, 
Buenos Aires, to the detriment of all others (a goal that, in fact, fundamentally contradicted the 
general federalist goal) (De la Fuente, 2000, 8; Gautreau & Garavaglia, 2012, 31; Rock, 2000, 
183). Indeed, it was through federalism that Rosas could ensure the containment of Buenos 
Aires’ revenues. Beyond his federalist stance, however, Rosas was born from a family of 
ranchers, and this bias was central to his government. In an attempt to reverse the Rivadavian 
emphasis on mercantile interests, Rosas completely re-engineered public spending, increasing 
rural spending three-fold from 1831 to 1834, while non-military urban spending halved in the 
same period. Important to the dismantling of Rivadavian policy was the decree in 1832 whereby 
Rosas ordered all renters to pay their arrears within three months. Those who could not pay (with 
Rosas’s discretion targeting Unitarians) would have their rental leases terminated, with the lands 
being sold to private individuals thereafter (Zimmerman, 1945, 13). This was the beginning of 
the privatization of land in Argentina.   
In reorienting government spending to the military, Rosas was concerned with the further 
conquest of frontier lands, culminating in his enormous, so-called ‘Desert Campaign’ under 
which more than 100,000 indigenous peoples were killed and frontier fortifications were erected 
from 1836 to 1837.  As a means of administering these newly acquired lands, Rosas disbanded 
the Law of Emphyteusis in favour of a paternalistic distribution of land to soldiers who had 
participated in the frontier campaign (Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 24). Ultimately, however, soldiers 
sold much of these lands to the large ranchers of the pampas, and in this way, under Rosas, the 
centralization of land under big ranchers was furthered (Adelman, 1999, 128). Land had, once 
again, become the primary means through which political power was produced, reproduced and 
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distributed (Adelman, 1999, 110). Thus, it was under Rosas that the first broadly successful 
campaign against indigenous dispossession was led, while the tensions between Unitarists and 
Federalists were exacerbated and the first attempts at (contained) land privatization began.  
By mid-century, when the pressures of global market commodity production were 
beginning to impinge upon the arid cereal-producing regions, the Argentine state had neither the 
land nor the population upon which to rely for the collection of taxes for building public 
infrastructure, directing colonial settlement and administering a program of agricultural 
development (Adelman, 1999, 229). Further to this, those who did possess such resources were 
the large ranchers and land speculators whose reproduction would have been stymied by a shift 
to wheat production or the fragmentation of landholdings for the settlement of farming families 
(Adelman, 1999, 278; Solberg, 1987, 28)). This, then, was the landscape of social property 
relations, on which capitalist pressures would impinge.  
The fall of Rosas was a critical turning point in Argentine state-building. Rosas had 
begun the process of instituting private property; however he did so in a manner that was both 
intentionally and de facto protected from market pressures. In the first instance, Rosas had 
combined privatized property relations with cronyism, which dictated differential and politicized 
access to interior and international markets. As such, many producers were not given access to 
spaces in which competition impinged on productive activities (Adelman, 1999, 112). On the 
other hand, as a result of the Anglo-French blockade for several years under Rosas, the 
Argentine economy was denied access to important markets in which the competitive production 
of grains had begun to emerge (Adelman, 1999, 124-126; Rock, 2008, 53). Thus, it was only 
with the fall of Rosas that the full effect of London’s shift to free trade was felt.   
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Barbarism versus Civilization: The Generation of 1837 and the Consolidation of National 
‘Whiteness’ 
 
In this final section I begin to trace the first efforts to organize and name a national 
population in Argentina, demonstrating that this conceptualization of nation was a) a 
fundamental strategy of state building and capitalist development which b) would come to be 
based on a racial hierarchy of political belonging. I hope to bring my critique of both Anderson 
and the postcolonial position around full circle by pointing to the following key factors. First, 
while not denying the centrality of epistemic, cultural and discursive practices in affecting 
colonial power and consolidating subjectivities, I demonstrate how these were fundamentally 
tied to a new project of socio-economic organization—that is to say, one was increasingly 
motivated by efforts to erect competitive capitalist agro-production targeted for world export 
markets. Faced, however, with the obstacles of administrative and fiscal weakness, the 
consolidation of a national identity was a strategy of substitution; it stood in for and became the 
foundation upon which the governing elite sought to develop its own administrative and fiscal 
centralization along with international credit-worthiness. Second, I demonstrate that the analysis 
of nation building cannot uncritically assume that success or failure hinges on a liberal bourgeois 
character and presumptions of civic homogeneity. The equation of capitalist modernity with a 
metropolitan industrial bourgeoisie is an erroneous reading, and misses the centrality of agrarian 
relations in the transformation of the productive landscape, in dialogue with, but not 
subordinated to, global and local bourgeois interests. Liberalism fused with, and in many 
instances advanced the interests of, existing landed classes of the provinces. As will be clear, the 
conceptualization of an Argentine nation, articulated in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
was neither the product of the liberal Unitarists nor the provincial Federalists alone, but rather 
represented the interpenetration and combination of European ideas of liberal political economy 
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and traditional practices of social production and reproduction. Thus, contrary to the postcolonial 
critique it is possible to read the emergence of national formations that are neither fully liberal, 
nor fully traditional without relying on a ‘modernity/tradition’ binary, while nevertheless keeping 
capitalist social relations central. Importantly, we are able to explain how conventionally illiberal 
practices were foundational to the constitution of liberal states. Specifically, variable racialized 
formulations of political belonging were generative of and foundational to capitalist state forms 
in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world.  
In the early 1830s, several prominent members of the Argentine intelligentsia would 
come together to develop a platform to make Argentina a ‘modern nation.’ Referred to as the 
Generation of 1837, the group was comprised of, among others, Esteban Echeverría, Juan 
Bautista Alberdi, Manuel Cané, Vincente Fidel Lópex, Juan María Guitérrez and (future 
presidents of the republic) Domingo F. Sarmiento (1868–74) and Bartolomé Mitre (1862–68). 
Initially building upon the legacy of Rivadavia and against the policies of the Rosas dictatorship, 
the relationship between the Generation of ’37 and these two political figures is much more 
complicated than this simple juxtaposition suggests. Thus, for example, Alberdi would criticize 
Rivadavia’s attempt to falsely borrow European models without consultation with the ‘organic 
tendencies’ of ‘the people,’ while suggesting that his autocracy aside, Rosas did just this and 
provided a necessary stepping stone to the development of an organic and nationally unified 
democratic republic (Shumway, 1991, 123). Furthermore, both Alberdi and Sarmiento were 
critical of Rivadavia’s policies extending the franchise, instead insisting that liberal statehood 
would have to be preceded by a conservative process of liberal nation-building (Negretto and 
Aguilar-Rivera, 2000, 370). The people were not themselves capable of determining the course 
and interests of the nation, and had to undergo an education of sorts before gaining such 
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capability. Indeed, precisely because of the cultural movement represented by Rosas (tied to 
caudillo federalism and a political contest for power) Alberdi would formulate his nation-
building project as “civil liberty for all, political liberty for a few” (quoted in Spektorowski, 
2000, 84). As Lomnitz has argued, nationalism in the Americas did not crystalize around a single 
fraternal imaginary, but instead politically bifurcated a community otherwise bound by common 
loyalties; civil liberty for all was mediated by the distinction between full and partial, strong and 
weak citizens, whereby the strong functioned as intermediaries between the state and the 
politically partial citizen (2001, 338).  Gabriel Negretto and José Antonio Aguilar-Rivera have 
further argued that the operation of liberalism in Latin America was more broadly concerned 
with the creation, legitimation and regularization of effective state authority (as in American 
republicanism) than with political liberty (2000, 369). Rather than read Argentine liberal nation-
building as a failure to subordinate traditional authority and power structures, this dissertation 
makes clear that the Argentine state in the latter half of the nineteenth century represented 
neither the unimpeded continuity of parochial political power nor a replication of European 
liberalism; what emerged was a novel state form that erected political mechanisms of liberal 
ordering alongside stratified and hierarchicalized models of political subjectivity. In the tensions 
articulated by liberal state-builders, we can discern a consciousness of presumed socio-political 
backwardness and a willingness to borrow innovations from abroad, yet caution that such 
innovations would have to be reconfigured according to local conditions.   
 The Generation of ’37 identified, as its primary targets, the problems of unifying the 
provinces and of combatting the apparent problems posed by a vast and modestly populated land 
mass (Shumway, 1991, 112; Ward, 2007, 86). On the one hand, the Generation of ’37 sought to 
transform the so-called barren, barbaric and unproductive Pampean lands into a US-style 
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agricultural-led development and diversification process (Adelman, 1994, 67-69; Fleer & Tobler, 
2001, 18; Rock, 2008, 63). It was thought that an alteration in the physical environment would 
precipitate a transformation in the ‘civilization’ of the peoples and thereby stimulate ‘progress’ 
in the style of the agricultural development of the United States (Shumway, 1991, 136). On the 
other hand, this symbolic juxtaposition of land occupation and progress was materially 
complemented by the post-Rosas objectives of stabilizing and unifying a politically and 
ideologically fragmented population. By 1852, after decades of non-representative political 
practice, the liberal regimes that followed required some semblance of popular legitimation. The 
heavy-handed authoritarian practices of the Rosas era had to be, at least nominally, replaced by 
civic institutions. However, this too required the deliberate fomentation of a population bound 
together by a common national character and developmental project, for the ‘environmental’ 
conditions of political factionalism and divided historical loyalties would mitigate the liberal 
agenda of an active and interventionist state (Szuchman, 2006, 336). The former problem 
combined with the latter to produce racialized understandings of national character and identity. 
For the latter relied on the conditions of the former: to rally together and advance a centralized 
national-state project of development required, first, the consolidation of interior land holdings 
and the wresting of power from the provincial landed elite, which implicitly and explicitly 
denied the political and ideological merit and agency of those whose lands, labour and 
livelihoods were being alienated (Szuchman, 2006, 340).  
  The period from the 1860s to the 1880s marked the foundational years in the forging of 
the Argentine national state, which would decisively replace the provincial state as the primary 
locus of power, rights, and responsibilities (Rock, 2008, 178). In tackling the so-called 
environmental problem, the post-Rosas ruling elite sought to bring Argentine lands under a 
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common regime of property rights and establish an agricultural export economy that required 
both the building of a national rail system and the settlement of European immigrants to 
transform the arid grasslands. In the first instance, this strategy required the subjugation of 
indigenous peoples and the transformation of their lands into agricultural production zones. 
While the Rosas regime had played a significant role in frontier genocide and dispossession, it 
was the post-Rosas regime that established and codified Pampean property rights with the Rural 
Code of 1871 (Szuchman, 2006, 340).  
On the other hand, it was recognized that none of this was possible in advance of a 
nationally consolidated state. “National organization, as he [Alberdi] and the liberals called the 
state-building project, would promote rapid economic growth. It would enable the opening of the 
country’s great rivers to domestic and foreign trade, the construction of railways and the 
attraction of European immigrants” (Rock, 2000, 179). However, from Rosas to Sarmiento lay a 
troubled path of fiscal uncertainty and political struggle over public coffers. The post-Rosas 
Argentine state builders were faced with several related obstacles, among which were: a) 
emaciated provincial states lacking a monopoly over the use of land and the deployment of force, 
making them beholden to the parochial interests of internal, provincial caudillos and estancia 
owners (De la Fuente, 2000, 19), b) a mercantile trade that was effectively demolished and a 
public finance system almost exclusively reliant on import duties (Adelman, 1999, 224), c) a 
chronic shortage of money and massive public debt, which begged the creation of an effective 
monetary regime (Adelman, 1999, 229), and d) the necessity of readjusting Argentina’s internal 
legal systems so as to discipline local practices to the exigencies of the global market, which had 
undergone significant transformations during the 1840s but had been neglected by Rosas 
(Adelman, 1999, 224).  
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 The post-Rosas state builders, starting with Urquiza, followed by Mitre, Sarmiento and 
Avellaneda, emerged at a time in which, as we will recall from the previous chapter, the 
conditions for first global food regime were beginning to percolate. The international wheat 
market, commencing in 1846 and centred on England, was on a precipitous rise throughout the 
1860s, peaking in the 1870s when US wheat flooded the international market, dominated British 
imports, and thereby exerted mounting pressure on new economies to make leaps in efficiency 
and productivity (Rothstein, 1960, 401-402). Liberal state builders in Argentina, in addition to 
addressing the above problems, were also faced with the pressures of an increasingly competitive 
and commodified global agricultural system. A common solution to all the above problems, for 
these post-Rosas leaders, was found in the unification of a national peoples and a strong, 
centralized state. Thus, the state builders following Rosas sought to appropriate and centralize a 
monopoly over the exercise of violence, restoring order and establishing centralized authority; 
they sought to transform the financial reliance on imports and inflationary policies that 
dominated Rosas by establishing a staples export economy to replace the dilapidated merchant 
system, which, in turn, would rely on substantial long-term foreign borrowing to establish the 
necessary infrastructure of an export economy (primarily rails and communication networks). 
Establishing the ‘creditworthiness’ of the state, necessary to relying on a policy of long-term 
debt, in turn required the establishment of the conditions necessary to engender trust and state 
capacity to enforce contracts and guarantee loans (Saiegh, 2007, 12-18). The state-builders in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century turned to the formation of a common set of behavioral norms 
to unify and legitimize state institutions and debt financing in Argentina. 
 The first attempts at unification were made under Urquiza, but ultimately failed. Urquiza 
established the first Constitution in 1853, and made its central goal that of unifying the provinces 
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under a central government (Adelman, 1999, 196). However, his sympathetic stance towards the 
provinces saw the Constitution making fiscal concessions that Buenos Aires found unacceptable. 
As a result, the Constitution was ratified without Buenos Aires, which would temporarily 
establish itself as an independent state (Shumway, 1991, 171). Nevertheless, Urquiza began the 
first major projects of transportation, attempting to bring together the interior provinces in a 
common commercial project of export agriculture. While the absence of Buenos Aires’s port 
revenues proved insurmountable, and the realization of major infrastructural projects would have 
to wait until some form of fiscal unity could be achieved, Urquiza’s government began the first 
centralized policy of unification through dispossession that would gather steam under subsequent 
administrations (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera, 2000, 379; Shumway, 1991, 175). Thus, for 
example, the Urquiza government negotiated the first concession made by a central government 
with the American William Wheelwright to construct the Central Argentine railway, connecting 
Rosario to Córdoba. This concession induced foreign interests to invest capital in Argentina 
through a grant of land three miles wide on either side of the line and a guarantee of seven 
percent interest annually. However, continuing political instability owing to the secession of 
Buenos Aires from the Constitution, and the efforts of Bartolomé Mitre to wrest power from 
Urquiza, made foreign trust in such guarantees by the central government difficult, and it was 
only after the eventual victory of Mitre that construction would begin (Pulley, 1966, 66).  
 The construction of railways was pivotal to the project of national consolidation, and one 
that interpolated nationalism and racialized exclusions. As early as 1852, Generation of 1837 
spokesman Juan Bautista Alberdi declared that “Without the railroad political unity cannot be 
had in a country where distance makes central political power impossible . . . . Political unity . . . 
can only be begun through territorial unity” (quoted in Pulley, 1966, 63). Political and physical 
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distance marred attempts to stabilize and unify a central government that could provide the 
legitimacy necessary to foreign lenders in a climate where endogenous capital was scarce. As 
Adelman notes, the contractual nature of such relations required some mechanism of fomenting 
internal solidarity (1999, 229). Of course, these lands, which were to be bound together through 
rail and land concessions, were not empty lands, but lands that had been coercively and violently 
appropriated from indigenous and gaucho populations of the interior. Characterizing the 
emptiness of the lands as ‘barbarism,’ the state builders of the latter half of the nineteenth 
century sought to position the populations of the interior as a problem to be overcome by a 
unified ‘civilized’ peoples (Shumway, 1991, 151). It was for this reason that, in the following 
decades, Sarmiento could appeal to the unity of Argentines in the nation-building project by 
qualifying thus: “when we say people, we understand noteworthy, active, intelligent people; a 
governing class . . . . For that reason, in our legislature one should not see gauchos, negros, nor 
poor people. We are decent people; that is to say, patriotic people” (cited in Shumway, 1991, 
151). This graduated system of national organization accords with Omi and Winant’s suggestion 
that racial nationalism has as its core feature a continual, shifting capacity to simultaneously 
build and fragment the polity, “precisely because it allowed them to claim their whiteness, 
sometimes with ease and sometimes only after passing through extended ‘probationary’ periods” 
(2015, 77). While pursuing objectives classically associated with liberal and capitalist state-
building, the Argentine political classes nevertheless sought recourse to conservative and 
interventionist strategies, which among other things modelled populations on a hierarchy of 
relations vis-a-vis the state.  
As Peter Wade has argued with reference to Latin American nationalism, the very act of 
imagining and constructing a common referent for unity relied on the active construction of 
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difference. Representations of the nation depended “to some extent on the notion of 
indigenousness and blackness, even if the future was thought of in terms of progressive mixture 
and ‘whitening.’ Blacks and indigenous people, or at least the image of them, were needed as a 
reference point against which whiteness and a future of whitened modernity could be defined” 
(2008, 855). Furthermore, as Delaney shows with reference to Argentina, racial understandings 
of nationhood have served to obviate the European Romantic understandings of nation based on 
civic and political participation (2002, 639). Deploying the idea of race and racial hierarchy as 
the basis of national organization avoids the “disruption of political practices and social 
hierarchies [instead promoting] a nation building project based on the evolution of a [national] 
race, rather than political participation and civic incorporation” (Delaney, 1997). The Atlantic 
wheat market, in imposing competitive coercion on national production, led to a combined 
nation-building project that worked towards liberal ends, while nevertheless attempting to 
preserve, though in the course altering, traditional relations of political paternalism.  
In Argentina, this racial model was predicated on what David Goldberg refers to as an 
‘historical’ understanding of race, whereby those racially othered were seen as temporarily 
immature, to be eventually moralized, rationalized, and educated to the privileges and priorities 
of ‘whiteness’ (2002, 236).  The idea of national ‘whiteness’ bound together disparate parts of 
the population based not on automatic full citizenship but a promised eventual full citizenship, 
deferred until adequate environmental and direct political tutelage could transform the political 
and moral character of the interior populations (Brubaker, 2004; Davidson, 2016; Goldberg, 
2002). And yet, precisely because this nascent nationality was expressly articulated with goals of 
national economic growth and development, the promise of eventual full inclusion, rooted in a 
shared whiteness, gave common cause and identity to an otherwise fragmented and stratified 
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society. The chasms of region and class would be elided, not by an immediate full incorporation, 
but by the promise of eventual ascendance. And this, only once the nation and its people had 
done their part to launch Argentina to socioeconomic greatness—in order for the country to take 
its ‘true’ place as the bastion of liberal Europe in a ‘backwards’ America.  
 In sum, the shift from Spanish colony to independent statehood entailed a radical 
reorientation of the organization and distribution of political power, rights, and property. These 
conditions provided a unique backdrop against which Argentina’s engagement with a global 
capitalist market took place. In order to organize and consolidate populations, lands, fiscal 
resources and institutions for the project of agrarian transformation, nationalism became a 
supplementary strategy to legitimate and give common cause to an otherwise politically, 
geographically and economically disparate population.  
In the next chapter, I deal with the ways in which this project of national consolidation 
came to embrace a racial hierarchy of political subjectivities through state-builders’ attempts to 
dispossess and direct indigenous peoples. Following this, in the final chapter, I examine how 
these patterns, once established, laid the ground for the application of racialized understandings 
of political rights to various groups of immigrants through the final decades of the nineteenth 
century, as well as the tools with which such ideologies of inclusion and exclusion were enacted. 
Contact, Conquest and Settlement in British North America 
 
 While European contact with today’s North America has a lengthy history, the first 
perhaps explicit and sustained Euro-North American contacts were engendered by the sixteenth-
century explorations by both the French and British. In 1497, in an attempt to find Japan for 
spices and other bounties of commodities, an expedition under the leadership of John Cabot 
happened instead upon the east coast of today’s Canada. At the time, believing this land to be 
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Japan, Cabot declared it English property and returned home to declare his victories. One year 
later, returning to what was thought to be Japan, Cabot and his son Sebastian headed an 
expedition, this time discovering the bounty of cod that populated the Atlantic waters 
surrounding eastern Canada (Ryerson, 1963, 57). In 1506, the French arrived and were the first 
to chart the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. While a few attempts to establish settlements were made 
from the early sixteenth century onward, these were generally a failure, and moreover were not 
deemed essential for European operations in the North Americas (Ryerson, 1963, 59-60). Indeed, 
increasingly protein-scarce conditions that arose from increases in population and the tensions 
between land usage for pasturage versus agriculture in Europe made exploration of the 
continental shelf in the Atlantic for cod fisheries a primary impetus for such early and sustained 
contacts. Thus, while throughout much of the sixteenth century cod fishing became the primary 
nexus of the relationship between Europe and North America, actual inland contact was rare as 
Atlantic fishing and the curing of cod could be conducted with little need to embark on North 
American shores (Harris, 2000, 6-8).  
Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, however, new salting and curing techniques 
were developed that necessitated the procurement of timber from coastal shores and thus began a 
gradual inland movement of Europeans onto North American shores (in today’s Canadian east 
coast). Such incursions increasingly brought European fishers into contact with indigenous 
peoples and led to the discovery of the fur trade as a valuable corollary to cod fishing. By the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, in 1608, the French had moved inland and settled Quebec 
on the St. Lawrence to more fully establish a fur trade route. The French fur trade was heavily 
reliant on indigenous peoples for almost the entirety of the operation—everything from hunting, 
trapping and preparing the furs, to the customs and skills involved in the negotiation of trade. 
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Furthermore, intermarriage was often a strategy deployed in order to insinuate settlers into 
indigenous societies for the purposes of security, access to cultural resources, and so forth 
(Lawrence, 2003, 8). As such, the French relationship with indigenous peoples as it settled 
territories and built forts for the conduct of a fur trade necessitated the maintenance of 
indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural existence. “The main goal of the early Imperial 
presence was resource extraction through the fur-trade, an economic activity that absolutely 
depended on Native people’s labour and knowledge” (Mackey, 1999, 38). While, no doubt, 
violent and oppressive asymmetrical power relations existed throughout this period, they were 
not marked by a systematic attempt at indigenous disappearance; nor were they characterized by 
attempts to radically alter the nature of indigenous living. Rather, it was precisely these 
differences in material and cultural systems that created the conditions for an exploitative 
relationship. As Bonita Lawrence has argued, “the boundaries between who should be 
considered ‘European’ and who should be considered ‘Native’ (and by what means) have not 
always been clear” (2003, 8).  
That we should find this to be the case in both Canada and Argentina, settler states that 
nevertheless had different colonizers, is indicative of the necessity of understanding colonial 
endeavours within the wider remit of the international system and the development and spread of 
capitalist social relations.  Indeed, in her analysis of changes in international legal regimes, Maїa 
Pal has argued that the objectives and conditions of empire have been historically variable in 
relation to the dominant social property relations of the imperial homeland. It was not until the 
late eighteenth century, owing to the particular dynamics of British social property relations, that 
the politics of empire became attached to attempts to develop jurisdiction over indigenous 
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populations on the basis of the colonizers’ own legal (as well as intellectual, moral, and 
productive) system (Pal, 2012, 157).  
The distinctiveness of this colonial relationship can be captured through an examination 
of the 1763 Royal Proclamation, which, until the establishment of the Indian Act in 1876, was 
the legislation that governed the relationship between European and indigenous peoples. The 
Royal Proclamation emerged from a context within which the contest for territory amongst the 
American, French and British had been recently settled through a series of treaties, largely in 
favour of the British in what is now Canada. With the cessation of such rivalries over land, 
however, came the realization for the British that such treaties did not in fact give Britain 
authority over native territory—they only settled the competition for such territory amongst 
colonizing forces. Understanding this fact, the British sought a means by which the precarious 
relations with indigenous peoples might be stabilized into a partnership or tenuous alliance. One 
of the primary means through which this stabilization was to be achieved was the demonstration 
of the Crown’s good intentions, notably by mitigating the issue of white intrusion on indigenous 
lands (Slattery, 1984, 368). Additionally, the conditions of the Proclamation served as a buffer 
against American expansionism, which remained a potential threat. Indigenous peoples 
occupying lands along the boundaries between the provinces and America could be relied on to 
defend their own lands from intrusion and thereby reduce the costs of military expenditure 
required to defend lands more central to the economic goals of the colony (Hall, 2014, 3; 
Mackey, 1999, 40).  
 Amongst the main provisions of the Royal Proclamation were stipulations over the means 
through which indigenous land could come under the auspices of the Crown and/or British 
subjects. The public purchase of lands by the Crown became the only sanctioned means of 
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acquisition, while the granting of lands by the Crown, the settlement of land directly by British 
subjects, or the private purchase of land was prohibited (Slattery, 1984, 369). Indigenous peoples 
were, under these provisions, ostensibly entitled to the undisturbed possession of any lands that 
had not been ceded to or purchased by the Crown (Slattery, 1984, 370). These early articulations 
of an ‘Indian Policy’ had as their goal—at least rhetorically—the protection of indigenous 
peoples in the hopes of maintaining established trade relationships and military alliances while 
fostering new connections with those indigenous peoples who had previously been subjected to 
French colonial rule.  
Furthermore, as Bonita Lawrence argues, the Royal Proclamation established and 
recognized a nation-to-nation relationship with indigenous peoples, signaling that the forcible 
subordination to or subsumption by the settler colonial ‘sovereign’ had not yet been established 
(2003, 6).  Indeed, the administrative tools for dealing with indigenous peoples were established 
through the British Imperial Indian Department and beholden to diplomatic norms, rather than 
expressing a sovereign right to command (Lawrence, 2003, 7). To this end, the view of 
indigenous peoples as somehow inherently and racially inferior had not quite cemented; these 
ideas were far more flexible, as evidenced by Herman Merivale’s comments (appointed to 
assistant undersecretary of state at the Colonial Office in 1847) in 1840: 
they (Indians) seemed possessed of higher moral elevation than any other uncivilized race 
of mankind, with less natural readiness and ingenuity than some but greater depth and 
force of character; more native generosity of spirit, and manliness of disposition; more of 
the religious element; and yet, on the other hand, if not with less capacity for 
improvement, certainly less readiness to receive it (as cited in McNabb, 1985, 88). 
 
The fixing of racial difference, I will argue, resulted from the settler’s need to form a national 
identity in the aftermath of Confederation, which importantly was bound into the international 
development of competitive agricultural commodity markets and relied upon the acquisition of 
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land in the form of private property. As Mackey argues, it was at the moment that territorial 
boundaries began to assume an institutionalized form (such as property, reserves, land surveys, 
etc.) that the boundaries of so-called ‘race’ and culture began to harden (1999, 41). 
From Raw Commodity Export to the Beginnings of Domestic Production Structures 
 
By the early decades of the nineteenth century, permanent European settlements had been 
established in today’s Canada. Simultaneous with the collapse of the fur trade in Lower Canada 
was the rise of the timber trade in both Upper and Lower Canada. Historian Stanley Ryerson notes 
that the rise of the timber trade in the Canadas may have been heavily influenced by the Napoleonic 
Wars and the impetus it generated for ship-building (1983, 37). Unlike the fur trade, however, the 
nature of the timber trade required large quantities of labour and promoted the development of a 
home market as timber production engendered the development of forward and backward linkages 
for ancillary production activities (Ryerson, 1983, 37). Nevertheless, the land on which timber 
magnates reaped exceptional profits was governed by politically constituted rights, primarily 
associated with the absolutist regime in France. As such, timber, while generating distinctive 
geopolitical interests, was not itself conducive to a transformation of production relations. 
However, these shifts did have the important consequence of generating a class of merchants 
whose interests were not automatically aligned with those of Britain, and who instead sought their 
fortunes within the colony. Thus, in part, the geopolitical ramifications of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars would have been to generate conditions conducive to a rapid 
expansion of the mercantile and financial classes in the provinces. This development, in turn, 
would become responsible for some of the internal opposition to formal imperial dependency in 
its consolidation of a domestic class of merchants and financiers.  
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For the emerging financial and merchant classes, the problems of imperial rule were 
generally linked to trade regulations that exerted extreme restraint on the capacity of local elite 
accumulation. The Navigation Acts, for example, restricted the shipment of goods to or from the 
colony on anything other than British ships, while further colonial regulations restricted the 
manufacture of clothing (1768) in Canada, and trade with the US and West Indies (1784) 
(Ryerson, 1983, 106). These conditions, when combined with the effects of the British Corn 
Laws on trade with Britain itself, effectively denied growth opportunities in Canada. Advocating 
from this position early on, William Lyon Mackenzie pushed for colonial reform, and eventually 
independence. The Colonial Advocate, a Reform newspaper edited by Mackenzie, decried British 
dependence in 1824: 
We earnestly desire to see established, throughout Upper and Lower Canada, New-
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, efficient societies for the improvement of arts and 
manufactures. We would like to see the manufacturer not quite four thousand miles from 
the farmer . . . . Our foreign commerce, confined and shackled as it is, and it has been, is 
entirely in the hands of the British capitalists: our lumber trade is merely encouraged to 
support British worn-out shipping. We are inundated, glutted with British manufactures   
(as quoted in Ryerson, 1983, 91). 
 
By 1837, Mackenzie was demanding outright independence: “Until Independence is won, trade 
and industry will be dormant, houses and lands will be unsalable, merchants will be embarrassed, 
and farmers and mechanics harassed and troubled” (Ryerson, 1983, 108). However, the 
endogenous opposition to colonial rule tells only one side of the story, and indeed had 
international economic conditions not favoured a move towards free trade, it is doubtful whether 
independence would have been so easily granted to the Canadas. Thus, to gain a fuller 
understanding of the eventual Confederation of Canada, we need also to recall the 
contemporaneous problems in Britain of overaccumulation. 
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 As we saw in the previous chapter, of central importance to the British solution to its 
problems was a policy whereby new territories were settled in order to absorb surplus 
populations and produce consumption goods for the metropolitan market. This policy is 
understood by Pal as extraterritoriality, whereby Britain could transform the politics of Empire in 
accordance with its own internally transformed social property relations and state structures. 
Specifically, Pal argues that with the transformation of British social property relations, new 
debates over land and its improvement were generated, leading to new definitions of property. 
Specifically, the doctrine of improvement enabled a definition of land as vacant—a primary 
mechanism for the extension of agricultural cultivation to the provinces (Pal, 2012, 172). The 
practices of extraterritoriality allowed the British to extend semi-sovereign status to the 
provinces while maintaining political and economic leverage through the diffusion of its 
institutional configuration—namely the apparent separation of the political and economic (Pal, 
2012, 152-156).   
 One must be careful, however, not to overstate the imperial role in the shaping of Canada 
after the 1840s.9 For example, according to Ian MacKay, the Canadian state was formed through 
an imperial, top-down restructuring that accorded with the interests of free trade. This period 
was, for MacKay, a moment of passive revolution wherein local interests were selectively 
adapted to the colonially imposed legal order, so as to absorb and avoid popular resistance. As I 
show below, rather than passively accepting the imposition of foreign legal and institutional 
                                                     
9 This process of domestic, non-capitalist merchant elite formation to promote the ends of independence from 
colonial rule was also present in the United States, as Post has previously noted of the northern colonies (2011, 
186), suggesting that there is a particular dynamic trajectory of settler colonial class and property relations that 
should be understood as modifying the nature of capitalist transformations. Indeed, that the United States and 
Canada (along with settler colonial Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) formed their states 
through articulations of white nationalism is telling; the path to capitalism in these spaces, marked by distinct 
colonial forms, requires the very type of social analysis that PM provides. 
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orders, Canadian state-builders from the mid-nineteenth century onward were active and 
selective in their adaptation of British technologies of socio-political and economic organization 
to locally specified material and social relations, such that substitution in the name of advancing 
locally determined objectives, rather than subordination of local objectives to imperial goals, 
produced the amalgam configuration of the state that emerged in Canada. Indeed, the concept of 
passive revolution, following from Mackay, does not illuminate the nature of Canada’s racial 
nation-state formation, if, as we recall, the British colonial venture in fact sought to avoid 
cementing such racial categories of exclusion and inferiorization/infantilization. If the Canadian 
state was formed simply through processes of passive revolution, it becomes much harder to 
understand how racial state-making emerged as a ‘concession’ to local populations. This would 
fail to specify precisely what it was that race performed in these spaces, and we get at this 
question only by examining the local functionality of ‘race’ to domestic class forces and projects.  
 Additionally, Andrew Smith has highlighted how McKay’s (2010) account overstates the 
triumph of laissez-faire liberalism in Confederation. While perhaps Smith goes too far in the 
opposite direction, suggesting Confederation was a triumph of Toryism, his argument 
nevertheless problematizes the far too frequent interpretation of Confederation as prima facie a 
project of laissez-faire liberalism (2008, 5). Kevin Henley echoes this critique in his assertion 
that there has been a tendency to far too readily accept that the ascendance of economic 
liberalism in continental Europe was experienced universally in developing capitalist economies. 
Rather than interventionist and mercantilist policies representing an exception to the rule, Henley 
argued that such policies were in fact the norm for colonial/post-colonial economies such as 
Canada; within these economies, a significant contingent of domestic political economic thought 
deemed free trade untenable (1989, 110). Such a critique advances my own project, which seeks 
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to understand the confluence of formally liberal and formally illiberal politico-economic 
structures and processes within nineteenth-century settler colonial state building. Significantly, 
this was a time in which the reign of laissez-faire liberalism was too often taken for granted. Yet, 
recalling my argument that capitalism spread not through economic processes, but through 
politically designed counterstrategies of defense (Teschke, 2003, 265) in the form of combined 
development (Desai, 2015, 453), it becomes evident that it is not the fact of state intervention 
itself that requires explanation, but its specific form and content.  
Obstacles to Agricultural Production and Public Finance in the Canadas Prior to the Act of 
Union 
 
The ability for local agriculture to respond to the imperatives generated by the British 
transformation of colonial administration and trade was substantially hindered by pre-existing 
production relations. This is to say that as the British attempted to enact the policy of 
extraterritoriality, the introduction of the British institutional separation of politics and 
economics had to take root in (or combine with) a very different set of social property relations 
(SPR), and as a result, class actors with their own objectives.  As was argued by Gheller, and 
discussed above, a significant problem in transforming production relations was the fiscal and 
administrative weakness of the respective governments of the provinces. Emaciated public 
finance and politically fragmented authority made the capacity of productive activities to respond 
to market imperatives nearly impossible. Although each space was marked by different sets of 
social property relations and production structures, both Upper and Lower Canada experienced 
obstacles to centralized public financial administration, which stymied attempts to intensify the 
production of agricultural commodity exports.  
Indeed, Charles Post found similar problems plaguing the Thirteen Colonies, noting that 
despite British North American colonialism being driven by the imperatives of British capitalism 
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to find profitable outlets for surplus populations, and to establish agricultural commodity 
producers for the British market, the British were “unable to reproduce the agrarian capitalist 
social-property relations . . . . [owing to] the inability of British merchants and landlords and 
their allies among local colonial elites to establish an effective social monopoly of landed 
property” (Post, 2011, 172). As with the Canadian case, Post attributes this colonial problem to a 
combination of both the fact of the frontier, which made land widely available for little labour 
beyond that necessary to clear and till, and colonial and local administrative weakness, which 
precluded an effective policing of settler squatting, following the massacre or otherwise removal 
of indigenous occupants from the land (Post, 2011, 173). In the northern colonies, squatters were 
even effective at organizing ‘claims clubs’ to resist landowners’ pressures to assert title or force 
squatters to purchase the land they occupied (Post, 2011, 181). These problems of administrative 
weakness in the face of an expansive and unmanageable frontier in the Canadas were 
underpinned by colonial social property relations and stymied efforts to organize production on a 
national scale.  
In Lower Canada, under French rule as New France, Gheller argues that the nature of the 
French state as a colonial power with its own distinct class composition and internal reproductive 
conditions was such that it did not have an expropriated mass of peasants to commit to colonial 
emigration and settlement (2015, 117). Additionally, recalling Shilliam’s discussion of the 
French absolutist state, internal elite reproduction had been predicated on the appropriation of 
taxation, including duties and other benefits reaped via personal privilege in access to the 
rewards of the colonial carrying trade (Shilliam, 2009b, 38-40). In this sense, the French colonial 
state had an internal interest in fostering and maintaining colonial ventures of a mercantile 
nature, such as the fur and timber trade, and reproduced feudal-type property relations in the 
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colony via the seigneurial system, which could not be profitable on the basis of rents, but instead 
held land itself as the source of power that functioned as a means to the end of securing the 
profits of “politically constituted unequal exchange” (Bernier & Salée, 1992, 127; Gheller, 2015, 
110). In New France, then, the colonial settlement’s social property relations and ensuing 
strategies of elite reproduction did not allow for a taxable population base.    
 While Upper Canada was colonized by the British, its creation of a centralized state with 
the powers of taxation to foster a plan of socio-economic development was not possible. Once 
again, the absence of a peasantry to expropriate made replication of Britain’s quintessential 
three-class model of agrarian capitalism impossible. In large, land was distributed and/or 
occupied through two dominant mechanisms. In the first instance, the establishment of Land 
Boards in the final decades of the eighteenth century facilitated a clientelistic pattern of land 
distribution. Initially intended to abate the illegal occupation of indigenous lands under the Royal 
Proclamation (which threatened Britain’s sought-after military alliance with indigenous peoples 
against the United States), the Land Boards came to be a means of advancing the position and 
holdings of land speculators throughout the province (Clarke, 2001, 104; Vosburgh, 2008, 82). 
The Land Boards were to receive petitions for land and examine the loyalty of the applicant to 
the British Empire. Upon approval, a location ticket for a 200-acre lot, valid for one year, would 
be issued (Clarke, 2001, 101). Many of these lots were awarded on the basis of militaristic 
loyalty and relations of political patronage. For those without the political connections necessary 
to apply to the Land Boards, the other major means of land access was squatting. Squatting, 
according to Clarke, was a dominant practice in the Upper Canadas throughout the latter half of 
the eighteenth century up until the Union, owing to the cumbersome and corrupt formal channels 
of land acquisition. Many such squatters, having emigrated with the goal of pioneer farming, 
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were able to make ‘improvements’ to the land, erecting buildings and tilling the earth. However, 
at this time, these improvements were geared only toward self-sufficiency, and as yet did not 
constitute a means to the capitalisation of agricultural production. 
Recalling the colonial nature of these settlements, land was obtained through the 
dispossession and exclusion of indigenous peoples from the imperial polity, meaning that land 
was plentiful and its distribution was not subjected to market imperatives but rather to a 
clientelist system of distribution in which privilege and status were the main avenues to property; 
given this, there was scarce availability of wage labour, with most of the elite profiting from 
speculative activities and tenant-settlers preferring to erect a family farm model, providing the 
bulk of the labour themselves (Gheller, 2015, 170). In turn, this meant that until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, rents were paid in kind (often as a percentage of crop yield); there existed 
little incentive to improve the efficiency of agricultural production as market imperatives had yet 
to fully yield their effect, and consequently, there existed little opportunity or incentive to 
organize and centralize policies of taxation (Gheller, 2015, 187).  
 Throughout the 1830s the provinces experienced an economic depression, exacerbated by 
the unfinished project of the St. Lawrence Canal, which had incurred massive public debt and 
which would fail to generate revenue until long after its completion (Piva, 1990, 85). By the end 
of the decade, total public debt in Upper and Lower Canada had reached £1.44 million, while the 
means to generate public revenue for such debt was restricted to export customs collected in 
Lower Canada and the sale of Crown Lands in Upper Canada (Gheller, 2015, 196). 
 Customs revenues were never enough to meet the crippling debt accumulated in the 
provinces, nor were they adequate to engage in public spending on government salaries and 
infrastructural projects that may have aided the development of revenue-generating activities. At 
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the same time, the sale of lands to raise public revenue led the government of Upper Canada into 
a dependency on large landholders whose financial interests were bound into speculative and 
imperial mercantile relations. As Gheller notes, those who held lands through this massive public 
sale either sought land for its timber, thus continuing the mercantile system bound into imperial 
loyalties that had hitherto dominated the Canadas, or such lands were held for their potential to 
reap speculative profits (2015, 201).  A constant shortage of public monies, then, hampered the 
provinces’ ability to service ever-growing debt obligations and to respond to changing global 
economic conditions (Piva, 1990, 82). These circumstances underwrote the imperatives driving 
responsible government—the need to build a centralized fiduciary and administrative state.  
The ‘French Question’ and National Identity 
 
 If the British strategies of accumulation throughout the mid-nineteenth century required a 
refashioning of Empire, one that doled out aspects of sovereignty to its imperial possessions 
while maintaining fundamental loyalty or compliance to the project of Empire, the granting of 
responsible government to Canada faced at least one central obstacle: the relative position of 
financial and demographic power of the French in Lower Canada. Compared to Upper Canada, 
the French of Lower Canada had greater powers of population, less debt and greater access to 
financial resources, owing to their collection of customs revenue. In sum, the granting of 
political autonomy to the provinces would have posed the potential problem of allowing the 
French to gain ascendency and thus develop a national project unsympathetic to that of Empire. 
Indeed, this problem was recognized in Lord Durham’s recommendations for colonial 
responsible government, where he noted that only once the British had gained a majority would 
the plan be practicable in the Canadas (Ryerson, 1983, 141). Thus, before the Canadas could 
come into their own as a sovereign state, the Colonial Office sought to create the administrative 
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and infrastructural means to subordinate the French population. This came about, largely, 
through the Act of Union in 1841 (Creighton, 1958, 211).  
 The Act of Union was intended, among other things, to eradicate the distinctions between 
Upper and Lower Canada. Furthermore, given the hitherto ad hoc nature of financial 
administration and the crisis-prone indebtedness of Upper Canada, the Act additionally 
established a more systematized architecture for financial administration which conveniently 
redistributed French Canada’s financial advantages to the indebted British elements, while also 
establishing a firm separation between parochial and public interests (Piva, 1992, 258; Ryerson, 
1983, 141). Upper Canada, in turn, was enticed into Union by promises of a £1.5 million stg. 
loan, something badly needed in the context of massive public debt and incomplete public works 
projects, notably the St. Lawrence canal (Baskerville, 1992, 232).  Further elements of the Act 
intended to subordinate the French population were stipulations that all official documents be 
read in English only, and that the majority of seats be given to English speakers (for example, 
equal seats were allocated to Western and Eastern Canada, though the latter’s population far 
exceeded that of the former) (Ryerson, 1983, 149). 
The constitution of the Assembly under the Act of Union was intended to avoid creating 
deep rifts that could crystallize and politicize into unmanageable party factions. However, in the 
process, as Ryerson has argued, by attempting to eradicate these sharp differences between the 
Upper and Lower Canadas, a bi-national coalition of anti-imperial reformists emerged. These 
reformers sought responsible government and rejected colonial control. As I show in the next 
section, it was on the basis of anti-imperial and anti-American sentiment that English and French 
Canada could find some common ideological and historical ground. This rejection of colonial 
control was able to bind the French- and English-speaking elements of Canada, which were 
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importantly brought together precisely because of the second hand of the British strategy of 
colonial reconfiguration—free trade.  
The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 began, in many ways, the long path to self-
government and later Confederation. Thrown out of the system of imperial preference, and still 
dealing dominantly with a commercial mercantile economy, the occupants of the provinces 
found themselves increasingly under threat. In 1854, replacing the system of imperial 
preferences, a series of treaties of reciprocity were concluded with America. In this, it was still 
hoped that the provinces could continue to conduct their affairs as they had previously, focusing 
on commercial policy above anything else. With the onset of the American Civil War, however, 
the treaties were of little use, and by 1865, notice had been given for the formal cancellation of 
the treaties (Scott, 1942, 386). The provinces were once more faced with the task of developing a 
competitive national economy in the ‘bracing atmosphere’ of the free market (Crieghton, 1942, 
46-50).  
Beginning in 1846 and felt more painfully after 1865, then, was that ‘whip of external 
necessity’ that Trotsky identified as the first stimulus to processes of combined development. 
Indeed, that the latter half of the nineteenth century was a period of intense global economic 
pressure has been widely acknowledged by Canadian political economists, such as Harold Innis 
and those working in the tradition of staples theory. However, Innis and those following in his 
footsteps have too often overstated the role of external dependency in the shaping of Canadian 
political economy (Drache, 1982; Hutcheson, 1982; Innis, 1995). It is for this reason that uneven 
and combined development is instructive, for it shows the role of external forces as central 
without being deterministic.  
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It was, in the context of market pressures, having been ejected from the protection of 
imperial preference, and facing a hostile market environment vis-a-vis the United States, that 
merchant and financial classes of the Canadas became increasingly aware of their own socio-
economic backwardness. No longer could they automatically align themselves with and reap the 
benefits of British supremacy. Rather, a great deal of the future trajectory of development would 
rest in their concerted efforts. The first step, accordingly, was to dismantle those structures that 
had maintained a form of colonial dependency; if the Canadas would not reap the benefits of 
British imperial power, they would not bear the burden of it either. Rather they would selectively 
adapt what was available to them from the imperial home, but to advance local exigencies.  
The ‘whip of external necessity’ functioned as a force for class collaboration; the existing 
merchant and emerging financial and bourgeois classes of the Canadas could find common 
ground precisely because their business interests were increasingly conditioned by the necessity 
of modernizing state structures and tearing down restrictive and dependent colonial structures. 
Of course, because the architecture of Union had been intentionally unequal, a strategic element 
of incorporation was necessary to solidify a common and stable domestic base of colonial 
rejection premised on capitalist development, which occurred through the selective incorporation 
of small French-Canadian business and church elements into the administrative structures of the 
Union to provide a sense of equality (Ryerson, 1983, 169). In this analysis, then, the external 
environment did not ‘determine’10 political and economic consolidation, but instead evoked 
strategic responses on the part of local class actors, whose actions could not be ascertained from 
economic criteria alone.  
                                                     
10 I am pointing here to the ways in which my analysis departs from staples and neo-staples theory, which has 
suggested that state centralization was generated in functional response to external market pressures and internal 
geographical resource determinations (Hutcheson, 1982, 58).  
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Endogenous development was to produce and supply for global competitive agricultural 
markets, requiring a dismantling of some of the most pernicious of colonial trade regulations. In 
turn, agricultural development was to rely on infrastructure and immigration. As debt was an 
ongoing issue, it was determined that the revenue to service infrastructural debt would be found 
in the sale of Crown lands to create a Sinking Fund, a strategy that would transform the 
conditions stipulated under the Royal Proclamation (Piva, 1992, 259). These processes combined 
indigenous dispossession to raise fiscal revenues with the muting of Anglo-French antagonisms 
through the idea of common struggles and purpose.  
In the lead-up to the Act of Union, a central means to shore up administrative capacity, 
build state revenue, and ensure the continued subordination of the French element to British 
interests, was through the 1837 Public Lands Disposal Act. The Act abolished the practice of 
free grants, and intended to make the distribution of Crown Lands subject to a transparent and 
administratively robust process, whereby public auctions were to be the primary means of land 
disposal, followed by the possibility of private sales (Vosburgh, 2004, 35). These conditions 
were renewed in 1839, and again in the Land Act of 1841 under Lord Sydenham, who would 
become one of the main administrative reformers of the Dominion. Under the Act, which would 
last until 1853, Crown Reserves were sold through the Canada Company at a cost of 8s. per acre, 
a price that required many to turn to money-lenders for credit (Gates, 1968, 267).  
While the sale of Crown Lands to generate revenue was a central motivation behind the 
Act, there remained a tension between the bald fact of selling land for revenue (potentially to 
speculators) and the need to select for sales that would contribute to developmental objectives. 
Thus, reflecting Wakefield’s emphasis on governmental intervention in the distribution of land to 
promote development, agents of the Crown Lands department were given discretion to facilitate 
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the purchase of lands by squatters who had contributed to its improvement—the so-called bona 
fide settlers (Vosburgh, 2004, 35; Vosburgh, 2008, 82). That is, where squatters were concerned, 
and where they represented bona fide settlers (i.e. had made improvements to the land), 
opportunity was often advanced to give them first choice when it came to purchasing the land for 
themselves.  
The sale of Crown Lands to generate government revenue marked the beginnings of 
market dependency as criteria for squatters’ and settlers’ eventual title to land rested on 
‘improvement’ requiring capital investment. These conditions then led to a cash and credit 
dependency that would eventually stimulate market dependency (either through the sale of 
labour or of agricultural commodities) to fulfill obligations to money lenders and to ensure their 
consummation of land titles (Bilak, 1987, 180). At the same time, these criteria simultaneously 
provided the contours of racialized exclusion by distinguishing between deserving and 
underserving land occupancy on the basis of physical and technical improvements. The language 
through which indigenous peoples could be systematically dispossessed of their land was 
beginning to take shape.  
In the 1850s legislation passed to create indigenous reserves served to establish settler 
rights to the majority of land within the united province by parceling off explicit and marginal 
pieces of land for indigenous peoples. Land sales, in turn, would provide the capital necessary to 
purchase public debentures, but to sell land in a manner that avoided the trappings of imperial 
dependency (as had been the case under previous sales of Crown Land), immigration would have 
to be increased to attract small farmer settlement (Piva, 1992, 260). To pursue the common goal 
of settled capitalist development, increasingly geared towards agricultural commodity export, a 
common national goal was identified that was premised on the rationalization and centralization 
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of state administrative apparatuses, independent policy making and infrastructural development 
to stimulate and aid the settlement and development of agricultural regions.  
 It was largely in response to these concerns that Confederation came about. The bracing 
environment of competitive free trade brought to the fore the issue of binding together and 
expanding the domestic market while overcoming the Anglo-French divide (Creighton, 1952, 
217). From the beginning the question of political-economic unification was bound up with the 
problem of developing a national identity. Macdonald, for example, sought to form a strong, 
centralized government “charged with matters of common interest to the whole country” (Scott, 
1942, 399). And yet, there were clear issues at hand in determining the ‘common interest’ of the 
country, given the enduring socio-economic asymmetries between English and French Canada. If 
the country was to survive amid rapidly transforming global economic relations, it needed a 
strong government capable of directing national economic development through a robust 
program of rail development, agricultural and industrial production. Yet achieving these ends 
could prove difficult in the face of entrenched regionalism and linguistic-ethnic cleavages. 
National state development had to be accompanied by the development of a new national 
identity. 
Rejecting Colonial Dependency and American Annexation: Creating the “Northern Men of 
the ‘New World’” 
 
In this final section I argue that the stimulant to nationalist organization within what 
became Canada was most firmly established by the changing conditions of the global economy, 
which came increasingly to be predicated on free trade and competitive commodity production. 
Both Liberal and Conservative versions of nation building and national identity formation in 
Canada responded to these transformations. Taking the Canada First Movement (CFM) and John 
A. Macdonald’s nationalisms as indicative of liberal and conservative variants respectively, I 
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demonstrate how both sought to foster the consolidation of a nation in response to perceived 
external threats. The combined geopolitical and economic threats posed by imperial Britain and 
America generated an urgency on camps within the political spectrum to secure the conditions 
necessary for endogenous national development. While each camp sought to secure these ends 
through different means, there was nevertheless a commonality inasmuch as the goal was to 
centralize the administrative and fiscal apparatus of the state and shore up its legitimacy by 
fomenting a national people (and consequently their investment in a national project).  
It did not take long after Confederation for the recognition of a tension between colonial 
dependency and national growth to take hold of a small but active and vocal group. Only one 
year after Confederation, in 1868, the CFM was formed in Ottawa, and included George 
Denison, Charles Mair, William Alexander Foster, and Robert Grant Haliburton. Eventually 
becoming an official political party in the 1874 federal elections under the name of the Canadian 
National Association, the CFM produced a large body of work that argued intensely for the 
development of a national identity, distinct from Britain and the US, if Canada was to achieve 
internal development and progress as well as external recognition as sovereign (Berger, 1970, 
49-53; Wallace, 1920, 154).  
 The problem with colonial dependency, for the CFM, however, needs to also be 
contextualized by the potential threat of annexation to the US. Indeed, the basis for the CFM 
nationalism was an environmental form of racism, which contrasted the robustness and self-
reliance of so-called ‘northern races’ with the undisciplined laziness of the ‘southern races’ in the 
US (Berger, 1970, 53). Thus, the CFM favoured the racial character of its colonizer and 
encouraged immigration to this end, yet found danger to unity in the face of the US, given 
conditions of underdevelopment, an over-reliance on Britain, and the potential for disunity given 
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the diverse European backgrounds of settlers and immigrants to the new country (Berger, 1970, 
59, 61). In his address titled “Canada First Or, Our New Nationality,” Foster argued 
The citizen of the United States has a flag of his own, and nationality of his own – The 
Canadian has never had to look abroad for his. For years British policy isolated the 
Provinces, to prevent their absorption in the neighboring Republic, and in so doing 
stunted the growth of a native national sentiment . . . . Now that we are prosperous and 
united, vigorous and well-to-do; and now that some of the traditions of the past are 
gradually losing their hold on the imagination of a new generation, that sentiment which 
so long found an outlet in declamation over the glories of the Mother Land, will draw a 
more natural nourishment from native sources . . . . Young as we are, we are not too old 
to be abused without retort; weak as we may be, we are too strong to be bullied with 
impunity. (1871, 27) 
 
Haliburton, too, echoed these sentiments in his 1861 lecture The Men of the North and Their 
Place in History, delivered to the Montreal Literary Club: 
Man cannot live by bread alone, nor can a people become a great nation by its commerce 
only. National wealth without public spirits is like capital without enterprise. But national 
spirit is of slow growth, unless it is the offspring of a violent struggle or a great sacrifice. 
It can only spring from a faith in a bright future, or from the memory of a glorious past. 
What is our past? What is our future? . . . . Never did an infant nation crawl into existence 
in such a humdrum, common place, matter of fact way. . . . Confederation has been the 
work, not of the people, but of able statesmen and politicians . . . created as little 
excitement among the masses, as they would feel in the organization of a joint stock 
company . . . (Haliburton, 1869) 
 
In Haliburton’s statement, there appears the recognition that the organizational and ideological 
unity of a state had typically followed a series of conditions that did not apply to Canada. While 
Haliburton cites ‘mass struggle,’ we should be careful not to miss what such struggles entailed 
and resulted in. This is to say, these struggles concerned precisely the reorganization of social 
property relations. The two most obvious examples Haliburton referenced were the British and 
the US. Of course, the mass struggle in Britain, as I showed in previous chapters, was bound into 
the protracted process of expropriation, the rearrangement of social property relations, and the 
monopolization of land. Likewise, Charles Post has shown how the Civil War in the US was 
  145 
similarly rooted in contending sets of social property relations and the pursuit of a monopoly 
over the use and distribution of land. Canada, however, had yet to consolidate a monopoly over 
national territories. In response to such discrepancies, Foster advocated the purposeful and 
conscientious construction of a national identity, which united diverse immigrants through a 
common history grounded in the struggle for material advancement in Canada:  
As between the various Provinces comprising the Dominion, we need some cement more 
binding than geographical contact; some bond more uniting than a shiftless expediency; 
some lodestar more potent than a mere community of profit. Temporizing makeshifts 
may suit a futureless people. Unless we intend to be mere hewers of wood and drawers of 
water until the end, we should in right earnest set about strengthening the foundations of 
our identity; unless we are to become the laughing stock of the world, we had better not 
lose sight of the awful possibility off sinking under self-imposed burdens of territory 
(Foster, 1871, 29-30). 
 
The CFM was to find this ‘common bond’ in the articulation of a distinctly Canadian racial 
character, resulting from the self-reliance and liberality of the northern European ‘races’ striving 
for survival and material progress in Canada. Thus, whereas a monopoly over land facilitated the 
consolidation of a political state and population in the US and England, it was recognized that 
Canada lacked the historical antecedents for this general pattern of ‘development.’ The CFM 
thus sought to reverse the historical order of such developments, taking national identity in 
advance of its antecedents, and in fact, as a means to them. Indeed, the idea of progress was 
central to the ideological foundation of the CFM, such that conscious ‘catch-up’ and comparative 
backwardness were always central.  
For the CFM, progress and environment were bound into one another in a mutually 
constitutive relationship. In 1868, George Parkin argued that “the minds of men are molded by 
their surroundings” and in this statement, he reflected the broader consensus among liberal 
imperialists that the moral and intellectual development of a peoples is conditioned by their 
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material activity. In so far as this was believed, it was argued that the work of the settler would 
be crucial to the intellectual and cultural development of a national ‘people.’ It would be through 
their material transformation of the land, and the advancement of their economic and productive 
activity, that a common culture and morality could be fostered (Berger, 1970, 111). Thus, the 
first articulations of nationalism in Canada emerged through a combined understanding of racial 
character, territorial defense, and material progress.  
 The new Canadian nationality was to draw on the heritage of the ‘dominant race’ of the 
British people, and yet go further still than the British in bringing together the many people who 
settled Canada on the basis of their supposed climatic advantage for superiority. Thus, in 
distinction from the British, the new Canadian nationality was, for Haliburton, to embrace the 
Celtic, the Teutonic, Scandinavian, Celt, Norman and Swedish elements, fusing them together 
into a new Canadian ‘race.’ These northern ‘races’ benefitted from histories of self-reliance, 
energy, strength and liberality, which would be tested and strengthened by the harsh climate of 
Canada and its effects of a rigourous natural selection process (Mackey, 1999, 43). This melding 
of environmental and biological or scientific racism, furthermore, allowed the CFM to elide the 
prominent cleavages between French- and English-speaking populations. Under the threat of 
American annexation, the CFM was willing to integrate into its conception of Canadian racial 
unity the French European (and Norman descendent) populations in the name of producing a 
territorial-racial conception of nationhood (Mackey, 1999, 44). The CFM accordingly sought to 
selectively minimize or even deny the salience of French-English conflicts, instead emphasizing 
the shared histories of territorial defense during the War of 1812 and the objective of material 
progress (Mackey, 1999, 44). As I show in the next chapter, this ‘national character’ would be 
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mobilized to legitimize the destruction of indigenous lives, resources, and cultures, and their 
subsequent absorption into the state as ‘racially inferior’ dependents. 
 The CFM could embrace the French in their vision of nationhood because of their 
essentially liberal, anti-imperial thrust. For the CFM, the primary threat posed to Canada’s socio-
economic success was its dependent relationship with Britain, and as a result, it was the negation 
of this relationship that was ardently sought. In so much as the French could assist English 
Canada in its defense against the Americans, thereby ameliorating imperial dependency for the 
purposes of territorial defense, they were (if grudgingly) accepted into the national imaginary. In 
fact, it was precisely the unified consolidation of the Canadas that was deemed necessary to 
prevent annexation with the US. The two objectives were intimately bound into one another: to 
avoid annexation one had to avoid imperial dependency and consolidate the administrative 
capacity and autonomy of the state. Thus, for example, CFM member Edward Blake, who 
entered Mackenzie’s cabinet in 1875, focused on reducing the powers of the Crown in Canadian 
affairs through a negation of the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Clause 47 
of the Supreme Court Act was the result of these efforts, which established that Canadian courts 
would be the final arbiter of internal matters (Graham, 1946, 112). 
 Like the CFM, John A. Macdonald was ardently opposed to the prospect of American 
annexation. And like the CFM, Macdonald saw one of the greatest bulwarks against American 
encroachment in the prospect of Canadian national economic growth. However, unlike the CFM, 
Macdonald wished to foster a Canadian nationality that relied heavily on its attachment and 
loyalty to the British Crown. Rather than negotiate for trade reciprocity with America, as the 
Liberals had done with the American Reciprocity Agreements, the Conservative government 
instead wished to rely on a protective tariff and continued preferential trade with Britain. 
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Centralized financial institutions, industrialism and tariff protections all became central aspects 
of the Macdonald National Policy. Yet, because of the geographical and demographic scope and 
variety of the new Confederation, such administrative reform in the direction of a centralized 
government was difficult to implement. Thus, Macdonald sought to bind together the Canadian 
state through the development of a new national spirit sustained by a national party (Farr, 1955, 
17). This national spirit, it must be clear, was not tantamount to a re-articulation of British 
identity. Though Macdonald remained committed to the British crown, he was equally clear that 
Canada was to be an autonomous nation within the British Empire (Farr, 1955, 17). As I will 
demonstrate in the next chapter, these nationalist impulses within the new Confederation of 
Canada would construct the indigenous inhabitants as an obstacle to ‘progress,’ and as a 
consequence, the national people of Canada were increasingly defined by ‘racial whiteness’ in 
contrast to indigenous peoples.  
 While the Conservatives were attempting to foment a national identity based on a 
national protective tariff and anti-Americanism, the Liberals were no less interested in 
fabricating a national imaginary, though articulated differently, through reduced imperial 
dependency and an embrace of free trade. As with Argentina, the two contending national 
imaginaries reflected the variable class positions of merchants embracing open trade, on the one 
hand, and nascent agricultural and industrializing interests, which sought a protective tariff, on 
the other. In either event, I want to emphasize that the imperatives of national consolidation and 
imagination were stimulated by pressures (both material and ideological, internal and external) to 
develop a national economy and compete in a global agricultural commodity market. The 
differences in their respective nationalisms should not be read as too distinct, for they both 
emphasized the building of a national peoples based on racial whiteness; both sought to 
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centralize key aspects of state institutional and administrative capacity, and both sought to root 
their respective identities in the narrative of victimhood. For the Liberals, the source of 
victimization and oppression was the imperial motherland, Britain.  For the Conservative 
elements, it was the Americans and the threat of free trade that posed the greatest external threat. 
Through the narrative of victimization, Canadian nation builders were able to posit an external 
threat that presented a clear danger to a (constructed) homogenous whole, while at the same time 
completely obfuscating internal processes of victimization perpetrated against minority groups 
(Mackey, 1999, 21).  
 In many ways, this brief history of settler colonization in Canada suggests that the 
phenomena of settlement emerged at the intersection of British transitions to increasing laissez-
faire policies (both domestically and internationally) and the colony’s domestic transition away 
from merchant-based economies to more complex agricultural production and industries 
necessitating the development of internal markets, which could no longer be sufficiently 
provided for by the overseas British crown. Thus it should be emphasized that while the British 
impulse to transform the organization of its overseas possessions was critical in establishing 
settler colonialism independence, contradictory forces from within the colony’s burgeoning 
merchant, industrial, and labouring classes existed. Once independence had been granted, the 
problem of establishing an independent economic base posed itself to the early leaders of the 
settler-colonial state, and it was increasingly evident that this national economic base required 
the centralization of fiscal and administrative apparatus, the revenue for which would be found in 
increased appropriation of indigenous lands. Simultaneously, however, an independent national 
economy would necessitate the binding together of the hopes, aspirations, fortunes and interests 
of all the provinces of the Canadas.  
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Conclusion 
 
To return to the central problematic of this study, the foregoing analysis of Spanish and 
British colonial relations in Argentina and Canada is aimed at illuminating how changing 
conditions in the global economy fundamentally transformed the direction and objectives of 
colonialism. Importantly, I have attempted to show how national and racial identities were not a 
vestige of premodern practices and attitudes, but were instead strategic responses to the problems 
posed by state formation in the context of an increasingly competitive laissez-faire global 
economy. I have further tried to demonstrate how the spread of capitalist social relations does 
not, of necessity, contribute to a homogenization of identities, but instead is actively productive 
of difference in subject identities. While, to be sure, during the early colonial periods there 
existed differentiated classificatory relations between and amongst the European and indigenous 
populations, these relations were not indicative of a racial or national ordering of population 
(Wolfe, 2015, 7). The interdependencies, and (perhaps at time rhetorical) recognition of mutual 
(tacit) sovereignty, which characterized the relationship between many European colonists and 
indigenous peoples, did not benefit from the hardening of social identities, but instead benefited 
precisely from their fluidity and the fuzziness of their boundaries. Race, as Patrick Wolfe has 
usefully pointed out, was temporally concordant with the transition from merchant trade to 
competitive capitalist markets (instigated by English industrialization), which transformed the 
social organization of colonialism. This transformed colonialism absconded with the centrality of 
the trading post, and instead configured production and consumption both at home and abroad to 
suit the needs of metropolitan capital. The indigenous middlemen and security forces, once 
integral to the colonial merchant networks, were thus rendered obsolete (Wolfe, 2015, 8).  
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These transformations in the global economy generated the conditions and imperatives 
that underwrote attempts at fomenting a national peoples and state. In exploring the genesis of 
settler nationalisms, I have furthermore attempted to counter some common problems arising in 
the works of Anderson and postcolonial theorists. Specifically, I sought to argue that a) 
nationalism can and has been fomented upon criteria of ‘race,’ dispelling the myth that nations 
are predicated on legal equality, b) such an acknowledgement can be accounted for by Political 
Marxist analyses without reducing national forms to a homogenous or modal ‘type’ nor to pure 
economism, and as a result, c) it is neither necessary nor possible to conceive of nationalism as a 
purely bourgeois-led project.  In the next chapter, I delve more fully into how these nationalist 
impulses fundamentally reconfigured settler-indigenous relations. The combined imperatives of 
economic growth, predicated on a transformation of the landscape and the relationship between 
land, progress and national identity, would come to form a nexus from which the idea of national 
‘whiteness’ could develop.  
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Chapter 4  Producing the ‘White’ Nation: Territorial and Political 
Consolidation Through Indigenous Negation 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that the origins of settler nationalism were to be found in the 
uneven and combined integration of settler economies into global commodity markets from 
around the mid-nineteenth century. Drawing from Radhika Desai’s concept of the materiality of 
nations, I showed how nationalism was conceived as a means to specifically material ends—
namely the consolidation of the state’s coercive, administrative and fiduciary capacity. I began to 
outline how such nationalism was both integral to the nature of settler state formation, and how it 
predicated itself on an internal identity of ‘whiteness’ counter-posed to an indigenous racial 
‘otherness.’ Yet, I had only begun to gesture towards how this national construction of racial 
identity was actualized. In this chapter I seek to push this analysis logically forward and argue 
that the production of a national state and population predicated on ‘whiteness’ necessitated the 
material, cultural and racial othering of indigenous populations. In turn, such management of 
‘white’ and ‘racially other’ identities were productive of the material and institutional 
development of the state. The construction of white national identity served to legitimize the 
project of monopolizing and centralizing territorial and fiscal resources and simultaneously 
undermined alternative claims to sovereignty. In managing territorial and fiscal resources while 
policing counter-claims to sovereignty, the state further developed significant bureaucratic and 
organizational capacities. However, the ways in which ‘white’ and indigenous racial 
subjectivities were constructed, including the tools used to realize and enforce indigenous 
dispossession, drew upon and produced novel configurations of social property relations. These 
differences would result in unique strategies of political-economic development, and hence of 
immigrant recruitment and subject stratification (the topic of my final chapter).   
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Before turning to the empirical study, however, it is necessary to address a potential 
theoretical objection. Framing settler colonial constructs of indigeneity in terms of race 
necessarily brings up several important critiques coming from the fields of critical indigenous 
studies. However, while these concerns are essential, I remain convinced that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to analyze settler-colonial constructs of subjectivity without a sustained 
analysis of the racialized and nationalized nature of capital formation in the settler colonies. 
Thus, in the next section I address such critiques while arguing that an analytical focus on 
racialization remains necessary to the project of unmasking and opposing indigenous oppression. 
I will forward that conceptualizing race as foundational to national state formation mitigates 
some of the concerns raised by scholars from within critical indigenous studies.  
 Following this initial theoretical engagement, I develop my comparative case studies, 
turning to Argentina and Canada respectively. I analyze the ways in which settler ‘whiteness’ 
and indigenous ‘racial Otherness’ underwrote the legitimation and institutionalization of 
centralized coercive, administrative and fiduciary state capacity that was necessary for 
organizing agrarian production in the face of competitive market integration. In other words, I 
argue that the very institutions of the state and the forms assumed by state and capital in the 
settler colony were premised upon racial exclusions and hierarchies. These internal variations 
were the product of the spread and combination of European ideas of property and state within 
existing configurations of power, production and privilege. This conclusion will establish the 
grounds for the final chapter of this study, wherein I will show that the means and ends to which 
immigrant populations were recruited and categorized towards the turn of the century were 
shaped by the cultural, institutional, and socio-economic framework established by the 
management of indigenous identities.  
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Indigeneity and Critical Race Studies 
 
 The argument I have advanced thus far understands the analysis of settler national-state 
formation as complementary to the framework of racial formation. Developed in the seminal 
work of Howard Omi and Michael Winant, racial formation refers to the ways in which 
racialization is not simply an effect of power, but formative to power in its own right (Omi & 
Winant, 2014, 112). Because racialization is active in the formulation and realization of 
particular social, political and economic projects, it is not reducible to a singular model of 
exploitation or identity construction but instead can be understood to produce heterogeneous 
modes of racialized societal rule and organization (Omi & Winant, 2014, 106). The advantages 
of examining settler-colonial state building through racial formation are that it brings together, in 
a common analytical framework, indigenous and racialized migrant groups.  
   This choice, however, does not come without its problems. Applying critical race studies 
to indigenous peoples can be problematic in that it risks collapsing indigenous peoples into a 
general category of ‘internal’ oppressed minorities. The key to this issue, as Jodi Byrd argues, is 
that the term ‘internal’ subjects indigenous peoples to the sovereignty and 
ontological/epistemological status of the settler-state (2014a, xxiv). Upon having identified 
indigenous peoples as internally oppressed minorities, the solution becomes one of finding state-
legislated actions to ameliorate such conditions—for example, the Civil Rights movement sought 
the inclusion of racialized groups within the state. The problem, however, is that many 
indigenous peoples do not recognize the sovereignty of the state, nor do they seek inclusion 
within it (Byrd, 2014b, 133). To render solutions to the problems faced by indigenous peoples 
accessible only through the state is to re-impose the very condition of coloniality that produces 
such problems in the first place. Remediation, for many indigenous activists, is found precisely 
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in challenging the sovereignty of the state, not through being granted access to or 
accommodation by the state (Coulthard, 2015).  
 Indeed, as Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua have argued, within anti-racist scholarship 
the question of land is rarely systematically investigated (2005, 126). Yet, land is essential to 
indigenous experiences of oppression, and further legitimizes strategies and mechanisms of 
policing which other peoples of colour would not be subjected to. For example, the authors argue 
that subjection to militarized incursion continues to be a threat held over the heads of non-
compliant indigenous groups, as resource extraction further encroaches on and destroys the 
marginal tracts of land that remain in the hands of their peoples. In obscuring the question of 
land, the legitimacy of indigenous claims to sovereignty is also denied (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 
128). Instead, a liberal pluralistic framework of ‘difference’ will serve to flatten and erase 
indigenous difference (as well as destabilize and fracture differences amongst and between 
indigenous communities themselves). 
 This problem is further complicated by the fact that conceptual conflation or 
universalization of the category of the ‘racial Other’ serves to obscure how immigrants, 
regardless of their racialized oppression, are nonetheless complicit in the settler colonial project 
(sometimes implicitly, other times explicitly) (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 134). Immigrants, 
irrespective of status, participate in the ongoing occupation of indigenous lands, and (often) 
legitimize the settler state by engaging in official procedures sanctioned by that state to occupy 
said territories. (Of course, the equation is complicated when we deal with immigrants who enter 
territories in the absence of official, ‘legal’ channels.)  
 This, however, is not to say that race is not and cannot be an adequate mode of analyzing 
colonially-imposed indigenous subjectivities. The key, to my mind, and this seems to be echoed 
  156 
by Byrd, Dua and Lawrence, is that the racialization of indigenous peoples must be viewed 
through the concomitant production of ‘white nationality,’ which functioned as a material 
precondition of the settler state. Such an understanding allows for a view to indigenous 
racialization as distinct from, yet related to, the racialization of immigrants of colour. The 
conditions for liberal freedoms, civic inclusion, and so forth are from the beginning premised 
upon the decidedly illiberal tactics of dispossessing and policing indigenous peoples. To 
acknowledge this fact is to be able to understand the profound continuities of colonial racism 
encapsulated in the liberal-pluralist model of inclusion and recognition; this is what the theorist 
Charles Mills has called a racial contract (Byrd, 2014a, xxv; Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 131; Mills, 
1997)). As I will show in the final chapter, the patterns and policies of exclusion through which 
immigrant groups have been differentially included or excluded by the state were informed by 
the political and economic structures that resulted from the ‘management’ of indigenous 
dispossession and the policing of white national purity. Having come this far, then, 
decolonization becomes the focal point for anti-racist organizing more broadly, rather than 
simply an aspect of it (Lawrence & Dua, 2005, 131).  
 The model I have been advancing thus far, I hope, is consistent with these requirements. I 
argue that a ‘racial contract’ of sorts was at the core of the establishment of a settler national 
state. To address racialized immigrant and indigenous oppression can mean nothing other than 
decolonization. In this chapter, I aim to detail the specificities of this ‘racial contract,’ a 
condition of the materiality of the nation, roughly spanning the 1860s to the turn of the century.  
Indigenous Elimination on the Pampas 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed that the consolidation of the Argentine state was 
predicated on objectives of national unity and the development of a national Argentine people. 
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This project of national state and economic development was conditioned by transformations in 
the global economy, which positioned Argentina as a potential competitive producer of 
temperate agricultural commodities. In this chapter, I argue that national goals of material and 
territorial consolidation acquired a racial character through the reality of indigenous priority and 
the necessity of dispossession and colonization. Dispossession and colonization were legitimized 
and rationalised by positioning indigenous peoples as a material and socio-cultural obstacle to 
national goals. Through the framing of indigeneity as a ‘disease’ characterized by ‘racial 
barbarity,’ national consolidation became fused to a rhetoric of triumphant racial whiteness. 
However, because this racial myth was rooted in a Darwinian narrative of civilization versus 
barbarism, the persistent existence of indigenous bodies had to be forcibly assimilated. National 
whiteness was produced through violent military genocide, first, and then cultural assimilation. 
The productive power of racialization emerged in this process of creating and policing racial 
whiteness vis-à-vis indigenous dispossession and assimilation. State capacity was built in a) the 
consolidation of the legitimate means of coercive capacity, and b) the generation of international 
credit-worthiness, and hence of state fiscal resources.  
The case study of Argentina is important in demonstrating the centrality of violence and 
coercion (ostensibly ‘illiberal’ practices) in the constitution of modern liberal state orders. For 
example, a seminal scholar of Argentine history, David Rock, views Argentina’s modern cycles 
of military dictatorship and decline as rooted in its pre-modern colonial period and the result of 
white exploitation of indigenous peoples through tributary institutions backed by parochial and 
inflexible economic structures (1985). While Rock is right to point out the centrality of 
indigenous exploitation to modern Argentine nation formation, he fails to see how coercive 
relations and economic structures are—far from inflexible—profoundly transformed in the 
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modern period. This is precisely because traditional actors were defending their positions in 
response to an altered global economic climate. My argument is much more in line with scholars 
such as Tulio Halpérin Donghi or Jeremy Adelman (1994), who view the latter half of the 
nineteenth century as a transformative period for Argentina. Specifically, Adelman’s attention to 
property relations highlights that liberalism and capitalist modernity in Argentina are not ‘failed’ 
projects. He insists, as I do, that we dispense with the myth that there is one path to capitalism. 
That Argentina’s ‘modernity’ looks different from other agricultural developers at this time is 
instead indicative of the fact that actors rooted in specific constellations of property relations 
responded to global economic forces in ways that produced heterogeneous courses of social 
change.  
I will argue throughout the remainder of this study that the coercive powers consolidated 
in this period, while informed by pre-capitalist social relations, were not simply an ‘archaic’ 
element of political life that could not be liberalized or modernized. Rather, these were new 
forms of coercive power, informed by and deployed towards liberal consolidation. Coercive 
capacity was indeed related to the Spanish colonial legacy, the power of landed classes, 
indigenous exploitation, and the years of anti-colonial and then civil wars that followed 
independence. However, through the latter half of the nineteenth century coercive power was 
deployed to eliminate and assimilate indigenous peoples so as to push forward the national 
project of interior development, as well as to demonstrate legal and physical security to foreign 
investors. Indigenous elimination marked a departure from previous exploitative relations (as I 
showed in the previous chapter) and was importantly tied to an outwardly oriented project of 
socio-economic ‘catch-up.’ Through indigenous elimination, scattered provincial militia were 
progressively defeated and consolidated into a national standing army. In this process, the 
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Argentine state became a unified entity legitimated by its coercive capacity internally, and its 
creditworthiness externally. This marked a shift from the personalized and parcellized coercive 
capacity of local caudillos to the centralized and depersonalized coercive power of the state. 
The Militarization of ‘Civilized Whiteness’ over ‘Racial Barbarity’ 
 
 The project of national unification and economic development in Argentina began in 
earnest in 1867. Under President Bartolome Mitre, the Argentine Lands Act was passed, which 
established the transfer of huge swathes of land to interior ranchers. Along with this, a decree 
was passed ordering the army to occupy all territory from the Atlantic to the Andes, establishing 
it as ‘National Territory’ (Dodds, 1993, 318). These policies combined were the impetus for the 
final wave of territorial occupation and indigenous dispossession, culminating in the Conquest of 
the Desert (1875–84). From the 1870s onward, a series of military campaigns sought to brutally 
dispossess indigenous peoples from the Pampas and Patagonia in the 1870s and the Chaco region 
in 1884 (Delrio et al., 2010, 141; Dodds, 1993, 322-23; Trinchero, 2006, 126). All told, estimates 
suggest that anywhere from 10,600 to 12,335 indigenous peoples were killed in the Pampas, 
Patagonia and Chaco regions (Shwittay, 1999, 53; Trinchero, 2006, 133). From the end of the 
1860s, military expenditure as a direct result of frontier campaigns increased exponentially, 
accounting for, at times, more than half of the national budget (Trinchero, 2006, 126).  
The decision to pursue a brutal policy of military genocide against Argentina’s 
indigenous peoples must be understood in terms of the existing social property relations that I 
described in the previous chapter. To briefly recap, however, land was primarily concentrated in 
the hands of the caudillos whose reproduction relied on an extensive ranching practice along 
with intense speculation and localized coercive capacity. As such, those with territorial control 
were uninterested in, even hostile to, the centralization of political power and the opening of 
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borders to immigration and trade (Evans, 2016, 1067). The decades preceding the most 
successful military offensives such as the Conquest of the Desert and the Chaco campaigns were 
for years riven by civil warfare between provincial caudillos and urban liberals. As a result, 
Buenos Aires, as the administrative center of Argentina’s liberal forces, acquired significant 
military capacity, while provincial caudillos commanded a variety of personalized militia power. 
Because “landowners had more power than merchants . . . a powerful military emerged that 
assisted state formation” (Rock, 2000, 178). In other words, one “reason for the genocidal 
policies [of indigenous dispossession] was the expansion of military power made necessary by 
ranching interests and political forces” (Martínez Sarasola, 2010, 214).  
The state of expanded but dispersed coercive capacity throughout the Republic posed two 
main problems. First, the aggrandizement of Buenos Aires’s coercive capacity, while significant, 
had not yet been unified by a common program of operation or conduct; state military power 
was, as yet, not fully nationalized and thus could not be an effective front in the assertion of 
centralized state power. On the other hand, so long as the ‘national’ armies remained relatively 
undisciplined and fragmented, local militia would continue to pose a veritable threat to state 
unity and legitimacy (Gordillo & Hirsch, 2003, 9). Beginning under Sarmiento, though most 
fully developed under Julio A. Roca, the indigenous genocidal campaigns carried out through the 
1870s and 1880s provided impetus to professionalize and formally centralize a national army 
capable of suppressing both indigenous populations’ and local caudillos’ challenge to central 
authority (Goldwert, 1965, 190; Trinchero, 2006, 126). Indeed, this helps to explain the ways in 
which the ‘civilization versus barbarism’ narrative was applied to both caudillo and indigenous 
populations (de la Fuente, 2000, 3; Trinchero, 2006, 125). Both posed threats to the internal 
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expansion of state authority and legitimacy, and as such both served as obstacles to ‘progress.’ 
The national army was thus positioned as the institution of modernization.  
In 1869 Sarmiento established the Colegio Militar to provide a unified standard of 
training for military officers, and through this, he sought to suppress, once and for all, the gaucho 
militias under caudillo command throughout the provinces. By 1880 these militias had been 
formally suppressed, and the city of Buenos Aires was federalized (Goldwert, 1965, 190). It was 
at this point that the army began to occupy an increasingly central role in the construction and 
legitimization of the national state. Having defeated this first element of ‘barbarism,’ the 
military’s consolidation and centralization of legitimate coercive capacity would now come to 
center on the bodies of indigenous peoples, and in this way, it was unified and professionalized 
through a project of racial policing (Trinchero, 2006, 126). Indeed, indigenous elimination was 
articulated as a ‘war’ against an internal yet ‘foreign’ or ‘other’ invasive element (Rodríguez, 
2016, 129; Trinchero, 2006, 123). By the time of the Conquest of the Desert, the rhetoric of 
opposition between indigenous ‘barbarity’ and Argentine ‘civilization’ had reached an existential 
pitch—it was a matter of the life or death of the nation. This was made clear by Roca, then 
minister of war in 1877, when he argued  
In this campaign you are not armed to injure compatriots and brothers estranged by 
political passions or to enslave and ruin peoples or conquer foreign territories. We arm 
for something greater and nobler, to fight for the security and enlargement of the 
Fatherland, for the life and fortune of millions of Argentineans and even for the 
redemption of these very savages who, so many years living by their own instincts, have 
weighed like a scourge on the wealth and wellbeing of the Republic (cited in Martínez 
Sarasola, 2010, 218). 
 
Likewise, Sarmiento drew upon theories of social evolution to legitimize the violent genocide of 
indigenous peoples as a ‘natural conflict’ (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 610). Such conflict was 
‘natural’ because, as a so-called prehistoric race, the indigenes represented “stubborn animals 
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with no capacity for civilization” (cited in Helg, 1990, 40). The violence of the state, hence, was 
legitimized by the fact that it was simply following the course of nature. This, of course, is in 
line with all settler colonial projects, for which the first objective is always a process of physical 
and/or cultural destruction of the original indigenous occupants (Wolfe, 1999, 27). Only after 
total destruction could national material and cultural production begin. 
Thus, throughout the 1880s, and in line with the needs of the Conquest of the Desert, the 
army was increasingly professionalized and modernized under Roca. While in many instances, 
Roca utilized the army as his own praetorian guard, he nevertheless shifted the general structure 
of coercive forces in Argentina away from a politics of parochial command and towards a more 
routinized, meritocratic, impersonal and modernized bureaucracy at the service of the state. 
Throughout the 1880s and 1890s Roca introduced modernized weaponry, erected a professional 
army corps, and created a war academy for the training of general officers (Goldwert, 1965, 190-
91). In 1884 the Military Topographic Office was established, incorporated into the armed 
forces, and charged with mapmaking, topography, and the inspection and survey of territories, 
notably those newly acquired from indigenous raids (Goldwert, 1965, 190; Trinchero, 2006, 
126). 
  However, while physical genocide was the primary objective of these campaigns, 
understood as the natural and inevitable outcome of civilizational conflict, there was no 
conclusive elimination of the indigenous groups of Argentina. The clear disconnect between 
racist Darwinian assumptions and reality led to Argentina’s long-standing, contradictory policy 
on indigenous peoples, which enunciated extinction while practicing coercive assimilation and 
creating a form of second-class citizenship (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 612). And once more, 
the policing of Argentine racial whiteness through strategies of indigenous assimilation 
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contributed to a deepening and widening of the state’s coercive capacities. It was in fact the 
Ministry of War that would take charge of indigenous peoples throughout the nineteenth century 
(Shwittay, 1990, 54).  
The Problem of Indigenous Continuity: Assimilation into ‘Whiteness’ 
 
 The fact that indigenous peoples did not, as a matter of history, simply cease to exist 
following the military campaigns clearly raised problems for the myth of Argentine national 
whiteness, articulated through a Darwinian evolutionary schema. However, beyond this, 
indigenous continuity posed significant political-economic problems for state-builders. Recalling 
that historically indigenous groups of Argentina possessed significant capacity to assert and 
maintain sovereignty through violent attacks, such as the malones, state builders were 
determined to prevent the re-composition of indigenous political organization (Gordillo & 
Hirsch, 2003, 5). Indeed, an editorial for La Prensa in 1878 articulated clearly the ‘danger’ posed 
by any continued indigenous organization: “Let us destroy that race morally, let us annihilate its 
authority and political organization, may its tribes disappear, and if necessary, let its families be 
divided. This dispersed and broken race will, in the end, embrace the cause of civilization” (cited 
in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 613). In this way, to continue to reproduce indigenous identity 
through policies of reservation and segregation was unwelcome and politically counter-
productive. The goal was to eliminate indigenous peoples as a differentiated population (Dunstan 
& Peñaloza, 2017, 615).  
Personal secretary to Roca and famed social Darwinist José Ingenieros tried to reconcile 
these antinomies when he suggested that “we [Argentineans] belong to a privileged race, the 
Caucasian race, better gifted than any other known race . . . Who could stop our forward march? 
(cited in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 619)” and thus  
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To campaign in support of the inferior races is to be antiscientific. The most we might do 
is to protect them in such a way as to allow their gentle extinction, facilitate the 
provisional adaptation of those few who are capable of it. These discarded bits of human 
flesh are to be regarded with pity. They should be treated well, at least as well as the 
centenarian tortoises of the London zoo, or the trained ostriches of Antwerp (cited in 
Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 618). 
 
Rather than representing proof of the inadequacy of the theory of racial extinction that 
underpinned indigenous genocide, assimilation was forwarded as a final, humanitarian gesture to 
a dying race. These ‘barbaric’ elements would, where possible, be trained to occupy a 
subordinate position within the new Argentine nation, transformed into nominal citizens, and a 
cheap labour force, until eventually, they could be fully eliminated (Rodríguez, 2016, 127). In 
contrast to Benedict Anderson’s assertion that “nationalism thinks in terms of historical 
destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations” (2006, 149), the Argentine case 
suggests that the very content of the nation combined both of these. To be a full citizen was to 
embrace the ‘historical destiny’ of assimilation, while to continue to embrace traditional practice 
was to be ‘eternally contaminated’ by a secondary, or partial, form of citizenship.  
The militarized coercion of indigenous assimilation took on numerous forms of 
separation and dispersal. In the Chaco region, military fortifications were used to debilitate 
access to traditional livelihoods and forms of political organization. As the General in charge of 
the Chaco campaign, Benjamín Victorica, argued 
It will be difficult now for the tribes to re-organize due to the impact of the punishments 
they have suffered . . . Deprived of their fishing resources by the military posts along the 
rivers and impeded from hunting in the way that they used to do, the scattered members 
of the tribes will make haste to appeal to the benevolence of the authorities and run to the 
forced settlements or the sawmills where already many are living and benefitting from 
civilization. (1885, 15, quoted in Carrera, 1982, 15-17) 
 
The concentration camp was another significant mechanism of elimination and segregation 
established to separate and redistribute indigenous peoples in a manner that would prevent the re-
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composition of traditional socio-political organization and encourage assimilation into ‘white’ 
Argentina. In the camps, women and children were separated from the men, and families were 
forcibly dislocated so as to prevent physical (and cultural) reproduction. Amongst the most 
populated of these camps were the Castro Fort and Valcheta, both in the Río Negro, in today’s 
province of Neuquen (with estimates of up to 20,000 prisoners) and the infamous Martín García 
Island, a major site for indigenous concentration beginning in 1879 following the Desert 
Campaigns (Delrio et al., 2010, 141-42).  
Children were often forcibly separated from their mothers and ‘adopted’ into white 
families for the purposes of a ‘civilizing education.’ This was to be a responsibility borne by the 
army, as sub-lieutenant Miguel Malarín, in 1878, argued “Indian children must be distributed 
amongst the Republic’s families . . . . to civilize the savage until he achieves adulthood . . . The 
goal is to give a civilized education to these vagabond and dangerous people” (cited in Dunstan 
& Peñaloza, 2017, 615).  Women were then sent into urban domestic service, which prevented 
contact with indigenous men while cultivating the acquisition of European customs. It was under 
the tutelage of proper ‘white’ Argentines that indigenous children and women were to be guided 
into ‘civilization’ (Delrio et al. 2010, 139; Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 616). For children, this 
strategy was one of effecting the elimination of indigenous identity, while for women the policy 
was one of preventing the biological reproduction of indigeneity and promoting liberal domestic 
values associated with the nuclear family.  
Men, in their turn, were often compelled to provide military service, or were forcibly 
assimilated into a growing waged workforce (Carrera, 1982, 22). In many ways, the former 
strategy was yet another attempt to ensure the physical disappearance of indigenous peoples, as it 
was anticipated that most of those forced into military service would be killed in the line of 
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‘duty’ (Carrera, 1982, 22-23). In the latter case, the violence underpinning state formation is all 
the more visible, as it was only through forcible displacement that the agricultural sector of 
northern Argentina, the cattle ranches of the Chaco, and the sheep farms in the Pampas and 
Patagonia could meet their early labour demands (Gordillo & Hirsch, 2003, 11).  
 In the event that these coercive tactics did not fully eliminate the remaining indigenous 
populations, further strategies of administrative elimination and assimilation were deployed. For 
example, the 1895 Census of the Central Pampas recorded no category for ‘Indian,’ but rather 
provided only a choice between ‘Argentinian’ or ‘foreigner’ (Chamosa, 2008, 78). The lack of a 
statistical count for indigenous peoples reinforced the nation-building myth that the indigenous 
peoples belonged to a developmental prehistory of Argentina. When indigenous peoples 
attempted to make claims against the state, as Lazzari argues, the government could not 
recognize their distinctive claims, as they had already been erased from bureaucratic memory. 
Instead, when continued displacement and an ad hoc indigenous policy resulted in still many 
impoverished and homeless peoples, the government created an agricultural colony of 80,000 
hectares on which to transplant those who continued to make claims against the state. Once 
more, the title of agricultural colony served to erase the indigenous presence in the Argentine 
Pampas, positioning those who lived within the bounds of the Colonia Pastoril Emilio Mitre as 
‘settlers’ rather than original peoples (Lazzari, 2010, 65). Terms such as peón (farm-hand), 
pablador (dweller) and puestor (worker) would instead be used to describe these indigenous 
groups (Lazzari, 2010, 28-9). Additional administrative tactics included baptizing indigenous 
children with Christian names and overstating the number of casualties in the ‘desert wars’—all 
measures designed to feed the fiction that Argentina was an empty land awaiting its European 
civilizers (Lazzari, 2010, 55).  
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Though not constitutionally excluded from the Argentine state, indigenous peoples were 
subjected to and placed under a very different set of political relations vis-a-vis the state—
namely those of politically designated dependence (Shwittay, 1999, 53). While nationality was 
increasingly invoked to describe Argentina’s ‘white’ population, subject to its project of 
economic development, the exclusion of indigenous populations helped to define the parameters 
of national inclusion while holding out the promise of improvement through racial assimilation 
(Wade, 2001, 848-849). While technically meeting the birth requirement for citizenship, 
indigenous peoples were confined to an intermediary space of political existence. According to 
an Argentine Congressman in the late nineteenth century,  
the Indian, with his ignorance, his preoccupations and vices, does not meet the 
requirements to be a citizen . . . But if . . . he adopts the habits of cultured life, then he 
will be ready to . . . perform his role as Argentine citizen. (cited in Dunstan & Peñaloza, 
2017, 618) 
 
Given these statements, it might be tempting to conclude, following Anderson, that precisely 
because of this internal stratification of political membership, what emerged in Argentina was 
not nationalism. Indeed, modern nationalism, for Anderson, followed from the Latin American 
leadership of creole classes in asserting a binding identity that was neither ‘indigenous’ nor 
‘European’ but, through processes of mestizaje, uniquely ‘American.’ According to Anderson, 
this process of national formation led to an embrace of the indigenous as fellow citizen (2006, 
50). And yet, what I am forwarding is the suggestion that in Argentina, national identity was 
formed through a rejection of indigeneity and all aspects of mestizaje in favour of white 
European identity.  
The confusion is owing to the fact that “Anderson’s culturalist reading of nationalism is 
so general and abstract that it fails to clarify the politics of community production” (Lomnitz, 
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2001, 349). As Lomnitz argues, and as is further echoed in the work of Cooper (2015, 579) and 
Desai (2008, 398), these political conditions should be understood as responding to both internal 
and external pressures. Even more important, however, is the recognition of nationalism as 
productive of state power and resources, which is highlighted by these authors. Where for 
Anderson, the nation can be understood as produced through ‘modern’ productive forces, I am 
emphasizing the fact that, in some spaces, nationalism precedes such modernization and is, in 
fact, a key to the transformation of productive activities, including through the reorganization of 
political authority. In addition to binding together a population then, nations form to mobilize 
domestic resources in response to external (here capitalist) pressures. The particular political 
conditions necessary to mobilize resources in response to advanced capitalist organization may 
in fact lead to the consolidation of a national peoples, not based on homogeneous fraternity, but a 
stratified distinction between full and partial citizens, wherein the full citizen brokers and 
mediates the political dependence of the partial citizen in preparation for potential absorption 
into the body politic (Lomnitz, 2001, 338).  
This caveat is particularly important for understanding Argentina whose pattern of nation 
formation is widely held to depart from the general template established in the rest of Latin 
America (Dunstan & Peñaloza, 2017, 614; Rodríguez, 2016, 128). Whereas in much of Latin 
America, an inclusive identity premised upon mestizaje and promoted through creole 
functionaries was indeed the norm, in Argentina national identity was consolidated through an 
exclusive focus on whiteness and denial of the reality of centuries of miscegenation (Rodríguez, 
2016, 128). It is precisely owing to the political and economic dimensions of state formation, 
understood in relation to exogenous as well as endogenous pressures, that these differences can 
be understood. 
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Indigenous dispossession and fiscal insolvency in the Argentine interior 
 
Finally, the centralization of military capacity through indigenous dispossession served a 
financial purpose for the Argentine Republic. However, this centralization was not through the 
nationalization of indigenous lands and their use as a fiscal resource as had been anticipated; the 
state was ultimately unable to assert a monopoly on ‘liberated’ territory. In the process of 
dispossession, throughout the military campaigns of the 1870s and 1880s, the state distributed 
land as rewards to military personnel, hoping that as private property, land would be used by 
decommissioned soldiers to contribute to the national project of agricultural development. 
Frontier Commanders were to receive 8000 hectares, Regiment Commanders received 5000 ha., 
Sergeants 4000 ha., Captains 2500 ha., Lieutenants 2000 ha., and other miscellaneous personnel 
received 1500 ha. (Trinchero, 2006, 127).  However, soldiers sought monetary reimbursement, 
not land, and many of them quickly turned around and sold their titles to speculators 
(Zimmerman, 1945, 24). All told, under President Julio Roca, six million hectares were disposed 
to officers who had serviced the desert campaigns, while an additional three million hectares 
were sold to pay for other miscellaneous costs of the wars. Given the historical practice of using 
land as a security on foreign debt, the state was unable to preserve its credit, and in 1890, under 
the stress of a financial crisis, what little remained of public lands was liquidated (Adelman, 
1994, 68-69). In Argentina, efforts to generate a national monopoly on seized lands were met 
with resistance owing to the indebtedness of the state to the military personnel who advanced 
these campaigns of dispossession. Introducing private property to replace the politically 
constituted property regime under Rosas did not, despite efforts, contribute to advancing a mass 
project of agricultural settlement. Instead, private property rights served to re-inscribe and 
empower the class dominance of ranchers. Such lack of advancement placed severe constraints 
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on the capacity of the state to internally generate national resources for the implementation of 
state development projects (Evans, 2016, 1067). 
 While genocide and militarized indigenous dispersal were conceived of as necessary for 
the theoretical introduction of settlement and transportation infrastructure, they were also 
necessary to attract foreign investment. Absent a domestic base of taxation, the Argentine state 
relied primarily on foreign capital to fund its rail development, which in turn, either directly or 
indirectly depended on indigenous dispossession. In the first instance, foreign investors 
(primarily the British) were unwilling to invest in rail systems without assurance of the security 
of their investments from indigenous raids. Attempts to attract foreign capital to construct 
railways prior to the period of the so-called ‘desert campaigns’ were unsuccessful. For example, 
the construction of the Central Argentine railway was consistently disrupted by indigenous 
raiding (Ford, 1971, 651; Goodwin Jr., 1977, 619, 626). It was only from the 1880s onward that 
foreign capital began to pour into Argentina, following the conclusion of the military offensives 
against indigenous people; throughout the 1880s British investment amounted £7,600,000, 
growing to £64,600,00 in the 1890s, and by the onset of World War I, reached a peak of 
£225,000,000 (Pulley, 1966, 66). 
 In the second instance, “not without significance for the overseas investor was the 
assumption of power by a strong federal government that seemed capable of maintaining law and 
order and safety of property” (Ford, 1971, 651). Indeed Alberdi recognized this truth when he 
argued that foreign loans, while necessary, could not be obtained without national credit based 
on the united liabilities of the state: “Unite as the body of a nation, consolidate the liability of our 
present and future revenues and fortunes and you will find someone who will lend you millions 
to provide for your local and general needs” (Alberdi, 2013, 144). The dispossession of 
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indigenous peoples through the ‘desert wars’ aided in this strategy by necessitating and 
maintaining the national unification of the army, which had been divided throughout the years of 
Buenos Aires’s secession (1854–59), thereby giving the national state stability and legitimacy in 
the eyes of foreign lenders through its monopolization of violence. Bureaucratically, the 
assessment of agricultural colonies necessitated a rationally administered process of reporting, 
policing, and so forth, thereby contributing to the erection of national state instruments. Finally, 
throughout the 1860s a series of laws were passed through which the federal government 
increasingly assumed the debts and liabilities of the nation, which were declared the 
responsibility of all the revenues of the state (Saiegh, 2007, 17).   
The political unification and nationalization of Argentina throughout the final decades of 
the nineteenth century relied upon overt racialized constructions of indigenous people as a 
visceral threat to the development of ‘true’ and ‘civilized’ Argentines. It was through this 
narrative of racial threat that the state was to finally construct an image of unity, understood both 
materially and ideologically. The racial language of superiority and inferiority was not simply a 
residual effect of pre-modern prejudice, but was in fact productive of modern state power. 
Through the production and policing of racial whiteness (read as ‘civility’) Argentine state 
builders were able to finally assert a monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion and 
transform the parochial and factionalized nature of coercive power into a routinized, professional 
national army. Such capacity served to legitimate the state, understood increasingly in national 
secular terms, both internally vis-a-vis its power to suppress provincial powers, and externally in 
its ability to attract foreign investments through its guarantee of the security of property within 
its territories. Turning now to the case of Canada, I will argue that while indigenous 
dispossession legitimized through the national imagery of ‘whiteness’ was similarly productive 
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of state capacity and power in the late nineteenth century, it was of a very different nature; 
namely, in Canada, the process of structuring internally heterogeneous categories of belonging 
was productive of legal and bureaucratic state capacity.  
Canada’s Indigenous Apartheid: Segregation and Elimination Dispossession and the 
Creation of Fiscal Crown Lands 
 
As I showed in the previous chapter, the Dominion of Canada was born into a global political 
economy increasingly premised on competitive agricultural trade. However, the extreme 
regionalism that had preceded Confederation (and would continue until the end of the century) 
had meant that the very things required to pursue an intensification of agricultural commodity 
production were lacking, fragmented and in general disarray. Of central importance for such a 
project was a reconfiguration of the relations established between settlers, indigenous peoples, 
and land. Land was necessary as both a source of public revenue, and as a site of settlement and 
cultivation, especially in the Western prairie regions, where wheat cultivation would become 
dominant. However, even outside of the major agricultural regions, the search for fiscal lands 
was insatiable, and served to finance the government through sales to railway, mining and other 
industrial interests. The demise of the mercantile system of British imperialism was to radically 
transform the established patterns of indigenous-settler relations; it was at this point that relations 
assuming a nation-to-nation diplomacy were transformed into relations of domination, 
assimilation and elimination.  
The nature of indigenous-settler relations, historically or contemporarily, then, cannot be 
disembedded from this critical historical transformation of material, social and property relations 
in the context of capitalist globalization. When discussing disparities of power, it is critical to 
note the profoundly material basis for these structures of oppression, while nevertheless 
understanding that they conditioned and were conditioned by a variety of cultural, political and 
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ideological relations. In this section, I seek to trace out and explain, in terms of the shifting 
political-economic terrain of the new state, the transformation of indigenous land policy by the 
settler-colonial government. I argue that changes were, in fact, crucial to the very process of 
national state formation that was being undertaken at this moment. This is to say that the 
dramatic shift in policies towards indigenous peoples’ land was not simply an effect of the new 
settler state, but constitutive of it. These policies established a public monopoly over lands that 
conditioned, differently from Argentina, the possibilities for intensive agricultural innovation by 
amassing national state capacity and legitimacy.  
Two dominant trends for economic development existed in the provinces leading up to 
Confederation: west of Ottawa primary production of wheat and the timber trade predominated, 
while the eastern areas centered on Montreal sought to support nascent industrial and financial 
interests. The former saw no benefit to be had from tariff protection while the latter sought to 
support industrial development through the erection of a tariff (Miller, 2009, 127-129). 
Furthermore, as shown in the previous chapter, direct taxation remained a vexing question, as 
regional imbalances and dominant social property relations did not allow for an easily taxable 
population base. The question of taxation was especially protracted when negotiating the 
concessions of the eastern provinces, for which debt was far less, and resources much greater—
they did not want to enter Confederation only to have their resources taxed away to serve 
western debt (Smith, 2008, 7-9). Confederation was crucial to solving the fiscal and 
developmental crises of the settlers’ political economy. Confederation furthered the 
centralization and consolidation of authority over indigenous lands, which could then be 
transformed into public fiscal lands. In this way, the new Dominion could pursue a strategy of 
settler agricultural and rail development, financing the cost of these projects through the 
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appropriation and sale of indigenous lands. Macdonald echoed this objective in 1880 when, 
discussing the construction of the Canada Pacific Railway, he assured that “not a farthing of 
money will have to be paid by the people of Canada” (quoted in Martin, 1973, 11). To enable 
this, the British North America Act contained two critical provisions: the first allowing for the 
later incorporation of western regions (here the acquisition of the Hudson’s Bay Company lands 
was of paramount importance), and the second assigning jurisdiction over indigenous reserves 
and lands to the federal government (Miller, 2009, 129).  
Up until the transfer of Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) to the 
Dominion Government, indigenous land had been occupied, sold, and alienated through the 
conditions set out under the Royal Proclamation. These relations had generally incorporated 
indigenous traditions and practices, and were conducted on the basis of diplomatic relations 
between two sovereign nations (Miller, 2009, 138). In fact, under the Royal Proclamation there 
was explicit acknowledgment of indigenous title (Hall, 2014, 4). However, with the transfer of 
the lands west of the original federation of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 
covering an area more than five times that of the original four provinces, settler-indigenous 
relations were transformed. In part, the transfer of such land in one single negotiation both 
allowed for and necessitated the creation of a vast system of public survey, bureaucracy, 
accounting and policy for the administration of said lands (Martin, 1973, 9). Land transfers had 
the effect of shifting authority from the respective provinces to the central state for the purposes 
of land administration.  
Much of this process had been anticipated in the lead up to Confederation, wherein by 
1857 the Select Committee of the British House of Commons argued that in the coming years 
settlement would become a priority and thus recommended that the HBC cede its authority and 
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lands to the government of Canada (Martin, 1973, 3). The goal was to create a vast system of 
public fiscal lands that could then be directed towards the ends of Dominion (rail development 
and agricultural settlement) while providing the necessary revenue for such endeavours and 
avoiding regional disagreements. At this point in time, the HBC itself had become less hostile to 
settlement, as the development of vast rail systems in the United States had led to intense 
competitive pressures in the carrying trade (Miller, 2009, 123). The development of land, in this 
context, began to appeal to the HBC. In 1868, negotiations with the HBC for the transfer of 
Rupert’s Land to the central government had been formalized in the Rupert’s Land Act. With the 
act, the vast territories from the Hudson’s Bay basin to the North-West Territories were 
incorporated into the Confederation, in exchange for £300,000 cash, up to 50,000 acres of land in 
the areas of trading posts and forts, as well as one twentieth of the fertile land in the region 
(Martin, 1973, 5). In one single negotiation, the settler-state was able to assert an effective 
monopoly over land. 
The preparatory surveys and the incursion of central government into the Red River 
region did not go unnoticed by the Métis inhabitants. The Red River Rebellions, led by Louis 
Riel, was a response to the clear danger posed to indigenous peoples of the lands under HBC 
control, with the impending transfer to the new settler state. Thus, in addition to the conditions 
established in the Rupert’s Land Act of 1868, the Manitoba Act of 1870 provided for 1,400,000 
acres of land to go to “the benefit of the families of the half-breed residents.” However, to be 
clear, this agreement overrode existing agreements; all lands that had been granted by the 
authority of the HBC were to be converted into freehold grant for the Crown. This provision 
allowed for the allocation of sub-optimal lands to the Métis; as one Commissioner noted in 1885, 
“if it had been the object . . . to select the poorest land available, then they had succeeded” 
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(Martin, 1973, 5). Thus, the public monopoly on land conditioned the state’s ability to establish a 
reserve system, but one that would presumably not have impeded upon the overall national 
objectives. 
The year following the Manitoba Act saw the addition of British Columbia to the 
federation. With this addition, the government was bound to a commitment to begin construction 
on a transcontinental railway within two years, and to complete it within ten. The railway was to 
bind together disparate geographical regions of the union and create a nation from the Dominion. 
With the impending deadlines of rail construction now set, the government had to rapidly settle 
and cultivate the west, both to finance rail construction, and to make such construction 
practicable and viable by creating an interior market for commerce (Miller, 2009, 148).  
Having by 1871 massively expanded the land area of the union, the Dominion 
government sought to legitimize the accompanying transformation of power within the 
federation. Macdonald defended the centralization of authority that occurred under the ambit of 
Dominion Lands policy, arguing “it would be injudicious . . . to have a large province which 
would have control over lands and might interfere with the general policy of the Government in 
opening up communications to the Pacific, besides the land regulations of the Province might be 
obstructive to immigration. All that vast territory should be for the purposes of settlement under 
one control, and that the Dominion legislature” (quoted in Martin, 1973, 12). In part, what 
became necessary was a centralized and systematized policy for managing indigenous-settler 
relations, so as to clear away the inconsistencies and discrepancies that were beginning to 
emerge.  
Between 1871 and 1877 the first seven of the numbered treaties were concluded. The 
early treaties, one to three, were conducted to exchange lands for reserves, agricultural assistance 
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and the right to continue to hunt and fish. The agreement was to “cede, release, surrender, and 
yield up to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the Queen and her 
successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever to the lands included within 
the following limits . . .” (quoted in Miller, 2009, 172). These treaties covered the Chippewa, 
Swampy Cree, Saulteaux and Ojibwa groups of Southern Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Southeastern Ontario. Treaty Four was concluded in 1874, covering the Cree and Saulteaux in 
Southern Saskatchewan, and introduced ‘blanket extinguishment,’ wherein surrender involved 
“all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever to all other lands wheresoever situated within 
Her Majesty’s North-West Territories, or any of them, to have and to hold the same to Her 
Majesty the Queen and her successors forever” (quoted in Miller, 2009, 172). Additionally, as 
conditions worsened and indigenous peoples began to see treatymaking as their only option, 
Treaty Four allowed for additions to the original treaty, though this meant that latecomers had no 
voice in the negotiations and had to accept the treaty as it was. From 1875 onward, the treaties 
conducted separated the issue of ceding land from that of reserve conditions, making it clear that 
pretences regarding the protection of indigenous peoples were no longer necessary (Miller, 2009, 
172-173).  
Further changes were conducted in the language of the Manitoba Act, which reflected the 
rapid effacement of protection with bald policies of land acquisition and assimilation. In 1874, 
changes were made to limit land grants or scrips to Métis heads of families, rather than to the 
children of heads of families. These changes served to limit the generational obligation of the 
government to the Métis of the Red River region. Later, after the introduction of the Indian Act 
in 1876, yet more changes would remove land grants from the system and instead promise only 
scrip worth $160 for the purchase of Dominion Lands; this latter provision served to reverse 
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previous language that had, if latently, acknowledged the Métis’s prior claims to the land. With 
this final change in the language of the Manitoba Act, the Métis’s claims could only be 
processed with the mediation of the market, thereby extinguishing pre-existing, natural rights to 
the land (Martin, 1973, 21). When coupled with the 1869 Gradual Enfranchisement Act, which 
denied status and thus claims to women marrying ‘white’ men, it became clear that the direction 
indigenous policy was taking was that of elimination. Those who could rightfully make claims to 
land were quickly being defined out of ‘Indianness’ (Lawrence, 2003, 12). In effect, the first 
systematic attempts to institutionalize indigenous racial difference arose from the imposition of a 
public monopoly on land, which introduced, for the first time, ideas of land as property. This 
shift signaled a very new configuration of the relationship between land and social relations.  
All of this said, however, there remained much of the West to be fully appropriated, 
including the recently negotiated reserve lands. It became clear that to furnish the state with the 
lands, security and revenue for agricultural settlement and rail development, title to land would 
not be sufficient—rather more enduring strategies of subject formation that simultaneously 
legitimized the national state project and undermined the cultural, symbolic and ideological 
legitimacy of indigenous peoples as a nationally sovereign people were necessary. Thus, in 1876, 
the Indian Act was established. Perhaps the central contribution of the Indian Act was its attempt 
to consolidate and systematize a definition of what it meant to be an ‘Indian,’ as well as to 
legally codify a differential and dependent political relationship between the ‘Indian’ and the 
state. Once the conditions of defining a ‘rightful Indian’ had been met, it would become possible 
to either push to the very margins and police the conduct of those who qualified as ‘Indian’ or 
else to eliminate, and thereby hope to assimilate, the non-status ‘Indian’ who could no longer 
threaten the settler states’ claim to territorial sovereignty. ‘Indian’ identity served to define a 
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political position of dependence with the potential for the full acquisition of citizenship with 
assimilation to ‘racial whiteness’ through cultural and material norms supporting institutions of 
private property, settlement, and Lockean conceptions of productivity (Losurdo, 2011, 24).   
Defining the ‘Indian’ Out of land rights 
 
 The first attempts to legally define the ‘Indian’ developed in the lead-up to 
Confederation, through the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857. The Act clearly stated in its 
preamble that the goal of this legislation was to facilitate the acquisition of land and the 
eradication of a distinct, indigenous claim to national sovereignty: 
Whereas it is desirable to encourage the progress of Civilization among the Indian Tribes 
in this Province, and the gradual removal of all legal distinctions between them and Her 
Majesty’s other Canadian Subjects, and to facilitate the acquisition of property and of the 
rights accompanying it, by such Individual Members . . . . (1857, 3) 
 
In effect, the Act established the grounds upon which indigenous reserve lands could be 
converted into plots, which were then alienable by indigenous men wishing to become 
enfranchised. The enfranchised ‘Indian’ was he (only men could become enfranchised) who was 
willing, through the acquisition of British standards of education, morality, literacy and work, to 
renounce his ‘Indian’ identity and become a subject of the Crown (Tobias, 1985, 43-45). To 
become enfranchised thus meant to relinquish claims to an indigenous identity, whilst 
simultaneously removing pieces of land from the jurisdiction of the Royal Proclamation (Tobias, 
1985, 43) Political subjectivity clearly operated on a hierarchical plane, wherein relations of 
political dependence continued to define and discipline those whose life-worlds posed a threat to 
settler sovereignty. However, to renounce the collective identity and materiality of those life-
worlds led one on a path to full political inclusion in the national peoples, a subjectivity shorn of 
its overt and obligatory relation of political dependence. This, however, was not simply an 
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ideological manifestation of racial whiteness in Canada. It was in this way that the land held in 
reserve for indigenous peoples became subject to private sale and settlement by immigrant 
groups, a central pillar of the post-Confederation national development agenda (Boswell, 1970, 
94-96). The binding of racial identity to property relations formed an aspect of the very 
materiality of the nation in Canada, facilitating and legitimizing a national project of agricultural 
settlement through the sale of ‘public’ lands. 
 Thus, the distinction between the enfranchised and non-enfranchised ‘Indian’ went 
beyond legal definitions of subjecthood and land tenure. The ‘Indian’ was constituted through 
racialized criteria, defined in contradistinction to the Canadian national subject; enfranchisement 
not only meant a different form of political subjectivity, but also a partial transformation of one’s 
externally imposed racial identity. As Sunera Thobani has argued, the constitution of a juridical 
national subject in the form of the Canadian or ‘enfranchised Indian’ thus allowed the ‘Indian’ to 
be construed as contrary to the legal subject (Thobani, 2007, 13-15). Thus the ‘Indian’ was 
classified as of a lower racial order, living in a constant state of dependence and lacking the tools 
and drives for progress and productivity, education and morality (Carter, 1990, 16). Indeed, the 
term ‘Indian’ was initially used to homogenize into one racial category a variety of diverse 
cultural and ethnic groups; and in so much as this was the case, it could just as easily have been 
disaggregated as became necessary to the project of assimilation, elimination and nation 
building. The racialization of the ‘Indian’ was partially open-ended in so much as the acquisition 
of the various qualities deemed to be lacking in indigenous peoples would render them amenable 
to admittance into the national configuration of political subjectivity. This is because racial 
nationality functioned not simply as an ideological-cultural category, but as a profoundly 
material one as well.  
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Thus, part of the initial distinction between the ‘Indian’ and the ‘enfranchised’ 
pivoted around a racialized understanding of land tenure. This understanding is visible in the fact 
that prior to Confederation, to be accepted as ‘Indian’ one need only declare oneself as such for 
the designation to be accepted. In contrast, after Confederation, status as ‘Indian’ hinged on 
membership to a band, defined in relation to collective interests in land and/or money (Boswell, 
1970, 79). In the post-Confederation era, particularly under the Indian Act of 1876, the idea of 
blood quantum was introduced so that an ‘Indian’ was any male person of so-called ‘Indian’ 
blood, or any child or wife of such an individual who lived on reserve. To move off the reserve 
for more than five years meant the loss of such status. Land and geography functioned as a 
spatial boundary distinguishing between full or partial, dependent or ‘autonomous’ membership 
in the settler state (Boswell, 1970, 79).  
 To live on a reserve meant to live under the political and economic (and later cultural) 
custodial jurisdiction of the Canadian state. While ostensibly reserve life was to be for the 
‘protection’ of indigenous peoples and their lands, the conditions of the Indian Act 1876 clearly 
suggest otherwise. The goal of the reserve was to either segregate and eliminate or else prepare 
for the acquisition of and assimilation to Western liberal values by contributing to the federal 
government’s fiscal land reserve and agricultural development (Barron, 1988, 26; Carter, 1990, 
24). Placing indigenous peoples in a custodial relationship to the state enacted a differential 
modality of social reproduction wherein indigenous peoples were dependent upon and bound to 
the dictates of the state in ways that, on the surface, full citizens were not. Thus, within the Act, 
reserve lands could not be sold or alienated unless they were surrendered to the Crown; inter-
band trading, gifting, bartering and selling of the land and any implements therein (provided for 
by annuities) were prohibited, as was the use, occupation, settlement or hunting of lands not of 
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the same reserve in which one lives, whether by consent of the occupying reserve or not. These 
policies served to increase the dependence of indigenous peoples on the Canadian state and 
reduce traditional modes of social reproduction that served to inhibit the settler project of 
national economic development. In so doing, the settler state sought to coercively ‘encourage’ 
the entry of indigenous land and labour into the market economy, diminishing any resources that 
could be read as inducements to or complicit in traditional livelihoods (Shewell, 2004, 24).  
Land, moral regulation and racial state formation 
 
As much as the policies around enfranchisement and land were central to the settler 
state’s attempt to nationalize the agricultural economy, in practice, these policies were less 
successful than hoped. Indeed, very few indigenous peoples were interested in acquiring the 
electoral rights and freehold tenure promised by enfranchisement, and this lack of participation 
meant ongoing fiscal obligation by the federal government to indigenous peoples, as well as the 
task of managing conflict between indigenous practices and agrarian, pastoral and infrastructural 
projects (Boswell, 1970, 97). Indian Commissioner Edgar Dewdney at the time suggested that 
the bureaucratic response could be nothing less than “sheer compulsion” (cited in Miller, 1990, 
389). As a result, increasingly draconian legal policies of punishment were erected in order to 
enforce moral regulation on the reserve and encourage enfranchisement. The 1876 Indian Act, to 
be sure, contained a number of such policies, as there was a clear acknowledgement of the need 
to apply coercive pressure in order to maintain the integrity of the reserve system. However, 
subsequent amendments to the Act ratcheted up the severity and scope of the role of the penal 
system in the management of indigenous peoples, casting those on the reserve as inherently 
contra-legal, thus furthering the codified divide between the citizen-subject and the racialized 
ward of state. Indeed, as Sherry Gavigan has argued, the application of criminal law to the 
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indigenous populations on reserves was less about ‘criminalizing’ such peoples and more about 
‘Indianizing’ or racializing them (Gavigan, 2012, 25).  
 The application of criminal law to indigenous peoples followed the creation of the pass 
system and the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) in the prairie regions of Canada in the 
1870s and the subsequent amendments to the Indian Act. Central to the transformation of ‘Indian 
Policy’ and its integration into the criminal law system was the extension of criminal law to 
some of the most intimate and personal aspects of indigenous lives. These were practices that 
continued to condition social production and reproduction and which challenged the settler-
colonial project of asserting sovereignty predicated on a particular moral-cultural order and 
pursuing capitalist national development, both economically and socially. Key changes in this 
regard were the criminalization of polygamy, the sharing, gifting or exchanging of reserve 
resources, the consumption of alcohol, trespassing, horse theft and cattle killing, among other 
things.  
 Perhaps one of the central generative conditions for the integration of criminal law with 
‘Indian Policy’ was the pass system. The pass system was a segregationist practice, dominant in 
the prairie west, which required that indigenous peoples wishing to leave their reserve obtain a 
pass signed by an Indian agent or farm instructor indicating the reason and duration of their 
absence from the reserve. While historians have tended to argue that the pass system arose as a 
response by the Canadian government to the uprising occurring through the North-West 
Rebellion in 1885, Baron and Gavigan both argue that the pass system must be thought of as part 
of a wider strategy of control which both predates and supersedes the anxieties surrounding the 
North-West Rebellion (Barron, 1988, 27; Gavigan, 2012, 33-37). According to Baron, the origins 
of the pass system are to be found in the actions of Assistant Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed 
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who, prior to the Rebellion, sought to curb the movement of indigenous peoples by paying 
annuities only in the home reserve and withholding rations from those who spent too much time 
off the reserve. The regulation of movement was to ostensibly encourage the development of 
productive agriculture by indigenous peoples, a central pillar in the ‘civilizing’ project of the 
reserve (Barron, 1988, 29; Carter, 1990, 15). As Reed stated: 
I am adopting the system of keeping the Indians on their respective reserves and not 
allowing any (to) leave without passes — I know this is hardly supportable by any legal 
enactment but we must do many things which can only be supported by common sense 
and by what may be for the general good. (cited in Barron, 1988, 29)  
 
The resistance of indigenous peoples to assimilation, as well as the ‘disruptions’ and ‘security 
concerns’ raised by pastoral, agricultural and rail interests, was the impetus behind the 
government’s erection of these increasingly draconian and coercive manipulations of freedom of 
movement. Underlying this differentiated system of political subjectivity, therefore, were 
political-economic incentives; namely the need to foment competitive agricultural commodity 
production (Carter, 1990, 19).  However, as Reed noted, the pass system itself had no legal 
basis—these distinctions among political subjects could not find legal footing. Indeed, the treaty-
making process, which had created the system of reserves, guaranteed that no such curtailment of 
movement could be exercised by the settler government over indigenous peoples. And yet, the 
application of these practices lacking a basis in liberal legal doctrine were evidently viewed as 
crucial to the larger project of erecting a liberal political-economic order. To resolve this tension, 
the extension of criminal law to myriad indigenous practices would de facto create a legal 
footing for the pass system (Barron, 1988, 30). Such practices of criminalization created 
hierarchies of belonging within the national population. Theoretically, liberality and equality of 
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rights were to be extended to all bodies, but embodied practices distinguishable according to 
racial designations could legitimize the withholding of such rights. 
 Enforcing the pass system initially took the form highlighted by Reed; namely the 
withholding of rations and other forms of so-called privilege from those who did not comply 
with the requirements to obtain a signed pass in order to move outside of the reserve. These 
compulsions, however, did not prove effective and eventually criminal offences were made out 
of indigenous practices which conflicted with the policy of containment. Thus, participation in 
dances and rituals—such as the Sun Dance, which would take people away from the reserve for 
several days at a time, often during seasons crucial to the development of agricultural practice—
was banned under an amendment to the Indian Act in 1895 (Barron, 1988, 38). In 1880, the 
criminalization of horse theft became a central focus of the NWMP as this was a central means 
of circumscribing the movement of indigenous peoples. As Hubner has argued, the theft itself 
was not a concern of the NWMP, as often the so-called victims and perpetrators were both 
indigenous and it is unlikely that either party would have called on the NWMP to deal out 
‘justice.’ The elimination of horse theft through criminal prosecution instead served to suppress 
traditional livelihoods in a manner that reinforced the generation of agricultural practice on the 
reserve, reinforced the treatment of natural resources as ‘property,’ and prevented movement that 
was viewed as ‘disruptive’ to local economic development (Hubner, 1995, 283).  
The killing of cattle similarly became a central object of criminal prosecution throughout 
the 1880s and 1890s. According to Satzewich (1996), the criminalization of cattle killing by 
indigenous peoples was most prominent amongst the Treaty Seven First Nations, located in 
ranching rather than grain-producing regions of the prairies. Amongst Treaty Seven First Nations 
the number of criminal charges laid for cattle killing between 1887 and 1892 numbered only four 
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while in 1894 alone a total of 20 charges were laid against indigenous peoples for the ‘crime’ of 
cattle killing. The criminalization of cattle killing was intimately linked to the Department of 
Indian Affairs’s rations policy towards Treaty Seven First Nations as it related to the ‘civilizing’ 
project on the reserve and the national development policy off the reserve. On the one hand, 
Treaty Seven made no formal statements about the provision of rations, and yet the loss of 
buffalo in southern Alberta and ensuing starvation of Treaty Seven First Nations meant that, 
without rations, Indian Affairs’s efforts to contain and settle indigenous peoples in order to 
promote agricultural and ranching practices would be stymied. Indian Affairs attempted to settle 
on a policy that provided enough rations to keep peoples on the reserve whilst not allowing them 
to become dependent upon such rations. Ultimately, this policy, combined with later efforts at 
cost cutting, meant the reduction of rations to a point of near starvation, provoking resistance in 
the form of cattle theft and killing. Because these acts of resistance and survival ultimately 
negated the attempt to induct Treaty Seven First Nations into settled agricultural practices, cattle 
killing and theft posed a direct threat to the national development policy of the Canadian 
government. Additionally, however, off the reserve, southern Alberta was a central location for 
the development of the ranching industry, a central feature of Macdonald’s National Policy and 
strategy of economic development. In order to promote the ranching industry, rations to Treaty 
Seven First Nations were purchased by the state from area ranches. Cattle killing, then, also 
disrupted the wider economic development strategies of the Canadian state and posed a direct 
challenge to the development of self-sufficient market industries.  
In sum the integration of Canada’s early Indian Policy with criminal law served to inhibit 
the movement of indigenous peoples outside of their reserves, which suppressed or made 
increasingly difficult existing mechanisms of social production and reproduction in such a way 
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as to structure differential political relationships between state and subject. The aim of this policy 
was to transform the racialized ‘Indian’ into a ‘civilized’ enfranchised member who would 
contribute to the goals of national development through cultivation of the prairies. In the 
transition from racialized ‘Indian’ to enfranchised subject, the territory of the reserves would be 
parceled out into freehold tenure, thus securing on a wider scale the material conditions for a 
settler political economy. In the criminalization of particular indigenous practices, those on the 
reserve were reified as racial outsiders whose access to the ‘freedoms’ and ‘rights’ of the liberal 
state were qualified by their partial status as fully autonomous political subjects. Their 
construction as such legitimized the illiberal treatment of indigenous peoples as dependent wards 
of the state, which a) enabled the increasing appropriation of indigenous lands as fiscal 
resources, and as I will argue below, b) led to the development of increasing administrative and 
bureaucratic state capacity. At the same time, these constructions of the racialized ‘Indian’ 
served to bolster the basis for a common identity amongst Canadian nationals as predicated on 
individual thrift, grit, self-reliance, moral temperance, and rationality. 
Policing ‘Race,’ Producing the ‘State’ 
 
Thus far, I have established that a transformation of indigenous land policy followed 
Confederation to provide the new federal government with the fiscal resources to bind together 
the provinces in a unified, centrally administered national development project. I have shown 
how the continued enforcement of these radically transformed, oppressive land relations required 
further buttresses in the form of racial-moral regulation of indigenous practices. At its core, 
racial identity in Canada was undergirded by settler-indigenous property relations. However, 
while I have shown that the racialization of indigenous peoples was central to the material 
conditions of national economic development, I want to further demonstrate how these practices 
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also contributed the formation and centralization of state apparatus and legitimacy. I have begun 
to point to these developments in the above, but will here review with more precision how the 
racialization of indigenous peoples led to a ‘rationalization’ of state administration, accounting, 
and bureaucracy. This review will be of particular relevance to the final chapter of this study, 
which examines the ways that varying state capacities impacted ‘developmental’ trajectories and 
immigrant integration, segregation, and/or expulsion in Argentina and Canada. 
Bruce Curtis has advanced one of the more novel theses on Canadian state formation in 
the past two decades of Canadian historiography. At the core of his argument is the idea that 
administrative practices (for his purposes census-making) are foundational to state-building 
through their identification and formation of political subjects and the centralization of 
knowledge: “As a practice that creates social equivalencies, census making is further bound up 
with the formation of states. It serves to increase the possibilities for intensive administration” 
(2001, 1). For Curtis, the practice of counting and ordering subjects creates and subordinates 
citizens to national identities in ways that can pave over conflict, while simultaneously creating 
the administrative infrastructure to begin systematizing knowledge about that population (2001, 
2). At the core of his argument, then, is not simply a technical project of counting and applying 
policy to population, but a moral-ethical project of producing subjectivities themselves: “In 
principle, the consequences of such categorizations depend on the extent to which occupants of 
categories can be induced or coerced to conduct themselves in terms of them, or on the extent to 
which their life changes are determined by such categorizations” (2001, 25).  
Curtis pulls from Corrigan and Sayer’s contention that the materiality of state formation 
relies on a simultaneous project of building a cultural-ethical community. In so much as this is 
the case, Curtis’s work does much to support the argument advanced here. Curtis’s focus is on 
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the process of counting and forming the population of Canadian citizens and thereby producing 
knowledge about the content of ‘Canadianness’; his focus, however, is inward-looking, 
examining the societal boundaries of inclusion without attending to how the policing of 
population exclusion was also seminal to state formation. While an analysis of racial formation 
is not his project, I argue that the analysis provided herein adds a necessary dimension to our 
understanding of state formation as simultaneous material and cultural formation, by suffusing 
Canadian ‘cultural’ and ‘national’ formation with its de facto ‘racial’ content. Indeed, Stanley 
has made a similar argument, suggesting that implicitly in Corrigan and Sayer, as well as in 
Curtis, is a project that view practices of knowledge-production and legitimation as central to 
state-formation; Stanley points out that racial subjectivities as forms of classification with the 
objectives of ordering populations for different ends are similarly productive of knowledge and 
state legitimating discourses (2016, 9-10). It is necessary to shed light on the ways that 
enumerating and policing the contours of population, not only in terms of the included, but also 
those actively excluded, provided the state with administrative and fiduciary capacity. It 
produced both forms of knowledge and the means of acquiring and organizing knowledge, as 
well as a crucial legitimizing strategy vis-a-vis fiduciary concerns.  
As Neu and Graham point out, fiduciary concerns (and their transformation over time) 
have been central to the formation and transformation of indigenous-settler relations (2006, 47). 
As the settler-state increasingly appropriated massive tracts of land from indigenous peoples, 
negotiated treaties, and carried out fiscal responsibilities to indigenous populations on the 
reserves, a new, centralized system of bureaucracy, accounting and rationalization was needed. 
Following the conclusion of the first seven treaties, the office of Indian Affairs was developed. 
Initially, in 1878, this office employed only 54 people, and administrative capacity was limited 
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owing to the small number of officers and inefficiency in the organization of administrative 
units, which corresponded directly to the treaty area. Given the dearth of personnel and the large 
size of administrative units, the capacity of the state to directly intervene in indigenous practices, 
to constitute the indigenous subject as compatible with the settler agricultural development state, 
was minimal. However, the implementation of the National Policy (itself made possible by the 
prior appropriation of indigenous lands) allowed for a legitimized expansion of the state 
bureaucracy and by 1881 the size of Indian Affairs had increased to 131 officers. Such 
bureaucratic expansion enabled the settler state to partake in much more strategic and direct 
interventionist practices so as to affect the moral regulation and transformation of both settler 
and indigenous peoples (Neu & Graham, 2006, 50).  
Accounting practices were central means by which the federal government could 
translate such colonial objectives of indigenous elimination and moral regulation into concrete 
practices (Neu & Graham, 2006, 48). The use of accounting contributed to the state-building 
project through the extension of the moral-cultural formation of the settler state, but also 
necessitated and affected the rationalization and systematization of state practices, legitimized by 
the translation of moral or normative questions into the neutralized language of efficiency and 
the necessary concomitant—the production of statistical knowledge (Neu and Graham, 2006, 
51). First, accounting practices were effectively able to intervene in the cultural-moral makeup of 
indigenous communities by shifting social reproduction away from traditional practices of 
hunting, fishing and so forth, and forcing their reliance on government payment/resource 
distribution, which required reporting practices and a radical reorganization of band governance 
(Neu & Graham, 2006, 49). Manipulation of these ‘payments’ (for example replacing provisions 
of hunting equipment for agricultural implements, or making payment only receivable in the 
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reserve territories themselves) in turn served to ‘contain’ indigenous peoples on the reserve, 
reinforcing the settler project of moral-cultural regulation towards settled agricultural practices, 
and the use of land as property, productive of value. The forcible destruction of indigenous 
reproduction amounted to a policy of physical and cultural genocide; however the translation of 
these policies into quantifiable data for accounting practices served to neutralize and legitimize a 
politics that would otherwise have induced more broadly ethical-normative concerns and 
tensions with the nation-building narrative of freedom, prosperity and liberality (Neu & Graham, 
2006, 51). 
Finally, it is necessary to note how the regulation of indigenous livelihoods and mobility 
according to this racial doctrine enabled the state to institutionalize a national monopoly on the 
administration, adjudication and punishment of violence in priority areas of settlement through 
the erection of the NWMP, later to become the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The NWMP 
and its monopoly of state violence were importantly legitimized in the context of the post North-
West Rebellion containment and subsequent hardening of the racist and racializing project of 
indigenous subjugation. The introduction of the NWMP, as demonstrated earlier, was 
precipitated by the need to monitor and regulate indigenous mobility and behavior. When 
initiated in 1872, the NWMP was presented alongside a package of legislation proposing the 
establishment of a court system, magistrates and a council within the North-West Territories 
(Macleod, 1978, 5). The final proposal was passed in 1873 under the title “An Act respecting the 
Administration of Justice, and for the Establishment of a Police Force in the North West 
Territories” (Macleod, 1978, 5). This presence of ‘law and order’ in the region, furthermore, 
symbolized the safety of settlement, which increased quickly in the areas around major police 
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posts after the emergence of the NWMP (Macleod, 1978, 8). The movement of peoples and 
capital to northwestern Canada could now be assured of access to legal and physical protection.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the racialization of indigenous peoples in settler 
colonial contexts served a productive function. The process of racialization, in these instances, 
served to impel the consolidation, centralization, and legitimization of state institutions, finances 
and instruments. The process of creating modern, rational, and importantly, liberal states was 
formatively underwritten by illiberal practices of racialized and hierarchicalized subject 
formation. In this sense, it may be useful to once more evoke Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer’s 
The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution. The idea of state formation as 
cultural formation is an important intervention and response to the theoretical problems I began 
this chapter with. It allows us to simultaneously make sense of the political-economic 
transformations that occur under capitalist reorganization and the socio-cultural meanings that 
public identities are imbued with in this process. For even those officially negated are integral to 
the constitution of a particular form of public life. The ‘subaltern’ is not forgotten in this 
analysis; indeed it is precisely those who do not ‘fit’ into the dominant expression of public 
identities that are integral to its construction. Thus, in England, women and the ‘non-deserving 
poor’ all marked the negative category through which proper ‘Englishness’ was construed. In the 
settler colonies, it was the indigenous other who, denied an official public identity, served as the 
basis for construing what appropriate Canadian and Argentine cultural-moral conduct comprised. 
Fundamentally, because of the nature of settler-indigenous relations under capitalist 
reorganization, a racialized discourse served to legitimize indigenous dispossession by equating 
communal land relations with barbarism and private property with ‘civilization.’ This racialized 
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language would then extend to all forms of social, cultural and moral behaviours which were 
built upon communal land relations.  
The regulation of indigenous identities and practices, the management of their 
reservations and public payments, the separation of their families, isolation and segregation of 
the sexes, instruction in proper conduct, violent and coercive confinements, and the manipulation 
of their existence through census data, all contributed to the state’s monopoly on land and the 
legitimate means of administration and violence, which in turn, contributed to the development 
of a functional, centralized national fiduciary state capable of directing and effecting agrarian 
capitalist transformation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, while the 
racialized indigenous identities that emerged under the settler-colonial state, are indeed 
fabrications, it is also important to understand that “what is defined as real . . . is real in its 
consequences” (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, 142). The forms of state capacity and property relations 
that resulted from the combination of European ideas of property and state, with existing social 
arrangements, then established the conditions upon which development in response to global 
competitive pressures could be pursued, and the means by which immigrant labour would be 
incorporated. The result in each space was a differential structuration and management of ‘race’ 
and ‘difference’ within the body politic. This is the subject of the next and final chapter. 
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Chapter 5  Labouring Bodies and the Specter of Racial Hybridization 
 
Following indigenous dispossession, the final strategy of settler-colonial development 
was to be a project of mass immigration. Once lands had been violently and coercively removed 
from indigenous peoples, who were in turn segregated to marginalized tracts of land, killed, or 
assimilated, it became necessary to import and condition a body of labourers to both farm the 
land, and construct the necessary infrastructure to connect agrarian producers to international 
commodity markets. To meet their diverse labour needs, settler states sought to politically 
stratify different streams of mass immigrant recruitment. Crucially, there were those immigrants 
who could be, at least potentially, incorporated into the white national imaginary, and there were 
those for whom national integration would be denied on the basis of racial exclusions. Different 
immigrant subjects would be subjected to diverse apparatuses of the state to control the rights of 
relative freedom and unfreedom. Thus, within the developing capitalist settler colonial state, 
there were variations of status accorded to the first settlers, indigenous peoples, free and 
assimilable labour, as well as unfree, unassimilable labour. Such designations are not only 
consistent with the settler national-state but were, in fact, productive of it.  
The content of this final chapter engages critically with one of the central concepts of 
postcolonial theory—that of hybridity. Where Marxism is said to fail to account for difference, 
hybridity is argued to offer both analytical and emancipatory promise in the recognition of the 
heterogeneity and agency of immigrant subjects. In contestation of monolithic binaries of 
colonizer/colonized, capitalist/labourer, the idea of hybridity is argued to represent a complex, 
negotiated, and at times contradictory process of subjectification and identification. I argue, 
however, that the concept of hybridity too often presents as a banality empty of any real 
analytical force. Indeed I will argue that hybridity cannot be understood without an attendant 
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examination of the ways in which discursive and cultural fields are “grounded in and constitutive 
of specific relations of production and exchange” (Stoler & Cooper, 1997, 18).  By situating 
national formation and immigrant subjectification within a global process of uneven and 
combined development, I will show how variable constructions of immigrant communities must 
be understood in the complexity of their cultural, political and economic injection into the 
colonial community. Rather than a free-floating expression of pure, radical agency, immigrant 
agency was articulated with and through the narrative of a national, political, and economic 
community (a material order). The limits of immigrant agency were often defined, coercively, in 
reference to a master category of racial whiteness. Without attention to the ways in which 
cultural and political economy interact, the coercive and/or coerced elements of hybridity are 
rendered invisible. Taking up my case studies of Argentine and Canadian, I examine how the 
‘white nationalist’ project was disrupted by the labour market needs of a developing national 
economy. I then argue that these tensions were resolved through the erection of a public health 
administrative apparatus which conflated hygiene and race to reinforce the geopolitical and 
internal borders of the nation. In Argentina, this resulted in a public hygiene apparatus that 
focused on coercive assimilation, while in Canada exclusion and segregation became the 
dominant strategies. I will argue that the different approaches to policing racial hygiene were the 
product of the different social property relations in each space which dictated the level of ‘threat’ 
that racialized foreigners posed.  
Argentine Social Property Relations and the Dynamics of Migration 
 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century agricultural development in the interior and 
industrialization in Buenos Aires was conditioned by a dearth of both labour and capital, and as a 
result, the governing classes looked abroad for the importation of both (Adelman, 1994; Solberg, 
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1987). The importation of labour, however, served a further, and perhaps more vital purpose, 
than economic development alone for nation builders. Immigration of the ‘white races’ of 
Europe was intended to bring together and advance the racially diverse and ‘degenerated’ 
populations of Argentina, creating a truly national people (Beltz, 2010, 3). Indeed, the language 
of Argentine nation builders was explicit in linking the ‘whitening’ of Argentina to economic 
success, whereby immigrants would both transform and populate the recently ‘cleared’ interior 
lands, and further would serve to transform the presumed backwardness of the remaining 
indigenous, and criollo colonial, populations through the importation of racially and culturally 
superior qualities (Bastia and Vom Hau, 2013, 478). This is precisely what Alberdi meant when 
he sent out his rallying cry ‘to govern is to populate.’ However, state-builders of the latter half of 
the nineteenth century faced significant obstacles in this plan and were unable to attract either 
permanent or Anglo-Saxon ‘white’ immigrants.  
As I showed in previous chapters, indigenous dispossession and state formation in 
Argentina resulted in a private rather than public monopoly of land held by provincial ranchers. 
This set-up of property relations was such that the state was significantly limited in the extent to 
which it could implement its ideal program of immigrant settlement and agricultural production. 
The interests of landed classes were tied into ranching through an extensive exploitation of the 
land, and thus the landed classes had little incentive to intensify their production strategies 
through the deployment and exploitation of waged labour (Evans, 2016). Rather, landowners’ 
capital continued to be invested in the acquisition of land, both for ranching and speculative 
prospects.  
Because of the relative balance of social property relations in Argentina, those who 
dominated the control of land had little interest in fostering immigrant settlement. In contrast to 
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the American model of the family farm, so idealized by Argentine state leaders, those who had 
the capacity to dictate the distribution of land actively stymied state efforts to implement a 
homesteading (Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 19). By 1890, following a financial crisis, the state sold 
what remaining lands it held title to, and thus permanently closed off the option of homesteader 
settlement (Fleer & Tobler, 2001, 30). While in the late nineteenth century, ranchers would 
diversify the use of their lands, turning to cereals production in response to global market 
demand, this diversification remained peripheral to their own class reproduction. Land and 
speculative profit continued to be the primary source of elite reproduction in Argentina, and as a 
consequence, the cereals industry was built upon a structure of leasehold or tenancy production 
(Adelman, 1992, 278).  
Given the entrenched position of the landed classes, agricultural migration to Argentina 
was limited to short tenancy contracts of three to four years. Unable to attract immigrants with 
land, the state was therefore limited to subsidized passages which had little appeal to the Anglo-
Saxon emigrants seeking an escape from wage labour and the chance to become frontier small-
holders (Adelman 1994, 113-14; Solberg 1987, 30). Instead, immigration to Argentina was 
dominated by Italians, largely from the rural southern regions, as well as by Spaniards.  
The role of class in colonial sate formation, however, cannot be understood from an 
exclusive vantage point of the dynamics of class formation within the settler space. As Anne 
Stoler and Frederick Cooper (1997) have argued, “class impinged in the making of empire in 
other ways: constraining who came to the colonies, what visions they harbored, what features of 
European class culture were selectively reworked” (27).  In Argentina, Italian immigration in 
particular became a dominant source of rural and urban labour in Argentina for several reasons 
that would prove consequential to the shape and content of the settler state. First, the continued 
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presence of feudal relations in southern Italy meant that emigration was sought as a temporary 
expedient to deal with peasant landlessness and poverty. As I have argued elsewhere (Evans, 
2016), these endogenous property relations in Italy meant that Italian emigrants were well suited 
to the type of opportunities in Argentina; their sojourn was undertaken to accumulate financial 
goods that would then be reinvested at home.  
The result, in Argentina, was that immigration, though massive through the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, tended to be circular in nature, rather than permanent. That circular 
migration patterns dominated Argentina’s early period of state formation was the result of the 
uneven and combined processes of nation-building which had occurred from the 1860s to 1890s 
in the course of indigenous dispossession and state consolidation (addressed in Chapter Four). 
That said, while individual immigrants may have been temporary, the fact of immigrants as a 
massive portion of the national population, at any given moment, was a matter of relative 
permanence throughout the late nineteenth century and up until World War I. As a result, it 
became necessary to make the realities of mass, ‘non-white’ immigration consistent with the 
binding fabric of the nation—white European racial superiority. The fragile unity and legitimacy 
that had been achieved through a project of ‘white’ racial nation-building needed to be preserved 
and defended. 
Immigration Policy and the Problem of ‘Racial Degeneration’ 
 
The first articulations of an immigration policy at the level of the state can be found in 
the 1853 Liberal Constitution. The Constitution expressed an extremely laissez-faire approach to 
immigration, stipulating that there would be no restrictions to entry and that immigrants resident 
within Argentina were to be given rights with only minor differences from those accorded to 
individuals with full citizenship (Bastia & Vom Hau, 2013, 477). However, this stated preference 
  199 
to foster immigration fell well short of an actual programme or law governing immigration, and 
in 1876 the government of Nicolas Avellaneda passed the country’s first law on immigration (Du 
Toit, 1991, 79). Amongst the key provisions of the 1876 law was the subsidization of travel from 
Europe and accommodation in Buenos Aires for a short period upon arrival, free passage from 
Buenos Aires to the immigrants’ final destination and the offer of access to tenancy and seeds for 
those immigrants deemed suitable for colonization (Bastia & Vom Hau, 2013, 478). 
Additionally, an institutional presence was created in the form of the Office of Public Lands and 
Colonization, which was housed under the Department of Immigration (Du Toit, 1991, 79). The 
1876 law, however, did not fundamentally transform the liberal character of Argentina’s 
approach to immigration, with the exception of stipulating the exclusion of “those with 
contagious disease or organic defect that makes them unable to work; the demented; and 
beggars, convicts or criminals (article 32),” which was nevertheless sporadically implemented.  
Rather the 1876 law created the administrative means to carry out an active project of attracting 
and settling immigrants to populate the republic.  
The outcome of Argentina’s open door approach to immigration surpassed, by far, the 
expectations of many. Between 1871 and 1914 nearly six million immigrants arrived in 
Argentina, the bulk of them towards the close of the nineteenth century (Rodríguez, 2006a, 24). 
However, as I have already indicated, this increase in population through immigration was 
ultimately a disappointment to state builders as most came from Italy, Spain, and to a lesser 
extent Eastern Europe (Rodríguez, 2006a, 24-25).  According to the mix of biological and 
environmental racism that permeated the Argentine intelligentsia, the Italians and Spanish were 
situated on the outer limits of a racial hierarchy of white acceptability and were generally 
thought of as a ‘race apart.’  
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Despite official intentions to use this immigration to populate the interior provinces, 
providing a labour market for the agro-export industry, an unanticipated number of immigrants 
would not move from Buenos Aires itself (where immigrants entered through the port), owing 
largely to the vested and oppositional interests of the estanciero owners of the interior (Evans, 
2016, 1068). As a result, the population of Buenos Aires soared from 286,700 in 1880 to 1,563, 
082 in 1915, while the population occupying squalid tenements in the city rose to about a quarter 
of the population in the same period, and concentration within tenements rose from 35 persons 
per structure to over 42 (Black Welder & Johnson, 1982, 361). This massive urban concentration 
of immigrants was paralleled by problems of overcrowding, political and labour unrest (notably 
in the form of anarchism), crime, social disorder and disease. Collectively, these issues would 
come to be known as the ‘social question,’ and would challenge the very tenuous stability and 
legitimacy of the state. In attempting to reinforce state legitimacy, the ‘social question’ would be 
answered dominantly through the pseudo-scientific language of public health—a discipline that, 
from its inception, has been thoroughly racialized (see Bashford, 2004).  
The conundrum facing the state at this time was that immigration was a pivotal part of the 
development and nation-building platform of the Argentine elite. Immigration was both 
necessary, and a threat to, the project of national-state consolidation.  The central question, as a 
consequence, became one of how to preserve ‘healthy’ immigration and deter, assimilate, expel 
or segregate the ‘degenerative’ immigrant populations (Rodríguez, 2006a, 24).  
Ultimately, the group of state-builders and intellectuals (known collectively as the Generation of 
’88) who would deal with this problem turned to the founding Darwinian and neo-Lamarckian 
racial rhetoric which had accompanied the eventual assimilation of indigenous peoples; namely 
that the Argentine environment itself had a ‘whitening’ effect (Rodríguez, 2006a, 25; 
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Zimmerman, 1992, 37). This position was given further credence by the Argentine sociologist 
and jurist Carlos Octavio Bunge who claimed that the Argentine environment would prohibit the 
reproduction of non-white racial categories owing to the deleterious effect of the Pampean 
winds, and other climatic features, on those of a less robust physiological racial character 
(Rodríguez, 2006a, 20).  Through this ideological touchstone, coercive assimilation came to 
dominate the resolution to the immigration problem.  
The above provides historical and empirical substance to my argument that it is necessary 
to understand that the social property relations established through uneven and combined 
processes of nation formation imprinted fundamentally on processes of immigrant incorporation, 
differentiation and exclusion. Hybridization, as it were, was adapted as a necessary condition 
owing to Argentina’s inability to attract the desired ‘racial’ demographic of immigrants. Instead, 
those less desirable were selectively admitted or excluded, assimilated (hybridized) or 
segregated, based on a hierarchy of so-called racial degeneration. This strategy conditioned the 
tools through which assimilation or exclusion would be enacted. As I show below, in Argentina 
racial subjectification and exclusion by the developing Argentine state were deployed less at the 
border than within the state itself. This is to say that racialized immigration posed a threat less to 
the geopolitical frontier than to the internal or social frontier.11 The deployment of penal power 
internally, to coerce and force assimilation, would serve to maintain the state legitimacy created 
through the façade of a robust ‘white nation.’  
That said, there were at least two important exceptions to this claim: policies that 
provided for the public health inspection of immigrants arriving on ships which could result in 
                                                     
11 Ann Stoler uses the concept of ‘interior frontier’ to show how “at the level of the individual, frontier marks the 
moral predicates by which the subject retains his or her national identity . . . . [it entails that] the purity of the 
community is prone to penetration in its interior . . . . and [that] the essence of the community is an intangible 
‘moral attitude,’ a ‘multiplicity of invisible ties’ (1997, 199). 
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immigrants being turned away if they were found to be incapable of labour, and the 1910 Social 
Defense Law, which codified the prohibition of known or suspected anarchists from entering 
Argentina. In both of these cases, issues such as disease, mental illness and so-called political 
deviance were bound into criminological and socio-psychological understandings of racial 
inferiority, but to such an extreme that the individuals denied entry were seen to be incapable of 
self-reliant, rational and morally sound decision making and thus of providing labour and 
potentially becoming assimilated.  
The National Border as Discipline 
 
Throughout the 1880s and 1890s Buenos Aires experienced a rapid spread of contagious 
diseases such as tuberculosis and syphilis, heavily concentrated in the overpopulated urban areas 
and attributed to immigration (Rodríguez, 2006b, 357). Contagion at this time became a central 
anxiety amongst Argentine nation builders and impelled President Avellaneda to establish funds 
through the national treasury to build the Immigrant’s Hotel, train public health inspectors and 
police, and create a system of immigration inspection and confinement at the port in order to 
ostensibly stem the spread of disease (Costanzo, 2007; Rodríguez, 2006a, 190). Upon arrival, 
immigrants in the second and third class passages were to be inspected by a group consisting of 
the Immigration Inspector, Sanitary Doctor, and the Official of the Maritime Prefecture. 
Inspection consisted of the counting and categorization of immigrants according to nationality, 
education, health and any sign of visible stigma. Those found to be chronically ill and unfit for 
work were deported immediately owing to the supposed threat to racial degeneration that they 
posed. Furthermore, the port inspections allowed for the collection of data coded by race, which 
could provide a language of legitimation for the project of nation building predicated on ideas of 
‘civilized whiteness’ (Rodríguez, 2006a, 190). Indeed, given the limited reach of the public 
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health inspections in the face of more than six million immigrants coming through the ports, it is 
likely that this latter purpose was more integral to nation building than the actual capacity to 
reject and deport immigrants. As Julia Rodríguez notes, “the real goal of the sanitary inspections 
was to communicate ideals not only of health, cleanliness and industriousness but also of racial 
and spiritual unity” (2006a, 189). Nonetheless, the capacity to legally and administratively select 
for immigration was, at least rhetorically, an objective goal of Argentine statesmen. By 1909, an 
amendment to the immigration act made it a legal imperative to target second- and third-class 
passengers (which to this point had operated on a de facto basis), and the racial objective of this 
amendment was echoed in 1910 in a statement that declared that by “selecting the immigration 
current to incorporate healthy elements, we will be able to have a good future race, 
physiologically well-constituted on a purified ethnic base” (Rodríguez, 2006b, 270). The 
Argentine physician and scholar Lucas Ayarragary (Zimmerman, 1992, 29) similarly echoed 
these sentiments in 1910, making the case for ‘scientific’ criteria for selective immigration, 
stating that “we do not need yellow immigration, but rather European fathers and mothers of the 
white race to improve the hybrid and miscegenated elements that constitute the base of our 
nation’s population” (Rodriguez, 2006a, 373). Indeed, for Ayarragary, as for the Generation ’37, 
‘white European’ immigration was deemed absolutely necessary for successful political and 
economic development through the adaptation of Western institutions, which were deemed to 
require a racially ‘capable and rational’ as well as homogenous population (Zimmerman, 1992, 
29). 
Beyond mechanisms of border control that racialized and excluded physical disease, 
measures were also erected to provide for the exclusion of so-called moral and political disease. 
Understood as disease, these exclusions too were coded in a language of racial inferiority and 
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barbarity (Salvatore, 1992, 279). The immediate context of these forms of exclusion was to be 
found in the proliferation of labour unrest and recurrent general strikes throughout the 1890s, 
frequently organized by anarchist groups whose national base was (apparently) dominantly 
formed by Italian immigrants. Indeed, by the early 1900s, rapid unionization and the widespread 
use of the general strike literally paralyzed export production (Salvatore, 1992, 290). The 1902 
Law of Residence and the 1910 Social Defense Law were the result of such labour actions. 
However, before examining the laws themselves, it is important to take a step back and examine 
the dominant racial theories which bound anarchism and labour action to so-called racial 
barbarism.  
The influence of Italian criminology on the development of a legitimating language and 
technique of ‘scientific’ racial exclusion cannot be understated in the case of Argentina. 
Significantly, Cesare Lombroso (largely regarded as the founder of criminology) and his text 
Criminal Man, published in 1876, formed an essential cornerstone of Argentina’s socio-medical 
sciences. According to Lombroso, criminality was an inborn, biological pathology and could be 
detected by a variety of physical features such as a large jaw, low and narrow forehead and large 
ears. Lombroso’s physical typology was then further connected to the established European 
racial hierarchy, whereby southern and eastern Europeans were found to possess these physical 
traits at a much higher frequency than Anglo-Saxon Europeans. Lombroso further found that 
anarchists too could be physically detected, marked by a biological degeneration owing to the 
presence of deformed ears, inferior jaws, forehead depressions and facial asymmetry. Because 
this biological theory of criminality dispensed with classical ideas of free will and individual 
responsibility, the treatment of crime and anarchism in Argentina was to be found not in 
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punishment but in the protection of society through social isolation or exclusion (Zimmerman, 
1992, 35).  
Owing to the relationship posited between biology, race and disease (political and 
physiological), the influx of anarchist and socialist ideals was perceived as a threat to the racial 
purity and strength of the nation. Furthermore, because anarchism was deemed an inborn rather 
than acquired defect, the primary means of protecting national racial purity were initially through 
mechanisms of exclusion and expulsion. To this end, the 1902 Law of Residence, the first law to 
explicitly target foreigners, stipulated powers of the executive to expel any foreigner convicted 
or pursued by a foreign criminal court on the grounds of political disturbances, as well as anyone 
deemed to threaten public order or national security. Within the first week after the passing of 
the Law of Residence, more than 500 foreigners were expelled from Argentina. The response 
within the immigrant and labour community at large, however, was not one of acquiescence as 
expected. Rather, in the years following the passing of the 1902 law, anarchist and socialist 
organizing and demonstration expanded, and by 1910 Congress was meeting once again to 
debate, and ultimately pass, the Law of Social Defence (Costanza, 2007). In this debate, 
Ayarragary once again forcefully expressed his views on the racially degenerative and barbaric 
qualities of anarchists, calling them a “gang of degenerates and fanatics who reject civilized 
struggle”  and concluding that “since the country’s population already includes ethnic 
components of a quite inferior nature, it must counteract this by bringing in superior components, 
selecting the migratory flow in order to . . . . have a physiologically healthy population in the 
future on the basis of ethnically cleansed individuals” (quoted in Costanza, 2007). To this end, 
Ayarragary strongly supported the passage of the Social Defence Law, which stipulated legal 
procedures for selection and exclusion at the border. The Social Defence Law effectively 
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extended the provisions made for the executive under the Law of Residence to the policing of the 
border, prohibiting the entry of anarchists, and providing for the jailing of anarchists attempting 
to repeat entry after an initial denial for up to six years. Internally, the Social Defence Law 
further prohibited the organization and public association of anarchist, socialist and labour 
groups (Costanza, 2007).  
Whether under the guise of physical disease or political dissidence, what is important to 
note is that the selection and exclusion of immigration at the border were fundamentally aimed to 
protect and promote liberal civilization, read through the master category of ‘whiteness.’ 
Immigrants, for example, were the carriers of disease, not because of overcrowding conditions 
on ships and in tenements, but because they lacked the rational capacity to exercise sexual self-
control, appropriate self-regulation of hygiene, nutrition, addiction and financial management. At 
the same time, labour activists were characterized as biologically inferior because of the threat 
they posed to this same civilized citizen construct. In either case, it was the potential of liberal 
disruption posed by particular immigrant groups that marked them as inferior and subject to 
exclusion. Their inclusion in the national population undermined the proper functioning and 
ideological legitimation of the liberal nation-building project.  
To return to the problematic posed at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear that the 
conditions through which a ‘third space’ of ‘hybridity’ could result from the colonial encounter 
cannot be universalized. In Argentina, a mixture of biological and environmental racial theory 
established a hierarchy of racial acceptability which dictated how ‘others’ would be excluded 
from, or assimilated to, the ‘whitening’ environment of Argentina. However, given the 
difficulties of recruiting immigrant labour, which were tied into the social property relations that 
had emerged as a result of the initial nation-building phase, an open immigration policy 
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remained the most politically and economically expedient solution to the problem of labour. As 
such, racialized subjectivities were chiefly constructed through internal mechanisms of 
assimilation—indexed to, as David Goldberg has argued, European ‘whiteness’ (2002: 200). 
 
Policing Whiteness: The Internal Frontier and Assimilatory Hybridity 
 
Despite the implementation of institutional mechanisms of border control and racially 
selective immigration criteria, the majority of the immigrants to Argentina prior to the First 
World War were not turned away. Thus, the construction of a racially ‘white’ Argentine nation, 
through the identification and discipline of the so-called racially ‘inferior,’ occurred largely 
within the borders of Argentina. The hope, as was noted above, was of course to use the leverage 
of Argentina’s environmentally ‘whitening’ effects to ‘discipline’ and ‘civilize’ the undesirable 
immigrant flows. Where this proved impossible, measures of cultural, educational and health 
discipline were drawn upon and, in the last instance, the unassimilable would be quarantined and 
deported.  
The two dominant apparatuses to enforcing and securing the internal racial frontier were 
the penal system and the public health system, which in practice, overlapped. As Alison 
Bashford has argued, the practice of public health drew from and modified techniques of liberal 
governance that had been based in penal systems (2004, 7). The spectre of the so-called ‘social 
problem’ or urban pathology relied heavily on language and scientific methods which 
pathologized physical illness and crime. Because these ‘pathologies’ were dominantly the result 
of a lagging labour market in the context of ongoing, mass immigration, crime and illness 
appeared to be overrepresented in immigrant communities, such that they were quickly and 
readily accepted as the sources of racial degeneration. The problem of crime and disease, when 
posed in the language of public health, was one that shaped and informed national identities 
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(Bashford, 2004, 116). It resolved a tension in liberal governance between those who could act 
freely and voluntarily, and those who would against their will be committed, for the protection of 
the public, to exclusionary spaces aimed at the forcible instruction of responsible conduct 
(Bashford, 2004, 13, 51). 
In order to address both crime and disease (along with so-called moral depravities 
associated with gambling, alcoholism, vagrancy and prostitution) in a manner that holistically 
addressed the supposed threat of race degeneration, the concept of public health became the 
central organizing problematic and legitimizing language which could deploy scientific 
rationalism and positivism in the project of ‘racial purification’ (Comte, 2013, 9-12; 
Zimmerman, 1992, 23). Throughout the 1880s, public works projects simultaneously pushed 
poor immigrants in Buenos Aires southward into the tenements of the barrios (which would 
come to house most urban immigrants by the 1890s) while failing to adequately provide 
employment or additional housing for the masses of incoming immigrants (Rodríguez, 2006a, 
27). This situation was compounded at the end of the century when, between 1899 and 1902, 
Argentina was simultaneously struck by economic crisis and its peak period of immigration, 
while epidemic disease accounted for 46 percent of all death around this same period (1872–
1906) (Rodríguez, 2006b, 361; Salvatore, 1992, 282). Though the source of these problems was, 
largely, socio-economic, state builders were quick to suggest that the immigrant populations of 
the tenements were themselves the source of squalid living conditions which bred disease, crime 
and moral turpitude. It was in this context that the state created the National Department of 
Hygiene (1893) and injected a massive amount of state spending into public health infrastructure 
to build public hospitals (reserved for the poor and typically racialized, as the wealthy were 
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treated at private institutions12), mental health and vagrancy asylums, and prisons, as well as to 
train an army of sanitary inspectors and police who would be charged with the inspection, 
regulation, discipline and quarantining of those found incapable of exercising appropriate 
standards of self-care, thrift, foresight and work ethic (Rodríguez, 2006b, 361). Panic over racial 
degeneration, then, fuelled a surge in institutional capacity building, largely in the form of 
coercive or penal institutions. 
Throughout the end of the nineteenth century the idea of Argentine national health 
(understood largely in terms of standards of racial civility) was determined through the metrics 
of disease, morality and crime: “public health and nationalism are both modern projects 
connected with the complex emergence of political economy and with the development of liberal 
democracy and concepts of citizenship” (Bashford, 2004, 115). To this end, as Rodríguez 
suggests, the primary means for establishing the distinction between political nationals versus 
internal outsiders was through the identification of germs, behaviours and ideas thought to be the 
product of racialized immigrant nationalities. Thus, for example, the spread of tuberculosis was 
associated with a series of ‘risk factors’ disproportionately associated with immigrants, such as 
alcoholism, unsanitary living conditions, poor nutrition, hygiene and general predispositions to 
‘excesses’ (Rodríguez, 2006b, 180). Indeed, an 1890 report on the issue of disease and epidemics 
suggested that the cause of illness was the low quality of immigrants themselves, and thus the 
defense against epidemics became, as physician Luis Agote declared in 1898, “a defense against 
exotic migrating diseases” (Rodríguez, 2006b, 362-3).13 
                                                     
12 This stratification of public health measures echoes Bashford’s analysis of settler-colonial Australia wherein 
‘white’ disease was treated through voluntary admission into private sanitoriums, while ‘racial’ disease was 
treated through measures of forcible isolation (2004, 58).  
13 Again, this close association of disease and ‘foreignness’ specific to the settler colony is echoed in Bashford’s 
Australian study (2004, 81). 
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In addition to the external controls that were erected to guard against the immigration of 
‘exotic diseases,’ then, a series of internal measures were further erected which targeted 
immigrants as the sources of communicable disease. The objective of these policies was less to 
protect against the spread of disease as it was to protect against the moral and behavioural 
degeneration of the national population. Disease was so often and closely associated with work 
ethic (or rather a lack thereof) that it is difficult to extricate disease prevention measures from the 
project of liberal nation-building (Guy, 1990, 300). To this end, immigrants were admitted into 
the country and absorbed into the national population only to the extent that they could acquiesce 
and adapt to the standards of an increasingly market-governed society. When these qualities were 
deemed absent or threatened, a series of ‘public health’ policies were erected which could 
systematically target, inspect, reform and assimilate or extricate the ‘diseased.’ The expansion of 
the public health apparatus in the face of epidemic diseases was one such mechanism. In these 
cases, hybridization was not a voluntary or radical act of agency, but was instead a tactic of 
social control and racial policing of the national body of whiteness. Hybridization, here, 
functioned less as a means of asserting difference, and instead signalled the erasure of 
difference—to hybridize was to fuse with the dominant ‘white’ population in a way that would 
eradicate racial deviance and/or difference. As Mariela Rodríguez has argued, hybridity (or 
mestizaje) in Argentina was aimed not at the creation of the mestizo but of ‘whites’ (2016, 128).  
While official Argentine policy did not explicitly discriminate against foreigners deemed 
as racially inferior, such policies tended to explicitly target the occupants of tenements which, as 
was noted above, came to house most of the immigrant population of Buenos Aires by the 1890s 
(census figures suggest between 66 and 72 percent of the tenement population was foreign-born), 
when public hygiene policy was in its ascendancy (Rodríguez, 2006a, 183). Additionally, the 
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language used to describe predispositions towards disease and illness, which legitimized the 
targeted inspection of tenements, was the very same language that attributed a biological and 
racial predisposition to ‘social pathologies’ such as crime and anarchism. The targeted 
inspection, removal, education and isolation of tenement populations thus should be understood 
as yet another strategy to police the boundaries of a ‘white Argentina’ and promote educational 
and environmental ‘whitening’ through institutional reform measures.  
In response to outbreaks in yellow fever, cholera, and later tuberculosis, ordinances were 
passed in 1872 that made the reporting of transmissible disease mandatory, with a fine of up to 
3000 pesos and/or imprisonment for up to eight days for those who failed to report (Guy, 1990, 
305). Shortly following this, in 1874, the first so-called pest house was built to isolate men with 
contagious diseases, who until then had been kept in the same hospitals as men with non-
contagious illnesses (Guy, 1990, 305). In 1875 committees were named by the municipal council 
to begin inspecting ‘suspect’ neighborhoods, and in 1879 Hygiene Commissions were officially 
charged with the targeted and systematic inspection of tenement houses and working-class 
restaurants. The houses and establishments of the wealthy and white were notably absent from 
any form of regulated inspection (Guy, 1990, 306).  
Following inspection, a series of possible outcomes could occur. The most likely was 
eviction from, and even the destruction of, the tenement itself. Men with tuberculosis and other 
infectious diseases were often sent to the newly constructed pest houses, where, in addition to 
medical treatment, they were subjected to ‘moral’ education through the provisioning of 
appropriate reading material, literacy classes and games, while political and religious discussion 
as well as alcoholic beverages were prohibited (Guy, 1990, 310). Given the relationship posited 
between anarchism and alcoholism with disease in general, and racial degeneracy in particular, 
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this subjectification is not surprising and only serves to further the argument that the public 
hygiene hysteria was about policing the internal ‘colour line’ (Rodríguez, 2006a, 187). In these 
cases, racial constructs served to identify those deviants who were potentially capable of 
assimilation—fit for hybridity—and to extricate them from those who could not escape their 
‘biology’ as racially fixed.  
The illness of men was, more often than not, associated with a ‘criminal’ lack of work 
ethic, often rooted in alcoholism. As such, public hygienists sought to pathologize and police 
alcohol consumption. Dr. Emilio R. Coni, a prominent public hygienist in Argentina, argued that 
inebriation was the source of the production of a permanent criminal class whose inherent 
immorality predisposed them to avoid work (Guy, 1990, 302). Coni argued for the 
hospitalization of alcoholic men to prevent crime and promote their rehabilitation for work (Guy, 
1990, 310). While these proposals were never implemented in full, the disproportionate arrests of 
immigrant men versus Argentine-born men for public intoxication, coupled with the revocation 
of certain civic rights, suggests that the policing of alcohol use was yet another means of 
addressing the threat of racial degeneration through the vector of public health.   
The ‘prevention’ of venereal disease, likewise, showed itself to be as much a policy of 
policing so-called race. The targets of efforts to contain the spread of venereal disease were 
exclusively women, more specifically prostitutes operating out of tenements (Guy, 1990, 300). 
Statistics as to the nationalities of these women are sparse and unreliable, as prostitution was 
legal until 1936, and women arrested on proxy charges would often give a different occupation. 
However, the concentration of poor immigrant women in the tenements that would have been 
required to seek income strategies outside of the home suggests that, once again, these tactics 
had an explicit racial component, as prostitution was identified with biological degeneracy 
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(Rodríguez, 2006a, 187; Rodríguez, 2006b, 362; Solberg, 1969, 232). Furthermore, as Donna J. 
Guy notes, the marginalization and social exclusion of prostitute women were tied to their 
incapacity to fulfill certain moral standards of behaviour, whereby it was expected that women 
should provide the socially reproductive labour of the home to support the generation and 
maintenance of an able-bodied, robust male working class. To be seen working outside of the 
home, in any manner, let alone in prostitution, was registered as a violation of public morality 
and challenged the legitimacy of liberal state building (Guy, 1990, 301). Of course, the need to 
work outside of the home was in turn associated with a failure on the part of both men and 
women to exert appropriate behaviours of thrift, hard work, savings and general self-regulation. 
In short, the woman working outside of the home posed a visible challenge to attempts to erect a 
self-regulating liberal workforce. Again, these socio-economic conditions must be understood so 
as to differentiate between those immigrant women subject to potential racial assimilation (the 
housewife) and those to be segregated (the prostitute, worker, etc.) 
Amongst the most prevalent measures enacted against prostitute women for the 
ostensible purposes of guarding against the spread of venereal disease were laws that mandated 
the registration and medical examination of all female prostitutes. In 1875, this mandate was 
added to by stipulating that upon the satisfactory passing of biweekly medical examinations, 
prostitutes could only operate out of residences whose sanitary conditions had been approved, 
and which were confined to one story houses to be located at least two blocks from churches, 
theaters and schools. Women were prohibited from leaving these premises at night, and during 
the day were required to carry identity cards with them at all times (Guy, 1990, 301). Thus, the 
most basic civil rights granted to most residents, those of freedom of mobility, were restricted for 
women suspected of possessing less than civilized standards of morality and rationality. This 
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amounted to an informal segregation from the general population, subjection to invasive physical 
and environmental examinations, and unfree conditions of mobility.  
Finally, reforms to the Criminal Code and penal system served to systematically link 
work ethic with criminality and to isolate and ‘reform’ offenders. Indeed, in 1882 the first legal 
definition of the vagrant was established, which effectively criminalized all forms of 
unemployment, or at least posited a strong link between the former and the latter. According to 
the legal definition, a vagrant was “First: those who have no trade, are not day laborers, and lack 
any legitimate means of support. Second: those who have a skill or trade but do not practice it 
regularly and have no other legitimate means of support. Third: those who have inadequate 
means of support but do not engage in some other honest work, instead frequenting gambling 
houses and other dubious establishments. Fourth: those who have no disability but engage in 
begging” (Bonaudo, 1999, 74). Interestingly, and as Guy notes, the constructs of criminality in 
the turn of the century Buenos Aires functioned in opposite ways based on sex, where working 
outside the home was a deviant act for women, and unemployment was a sign of a man’s 
weakness of morality and character (Guy, 1990, 300). Thus, further complicating the possibility 
of immigrant inclusion and/or exclusion was the matter of gender as it articulated with the 
morality of political economy. Such ‘work ethics,’ furthermore, were never tied to the high 
seasonality of labour and periodic declines in domestic demand, but rather to individual 
biological, moral and intellectual abnormalities (Salvatore, 1992, 280-81). 
Perhaps one of the central reasons immigrant populations were linked to constructs of 
criminality, especially through the idea of vagrancy, was that, as Salvatore notes, the types of 
jobs on offer to immigrants were often transient and as such made the implementation of work 
discipline difficult (1992, 280). This is to say that, in the absence of regularized labour-employer 
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relations, the discipline and assimilation of the racialized ‘other’ into Argentine ‘white 
civilization’ was rendered problematic. Indeed, during the period of mass penal reform 
throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth century, casual (often day) labour was the 
dominant occupation of the city of Buenos Aires’s immigrants as well as accounting for nearly 
45 percent of all new job creation (Salvatore, 1992, 282). That arrest rates may have had more to 
do with policing the racial nation appears to be corroborated by statistics covering the period 
from 1885 to 1914, in which arrests for public drunkenness and disturbances far exceeded those 
for crimes against persons and property. As Black-Welder and Johnson argue, the 
overrepresentation of immigrant arrests in the ‘order maintenance’ category of arrests 
(drunkenness and disturbances) is likely a reflection of the fact that these types of arrests were 
determined by highly subjective criteria for establishing a violation, and thus left to the (often 
prejudiced) discretion of the police themselves (1982, 368). Order maintenance arrests could thus 
be deployed as a means of regulating and disciplining the behaviour of immigrants lacking the 
morality and discipline of ‘whiteness.’  
If the dominant form of arrests targeted immigrant communities with highly subjective 
criteria, sentencing and the penal system’s approach to ‘reform’ were even more suggestive of 
the ultimate ends to be served. The overhaul of the national penal system towards the end of the 
century involved the creation of the National Penitentiary of Buenos Aires, which introduced the 
idea of rehabilitation and a graded system that would allow for the modification of sentences 
according to the individual’s adaptability. Sentencing was thus ultimately discretionary and 
subject to clinical appraisals which sought to isolate and remove deviant behavioural patterns, 
replacing them with productive and rational motivations. Consequently, the idea of confinement, 
once in the penal system, was used less as the primary punishment, and was instead a form of 
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negative incentive to adapt to and internalize the requisite social norms. Once again, the liberal 
objectives contained within these coercive practices are evident; repression and punishment 
through the coercive power of the state were replaced with efforts to optimize the capacity of 
population (Bashford, 2004, 8). Within the penal system, social norms were disseminated 
through literacy and public education courses, as well as ‘redemptive work’ intended to instill 
the strong work discipline which, José Ingenieros among others, suggested was a key missing 
factor in the biological delinquent (Salvatore, 1992, 293-298). Under such conditions, any aspect 
of hybridization occurred under threat and coercion, requiring the asymmetrical adaption and 
subjugation of one racialized culture to the other.  
The identification and legal discipline of immigrants as vagrants, sexual deviants, 
criminals, diseased, or morally corrupt were fundamentally underpinned by efforts to protect the 
fragile liberal order of ‘white’ Argentina from the threat of degeneration. Underpinning all of 
these diagnoses was a mixture of social Darwinism, neo-Lamarckian racism and biological 
criminology, which rooted so-called barbarism in qualities and behaviours understood to be 
‘racially’ determined. By positing these individuals as distinct from ‘white’ Argentina, they were 
then rendered legitimately subject to a series of disciplinary and assimilationist strategies, to be 
‘whitened’ by the superior European culture of the state.  
Assimilatory Hybridity: Strategic Responses to the Porous Labour Market 
 
Patrick Wolfe has argued, throughout his oeuvre, that racialization emerges at the point at 
which colonizers are threatened to share space with the colonized—when the frontier can no 
longer be pushed back, and indigenous peoples must become part of the body politic, or when 
black slaves are emancipated and come to occupy a social-spatial proximity to colonial peoples 
(2015, 14). This insight is useful for further distinguishing the forms and mechanisms through 
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which racialization is performed. In Argentina, where immigrant labour ‘threatened’ the body 
politic, racialized practices were enacted. However, the policing of racial boundaries followed 
principles of assimilation and absorption. Racial ‘others’ were to be subordinated to, and 
swallowed by, the ‘whiteness’ of the Argentine peoples. What made assimilation palatable, I 
argue, relates to the degree to which social space as shared space was seen as threatening. To 
what extent did racialized others pose a challenge to, or stand in competition for, state 
membership and resources? This question, in turn, can be explained, I argue, by the uneven and 
combined development of the Argentine nation state and its attendant social property relations.  
To review the argument, the state in Argentina, following its initial phase of nation 
building, lacked an effective monopoly on ‘national’ territories which had been expropriated 
from indigenous peoples. Agrarian transformation to competitively produced cereals and meats 
was subject to the whims and preferences of the large, entrenched landowners. Landowners, in 
turn, derived their means of reproduction through extensive ranching, coupled with secondary 
cereals production, and as a result, had little interest in relinquishing title to land so as to 
implement a policy of small-scale, settler farming. Instead, a policy of land tenancy abounded 
which entailed a pattern of circular migration. The threat of naturalizing immigrants, therefore, 
was not central. Indeed, less than two percent of immigrants during the nineteenth century 
naturalized, despite the liberal conditions for doing so. Because social space was only threatened 
by the racialized foreigner in the short term, it was more palatable to pursue a policy of gradually 
assimilating those foreigners to the cultural, political and economic norms of the Argentine 
‘nation’ so as to make transient labour migration as functional and tolerable as possible.  
In addition, we should keep in mind that the effective organization of class power in 
Argentina meant that the agrarian rather than urban bourgeois state builders held a 
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disproportionate degree of influence over the national trajectory. This condition severely 
undermined the state’s capacity to implement policies which could expand the fiduciary and 
bureaucratic reach of the state, such that the financial and institutional capacity of the Argentine 
state to implement an effective and stable regime of immigrant segregation was further limited. 
Instead, the state’s central power rested in its coercive capacity; penal power became the central 
means of defending the racial nation. 
The policy of immigrant assimilation in Argentina, as I have noted, should be read as 
distinct from the otherwise dominant mode of racial state organization in Latin America—that of 
Mestizaje. Where Mestizaje registers a literal melding of peoples to produce ‘new’ racial and 
ethnic identities, the assimilatory polices of the Argentine state were to subordinate and swallow 
all that was not ‘white’—to turn it into ‘white’ or else to reject and make invisible difference 
through policies such as those noted in the previous chapter (Goldberg, 231). Rather than 
biological purity, racial nationhood was to proceed through a process of deracialization or the 
elimination of difference through the homogenization of the white imaginary.  
Canadian Property Relations and the Dynamics of Migration 
 
In Canada, indigenous labour, following the initial phases of colonial settlement and the 
transition from merchant trade to settled production, was ultimately deemed superfluous. 
Indigenous resistance often worked against efforts to proletarianize indigenous peoples, while at 
the same time the logic underlying the segregation of indigenous peoples to reserves was 
precisely one that relied upon the construction of indigenous peoples as presently incapable of 
labour (Coulthard, 2014, 12; Wolfe, 2015; 23). However, in contrast to Argentina, the state in 
Canada was able to impose a public monopoly on all lands seized from indigenous peoples. At 
the same time, because no entrenched landed interest held sway, business and merchant classes 
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were the primary potential allies and obstacles to national economic direction. As it happened, 
however, these classes were generally dependent on a national tariff, which could only be 
maintained through the earnings generated by the export sectors. Thus, the promotion of 
agricultural settlement was both within the capacity of the state, and generally supported by 
internal dominant classes.  
The result, then, was a state directed process of immigrant settlement. Under the national 
Dominion Lands Act (1872) the state sought to promote the settlement of small family farms by 
offering deed to land in exchange for a $10 administration fee and a guarantee to cultivate the 
land for at least three years. While there did exist a private market for land sales through 
companies such as the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Hudson’s Bay Company, these sales 
contributed little to grassland settlement as there was little that they could offer compared to the 
nearly free distribution of state land through the Lands Act (Adelman, 1994, 23). This broad 
support and capacity to promote the settlement of the interior for the production of cereals in turn 
helped in the long-term consolidation of state administrative capacity, culminating in the 
National Policy of 1876 under John A. Macdonald.  
For my purposes, key to the National Policy was that it endowed the state with the power 
and capacity to select for immigration. In contrast to Argentina, Canada had something to offer 
potential immigrants, and it was given broad class support to do so. Thus, initially, the state 
pursued a highly selective and racialized policy of immigrant recruitment, limiting its active 
targeting to the ‘preferred races’ of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic origin, as well as qualified 
exceptions for eastern and central Europeans. These were immigrants who would come to settle 
and reside in Canada permanently. In sum, owing to the configuration of class and institutional 
state power consolidated during the early nation-formation period, the Canadian state was able to 
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recruit a sizeable mass of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic immigrants—those deemed racially desirable 
(i.e. ‘white’). However, while the state could select for its ideal ‘stock’ of settler-farmers, it could 
not, in turn, enforce their proletarianization. To amass a sizeable labour force, the Canadian state 
needed to draw upon other, less ‘desirable’ populations, creating a social situation that 
articulated and defended ‘national whiteness’ through official and named difference rather than 
through a dominantly assimilatory practice. 
The Labour Problem in Canada: Stratification through Immigration Policy 
 
Colonial settlement alone, then, was inadequate to supply a growing demand for wage 
labour, as determined by the need to attract foreign capital in the promotion of agricultural export 
production, infrastructural construction, and nascent industrialization. As Wakefield had 
recognized in the 1830s, the availability of extensive land and capital in the settler space (indeed 
the very motive for settler colonization) functioned as a disincentive for proletarianization (this 
was not a problem in Argentina, where the estanciero held a monopoly over land). It was for this 
reason that Wakefield had suggested the creation of an artificial floor on the prices of land. In 
Canada, however, the development of the Dominion Lands Act instead placed an artificial 
ceiling on the price of land to attract settlers, and thus had the effect of turning many potential 
labourers into small farm owners (Adelman, 1994, 40-45). In contrast to Argentina, then, the 
availability of an exploitable class of workers could not be met by undifferentiated, open-door 
immigration. Instead, immigration would have to occur through a dual process which 
distinguished between those desirable for small farm operation and petty bourgeois activities, 
and those to be cordoned off through coercion and exclusion as a hyper-mobile, malleable and 
punishable labour force. The conditions of colonial incorporation and/or exclusion were, once 
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more, established by the extant configuration of social property relations consolidated during the 
early nation-building phase. 
It was this problem—the need to satisfy the population requirements for a farming and 
labouring class—that made visible the tension within liberal nation building. This tension again 
demonstrates the fundamentally illiberal practices which presuppose liberal state building within 
a global capitalist market. As Donald Avery has argued, the bulk of Canadian politicians and 
social and labour organizations prioritized what they saw as the ‘quality’ of immigrants, defined 
primarily in racial terms of assimilability, while capitalists sought an open immigration of any 
person capable of labouring in the myriad skilled and unskilled positions which needed to be 
filled—in other words, their approach to immigration policy was to encourage mass quantity 
(Avery, 1972, 135-38). Nationalist forces were faced with the problem that those deemed 
‘desirable’ immigrants provided an unstable pool of labour, willing to work the rails or extractive 
projects only until they could settle land. This dual and differentiated immigration stream meant 
that because some immigrants were legally allowed and desired to settle as national citizens, 
those who were not desirable required formal, legal exclusions.  
 Thus, in contrast to much of the literature, which explains immigrant racialization as a 
result of intra-class competition and conflict, the immigrants who became subject to legal 
mechanisms of racialization were rarely in direct competition with so-called ‘white labour’ in 
Canada. Indeed, it was not uncommon for segments of the racialized labour force to attempt to 
organize against employers in order to demand better working conditions and pay, thereby 
contributing to a broader platform of class struggle (Goutor, 2008, 45). Instead, I will argue that 
the differentiated rights extended to particular classes of immigrants were materially and 
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ideologically rooted in the patterns with which national state consolidation had been established, 
and by which it would then have to continue to legitimize itself.   
As with Argentina, Canada’s first Immigration Act (1869) was open-door and laissez-
faire in nature. The main exception to this open-door policy was with regard to the restriction of 
immigrants with certain physical disabilities, those with criminal records and those likely to 
become dependent on charitable organizations upon arrival (Kelley, 2010, 62). Amongst 
politicians, however, this ‘open-door’ policy was further qualified by the idea of ‘acceptable’ 
ethnicities, capable of assimilation and of agricultural settlement so as to expand the frontier of 
the new state. And yet, the precise type of immigrant deemed ideal to the political classes of 
Canada was the antithesis of that required by capital. To open up the frontier for settlement 
required the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), and as CPR President Thomas 
Shaughnessy argued, the labourers needed to build the railway were of a different character than 
those who would settle the frontier: 
Men who seek employment on railway construction are, as a rule, a class accustomed to 
roughing it. They know when they go to work that they must put up with the most 
primitive kind of camp accommodation . . . I feel very strongly that it would be a huge 
mistake to send out any more of these men from Wales, Scotland or England . . . it is only 
prejudicial to the cause of immigration to import men who come here expecting to get 
high wages, a feather bed and a bath tub (as cited in Avery, 1972, 138). 
 
On the other side of the equation, from the perspective of politicians, there was little 
desire to utilize the preferred ‘races’ of immigrants for the unskilled labour needed on the rails 
and in the mines. According to the BC Supreme Court Royal Commissioner Dr. John Hamilton 
Gray, “It is fortunate . . . this cheap labour can be obtained, for it enables those whose minds are 
capable of higher development and whose ambition looks to more ennobling industry to follow 
pursuits in which they will rise rather than toil and slave in groveling work, which wears out the 
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body without elevating the mind” (Anderson, 1991, 36). The very possibility of settlement, then, 
created the conditions through which a formally bifurcated immigration policy would emerge. 
The first major group of immigrants who were constructed as inherently outside of the 
Canadian nation were the Chinese, who migrated largely to British Columbia, and it is to this 
group that I will devote my attention. Chinese migration to Canada was fairly minor prior to 
Confederation, with figures from 1858 to 1859 citing approximately 2,000 Chinese, largely to 
supply labour to the goldfields of the Fraser River (Anderson, 1991, 34). Major immigration 
from China to Canada, however, occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century, at which 
point the pool of ‘ideal’ rail workers in the form of the Irish Catholic navies was beginning to dry 
up (Avery, 1972, 136). Considering this labour shortage, part of the condition for bringing 
British Columbia into Confederation was a promise on the province’s part to contribute the 
necessary resources to expedite the building of the western leg of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
(Kelley, 2010, 93). Unable to attract workers from central Canada into the West, or to pull 
American rail workers north into BC, rail contractors looked to China, where poverty was 
rampant, and transportation to the west coast was easier and cheaper than the alternatives. 
Throughout the 1880s, over 15,000 Chinese labourers were thus brought into BC to complete the 
construction of the CPR’s western leg (Kelley, 2010, 94).  
The onset of large-scale migration from China to (primarily) British Columbia occurred 
within the context of a Canadian economic depression, which had begun in 1873. By the 1880s, 
considerable agitation had been mobilized against Chinese immigrants from organized labour 
(Goutor, 2008, 37), which led to more than 100 anti-Chinese bills or acts being put forward 
through the provincial legislature, though many would be deemed unconstitutional. Macdonald, 
while recognizing the growing agitation around Chinese immigration, would not concede to fully 
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restrict such immigration, arguing that Chinese immigrants were “valuable, the same as a 
threshing machine or any other agricultural implement” in 1985 (Kelley, 2010, 109), but that 
there was “no fear of a permanent degradation of the country by a mongrel race” (Dua, 2007, 
451). However, the conditions of the Canadian frontier at the time, and the offer of cheap and 
expansive tracts of land to all those who could afford it, threatened the resolve of Macdonald 
regarding the impermanence of Chinese immigrants. In order to make such platitudes a reality, it 
was necessary to legally and politically encode the exclusion of Asian immigrants to the body 
politic.  
The basis for articulating and legitimating such exclusions was through the construction 
of the Chinese ‘racial’ character as unsuitable to the larger national objectives of liberal 
economic development. Thus, for example, the Chinese were constructed as transient of their 
own accord in such a manner that suggested that they would be incapable of settling the prairies 
(Goutor, 2008, 39). These arguments were bolstered by the legal restrictions against female and 
family migration, which was said to, once more, depreciate the standards by which Asian 
immigrants could subsist and contribute to a depression of the general wage. The depreciation of 
the general wage was viewed as an inhibition against the ability of white settlers to accumulate 
savings through labour, and to therefore eventually be able to homestead on the expanding 
frontier, a key to the economic development of Canada.  
Furthermore, the supposed transience of the Chinese was posited as a drain on the 
economy inasmuch as the Chinese were said to come to Canada, work for poverty wages, and 
subsist on next to nothing so as to be able to bring back as much of their wages as possible to 
China. The Industrial Banner in 1906, for example, claimed that “a coolie he was born and a 
coolie he will die, and while he undersells legitimate labour he hoards up his money with the 
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intent of returning to China and spending it there” (cited in Goutor, 2008, 60). The Chinese (and 
Asian populations more broadly) were thus constructed as a net loss to the economy of Canada, 
failing to contribute to the generation of domestic commodity markets and leading to potential 
crises of overproduction and stagnation (Goutor, 2008, 39). In so much as this was the case, then, 
the presence of Chinese labour could be construed as threatening the establishment of a national 
economy in Canada and undermining the expansion and development of settler property 
relations. Rather than threatening the interests of labour alone, then, the Chinese immigrant was 
framed as a threat to the very (economic) viability of the Canadian state itself.  
The National Border as Exclusion 
 
Attempts were initially made to legally mark out Chinese immigration as substantively 
different, and thus subject to legal mechanisms of coercion, through the Act To Restrict and 
Regulate Chinese Immigration (1885). The language of regulation allowed Chinese immigration 
to be included as a transient labour supply and involved the application of a $50 dollar head tax, 
which at the time was low enough to restrict only the most impoverished, while ensuring that 
those who came would contribute some amount of capital to the national economy. Indeed, in 
debating a proposal to raise the head tax from $50 to $100 in the House of Commons in June 
1900, MP Edwards asked, “Now what is the purpose of this legislation? Is it for the purpose of 
excluding Chinese from Canada, or is it for the purpose, in an indirect way, of collecting taxes 
from them?” (cited in Cho, 2002, 2). The fact that labour brokers and ship captains (to whom the 
Chinese became indebted), not individual Chinese labourers themselves, were responsible for the 
immediate payment of the head tax further lends credence to the assertion that the head tax’s 
primary objective was not one of exclusion but conditional inclusion (Cho, 2002, 8). Thus, while 
attempting to mitigate the fears of ‘white’ nationalists by marking the Chinese as ‘Other’ and 
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transient, the Chinese head tax served to allow for the inclusion of subjects whose labour could 
be dispensed with after the task of consolidating a Canadian nation through the construction and 
completion of the railway. In Canada, then, the first means to distinguishing migrant streams 
between those fit and those unfit for national membership occurred at the border. The Act 
established legal channels to control (not deny) the entry of Chinese immigrants and mark them 
as inassimilable. In contrast to Argentina, then, ‘undesirable’ immigrants were indefinitely 
relegated to a legally differentiated status.  
The Act to Restrict and Regulate remained the only significant piece of exclusionary 
immigration policy (operant at the border) for much of the nineteenth century.14  Under Minister 
of the Interior Clifford Sifton (1896–1905) contestations over controlling the entry of ‘non-
white’ immigration occurred in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion. However, this began to change 
at the turn of the century. The early twentieth century saw the introduction of medical inspection 
at the border, which became the first channel through which immigration decisions would be 
made, overseen by Chief Medical Officer P.H. Bryce (Sears, 1990, 96). Acts of quarantine, as 
Bashford points out, have been central technologies of public health through which the national 
state affirms and legitimizes its national status externally, through the consolidation of 
administrative capacity to detain and eject (2004, 115). Quarantine, in the settler context, further 
established the national border as a public health and racialized immigration restriction line 
(Bashford, 2004, 13). Medical inspections, applied unevenly at the borders, targeted eye disease 
(likely borne from unsanitary and unsafe ship passages that ‘undesirable’ migrant groups were 
subjected to), ostensibly linking cultural practices with a lower, ‘unclean’ civilizational order. 
                                                     
14 In the twentieth century, diplomatic agreements and amendments to the Immigration Act—The Gentleman’s 
Agreement (1907), and the Continuous Journey Regulation (1908)—were made to limit Japanese and Indian 
migration. 
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The introduction of medical inspection as a key intervention in immigration marked the initial 
shift away from laissez-faire policies and rapidly became coupled with psychiatric assessment, 
all in the name of managing ‘public health.’  
By 1905 the position of Minister of the Interior had been inherited by Frank Oliver, 
whose primary objectives included the introduction of measures to deal directly with the so-
called undesirables. These objectives were made evident in Oliver’s 1906 Immigration Act, 
which defined the ‘undesirable’ and ‘inadmissible’ as the insane, epileptic, deaf and dumb, blind, 
infirm, contagious, pauper, destitute, prostitute, pimp and convict of crimes of moral turpitude 
(Kelley, 2010, 136). Though physical ailments had already been evoked as a justification for 
exclusion or expulsion, this new legislation formally bound diseases of the body with those of 
the mind and morality. More precisely, what was declared mentally and morally defective were 
those precise characteristics that worked against the construct of ‘white’ liberal capacity. Indeed, 
it was a genetic failure of character to exercise the qualities associated with liberal nationhood, 
which led, in the minds of policy makers, health practitioners and the general public, to 
conditions of cognitive and bodily disease. 
Policing Whiteness: The Internal Frontier and Exclusion 
 
However, as I have already established, ‘racialized’ immigration could not be absolutely 
excluded. Yet practices at the border did serve to impress upon subjects their legal precarity and 
differential status as they entered the Canadian state. Given the wide availability of land, 
however, the tangential inclusion of Asian15 labour throughout the late nineteenth and early 
                                                     
15 My focus in each case is on the predominant group of racialized immigrants. However, I would be remiss to 
exclude any mention of, for example, the Italian in Canada. As in Argentina, Italian immigrants were viewed as 
racially ‘other,’ and in Canada differentiated on the basis of being unsuitable for settlement. Italians were only to 
be included as (initially) a transient labour supply. Thus for example, in Strangers Within our Gates (1909), 
Woodsworth describes “An Italian! The figure that flashes before the mind’s eye is probably that of an organ-
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twentieth century continued to stoke the fear of Asian immigration and its impact on the ‘white 
settler.’ The threat of shared social space was too close for comfort. Indeed, Charles Wilson of 
the BC legislature commented in 1882 that, “we must not overlook the fact that we are 
establishing a white country” (cited in Dua, 2007, 447). These fears peaked in the first decade of 
the twentieth century (notably with the anti-Chinese riots in Vancouver, 1907, speared by the 
Asiatic Exclusion League)—a period that marked the rising ascendency of eugenics as a science 
of population management (McLaren, 1990, 23-30). Once more, the links between public health, 
race management and nation building are evident. However, in Canada, public health 
management assumed a different form than it did in Argentina; assimilation was out of the 
question, and thus practices rooted in a fear of biological contamination predominated. 
The eugenics movement in Canada, which peaked in the 1890s and 1920s, reflected the 
concern that the health of society was the sum effect of the ‘health’ of individuals (MacKenzie, 
1976, 500-02; Aldrich, 1975, 34). This acknowledgement revealed the tension in bourgeois 
theory, as the maintenance of public health would necessarily come into conflict with laissez-
faire doctrine (Bashford, 2004, 51). Rather, states were required to manage both population and 
economy; in Canada, this practice drew upon the administrative and legal capacity consolidated 
during the early nation-building phase.  
                                                     
grinder with his monkey . . . we see dark, uncertain figures, and someone whispers, “the Mafia – the Black Hand” 
(160). And this distinction manifests in the relative freedom or unfreedom of movement for Italians; as MP William 
Lucas of the United Farmers of Alberta Party argued, “I would say we must not move towards too free a movement 
among certain Italians, if you need them, for settlement; if you need them for railways or for digging drains you 
cannot get anything better than the Italians” (cited in Fitzgerald et al., 2014, 158). Thus, while I deal with Asian 
immigration to Canada as the dominant example of exclusionary policy, the reader should bear in mind that the 
dual-streaming of immigration (those to settle and assimilate, those to labour and be maintained apart) applied 
beyond Asians alone, and extended to Italian, Ukranians and other central-southern Europeans who were to be 
imported for rail and mine work, but thought generally unassimilable (Wayland, 1997, 37). 
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In Canada, public health assumed the position that the “overall physical, mental and 
moral well-being in the interest of usefulness to the nation” (Sears, 1990, 97), which consisted of 
personal sovereignty and the exercise of rational, individual will (Malleck, 1997, 268). While 
none of this was particularly new, in contrast to Argentina where an environmental model of race 
predominated, Canada retained a biologically deterministic view of race which saw moral, 
mental and physical ailments as hereditary and thus not curable through educational and 
assimilationist strategies. The key to maintaining the health of the nation, then, lay in controlling 
the genetic make-up and purity of the population. This objective figured itself into policies 
concerning immigration, sterilization, hospitalization, and miscegenation, among other things.  
Perhaps the first of these to become prominent was the threat of Asian sexuality. Indeed 
this ‘threat’ pervaded public and political debate throughout the final decades of the nineteenth 
century and well into the twentieth. According to Peter Ward, Chinese women were commonly 
thought to be either prostitutes or concubines and were frequently presented as preying on the 
‘innocent youth,’ corrupting their moral and mental integrity. Indeed, frequent reference was 
made to the descent into so-called lunacy that these ‘innocent youth’ suffered after a visit to a 
brothel in the Chinese quarter (Ward, 2002, 8-9). According to this lore, then, the white men 
entered a brothel ‘rational and civilized,’ in full possession of their mental capacities, but would 
come back depraved, uncivilized, psychologically and mentally disturbed and beyond rationality. 
During this period, social policy sought to link infectious disease with mental health in so much 
as the former was thought to trigger the latter, particularly in the case of STDs (Chadha, 2008). 
Indeed, as it turns out, what many of these men were leaving brothels with was, unsurprisingly, 
syphilis, the spread of which indisputably predated the rise of the Chinese brothel in the West. 
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Nevertheless, Chinese prostitution continued to evoke the idea of moral and mental depravity, 
which threatened the social health of the nation.  
Along with the fear of prostitutes’ impact on the health of individual citizens, further 
concerns were raised regarding Chinese sexuality and its threat to the racial stock of the nation. 
Again, this threat was construed in ways that consistently painted the Chinese as of another, 
discrete form of being which lacked the morality, discipline and rationality of the ‘white race.’  
As Comeau has commented, “the darker, presumably non-Northern races were thought to be 
prone to sexual excess, and their reproductive potential was believed to threaten the order of the 
whole nation” (as cited in Comeau, 2001, 154). The idea of sexual deviance being linked to an 
anti-liberal character is further supported by Valverde, who suggests that the undesirable 
immigrants were understood as “‘savages’, that is, people who could not control their sexual 
desires and were thus unlikely to lead orderly and civilized lives, saving for rainy days and 
postponing gratification” (cited in Valverde, 2008, 177). Thus, fears of miscegenation were not 
simply about the phenotypical consequences of ‘mixing’ but rather were profoundly linked to a 
fear of the spread of (assumed) genetic predispositions, which did not support the thrift, grit and 
self-regulation required of a liberal economy. These supposed threats stemmed from both the 
idea of prostitution, under which conditions many argued for the need to restrict Chinese female 
immigration, as well as from the very fact of single male immigration, in which case the threat 
was posed by the potential coupling of lonely Chinese men with ‘innocent white’ women (Dua, 
2007, 446).  
The treatment of Chinese male sexuality suggested there was something reprehensible 
and morally vacuous about the ability of these men to migrate to Canada without their families, 
while at the same time vehemently opposing the introduction of familial migration (which was 
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legally prohibited). Thus, the Chinese man was somehow morally deficient, barbarous and 
uncivilized in his assumption of familial responsibilities. The outcome of this supposed character 
deficiency was the influx of a population of single men whose solitude in Canada would 
ostensibly lead to the sexual abuse of young ‘white’ women or the solicitation of ‘white’ female 
prostitutes. This fear was so widespread that it even led to the proposal in a House of Commons 
debate on the 1885 Report on the Royal Commission that the solution to the specter of the single 
Asian male was to officially promote sexual relations between Chinese men and indigenous 
women (Dua, 2007, 155). While this proposal was eventually rejected, it nevertheless suggests a 
strong eugenic current within the sorting of Canadian immigration policy, which relegated 
deeply racialized forms of exclusion to Asian immigrants based on familial, sexual and moral 
tropes. In the project of building Canadian settler colonial nationality, legal border exclusions 
were selectively deployed in order to enforce the transience of Asian immigrants, while 
simultaneously fostering wide public outrage and panic over the moral and physical specter of 
the racialized immigrant. This panic allowed both the needs of capital and race nationalists to be 
satisfied. The conditions of progress and economic development could be achieved through the 
strict regulation of racialized immigrant labour, while the national population remained ‘white’ 
through legal measures that ensured the temporary and segregated nature of the racially-coded 
immigrants (i.e. through the prevention of female and family migration).  
Aside from the prevention of female and family migration, further mechanisms drawing 
on the psychiatric, medicinal and criminal systems were generated to limit, constrain and eject 
the ‘non-preferred’ classes of immigrants. These mechanisms, which found expression in policy 
and legal code, were selectively enforced such that they allowed for the attraction and retention 
of a labour-force subject (who could and would be expelled when the requirements of the market 
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shifted) to myriad forms of coercion. In so much as this was the case, a tentative reconciliation 
between the needs of capital and broader aspirations to economic development and nationalist 
forces could be reached.  
The introduction of the Act to Prohibit the Importation, Manufacture and Sale of Opium 
for Other than Medical Purposes (The Opium Act) in 1908 should be read in this light. The Act 
was erected, in large part, to target and expel Chinese workers when their utility to the labour 
market had been exceeded. As Malleck points out, drug and opium addiction had a place in the 
Canadian state long before the so-called deluge of Chinese labourers, and in so much as this was 
the case, it is necessary to read the Opium Act as a concerted effort to render temporary the so-
called threat of the Chinese to the body politic of Canada. The construct of the Chinese opium 
addict was, in large, connected to broader cultural stigma of slavery and oppression which had 
been attributed to the Chinese, considering their supposed capacity and seeming willingness to 
work under conditions of effective servitude in Canada. Opiate addiction was further read in this 
light and was linked to an inherent genetic failure of individual character to postpone immediate 
gratification. This failure, it was said, led to an inability to work hard, save, and exert control 
over one’s baser, bodily needs. In short, the Chinese opiate addict was a ‘slave’ to his base 
needs, rather than an enlightened and rational actor whose foresight allowed for him to 
contribute to the long-term goals of the national project (Malleck, 1997, 267-70).  
With regards to the ‘white’ population, the Chinese opium dens were seen to threaten the 
physical and mental virility of the national population, which was manifest in terms of the loss of 
self-control and foresight, but further in the decline of the physical vigour of the settlers in terms 
of their labouring and reproductive capacities (as opium addiction was linked to a decline in 
sterility). Thus, the Opium Act would impose upon violators a $1000 fine or three years of 
  233 
imprisonment. This latter strategy, in light of the 1906 Immigration Act,16 would in turn allow 
for the deportation of Chinese labourers once their labouring capacity was determined to be 
compromised (Malleck, 1997, 271-73).   
In the late nineteenth century, leprosy in Canada was construed as a public health crisis in 
which moralization of the disease in connection to race and nation was the primary mover. While 
smallpox and tuberculosis were far more communicable and rampant than leprosy, only leprosy 
evoked drastic responses in its ‘containment’ measures, which were largely removed from any 
medical concern. Indeed, popular medical science at the time held that leprosy was not 
communicable and hence should not result in forcible segregation and quarantine. That the 
dominant response to leprosy consisted of such measures, as Bashford notes, should direct us to 
the functional utility of public health instruments as forms of racial management (2004, 88).   
That the leprosy panic was one of racial contamination rather than biological threat can 
be evidenced by BC’s extreme response in the form of the D’Arcy Island Asylum, a leper colony 
that operated on an island off the coast of Vancouver from 1891 to 1924. In 1872, an amendment 
to the Dominion’s Quarantine Act provided City Health Officials with the legal means to 
apprehend and isolate anyone suspected of being infected with leprosy. Yet, leprosy’s symptoms 
were often confused with those of other common diseases and as a result this amendment 
provided an easy means for targeting and removing racialized subjects from the population. In 
1891, this amendment culminated in the opening of the D’Arcy Island Asylum, which emerged 
out of a proposal by the mayor of Victoria that allowed for the coercive removal and indefinite 
segregation of those suffering from leprosy. The asylum, however, very clearly had little to do 
                                                     
16 Sec. 33 stipulates that, “Whenever in Canada an immigrant has, within two years of his landing in Canada, 
become a public charge, or an inmate of a penitentiary, gaol, prison, or hospital or other charitable institution, it 
shall be the duty of  the clerk or secretary of the municipality to forthwith notify the Minister . . . . with a view to 
the deportation of such immigrant.” 
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with medical concerns. Rather, those exiled to the island were almost exclusively Chinese 
(though racialized Japanese also formed part of this population) and received no medical 
treatment or pain relief. By 1906, when the federal government assumed control over D’Arcy 
Island, though treatment became a part of the asylum’s purview, the deportation of (suspected) 
carriers was also introduced. Indeed, Mawami (2003) argues that the asylum’s apotheosis was as 
a deportation detention center. Until its closing in 1924, 21 inmates were deported, of which 20 
were Chinese and the last a Japanese man (Mawani, 2003). These findings are consistent with 
Bashford’s argument (2004) about the different objectives of public health spaces. In Canada, the 
management of leprosy contrasts with the variety of public health asylums and sanitoriums that 
arose in Argentina, where the objective was ‘productive’ in the sense of promoting racial 
assimilation. Instead, the leper colony was a form of public health segregation operating on the 
basis that assimilation was not possible, and contact was subversive and dangerous—hybridity 
was to be avoided at all costs (Bashford, 2004, 89).   
The Threat of Shared Social Space: Exclusion, Segregation and Deportation 
 
In contrast to Argentina, immigrants to Canada were funneled through a dual 
immigration recruitment program which distinguished between the racially assimilable and non-
assimilable populations. As in Argentina, the tools for policing the racial unity of the nation from 
the immigrant ‘threat’ were dominantly public health apparatuses. This is consistent with the 
broader trajectory of settler colonial racial thinking during this period, which bound biology, 
culture, and health. As Bashford (2004) has shown, the racialization of public health measures 
and discourses throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was productive of 
national political bodies. I have shown how these practices contributed to the production of 
internal and external spatial boundaries, legitimizing the state and its territorial authority and 
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integrity. However, unlike in Argentina, in Canada these measures sought to segregate and eject 
the ‘diseased’ rather than educate them into assimilation. These distinctions can be read as the 
difference between naturalist and historicist racial regimes, identified by Goldberg (239). In the 
latter case, marginalized populations are seen as biologically (and always) inferior and hence a 
permanent threat to the body politic. I suggested throughout this chapter that this distinction (in 
contrast to a more historicist, assimilatory regime in Argentina) can be read as a product of the 
social property relations established in the early phases of ‘white’ nation building in Canada. 
Canadian nation building, in short, produced social property relations which were reliant upon, 
and welcoming to, agrarian immigrant settlers (of the ‘appropriate racial stock’). Because 
permanent settlement was a possibility, immigration could not remain open-door; there needed to 
be mechanisms for marking out and excluding those deemed ‘racially undesirable.’  
The 1906 Immigration Act to exclude or deport on the basis of mental and physical 
defect was a legal basis for creating endogenous forms of racialized exclusion from the body 
politic of ‘white Canada.’ That exclusion was applied within the state as the consequence of the 
tension between a need for labourers willing to contribute what ‘white’ settlers would not and the 
need to police the boundaries of racial inclusion. Legally defined exclusions could be applied in 
a post-hoc fashion after the immigrant in question had contributed his or her labour, rather than 
being used to exclude racialized immigrants altogether. The key to this new practice were 
stipulations concerning deportation, which allowed for the ejection of any immigrant found to 
violate public health standards within two years of admittance (Immigration Act, 1906). Thus, 
the application of medical, psychiatric and eugenic criteria for immigration and citizenship 
effectively enabled the inclusion of racialized populations within Canada’s labour markets, while 
marking off these same groups from the project of nation building. Racism did not simply 
  236 
operate to exclude certain groups—such groups were in fact integral to the building of a national 
economy and peoples. Their inclusion, however, was one circumscribed by myriad forms of 
racialized conditionality such that, in the long run, many faced political isolation and exclusion 
from citizenship, which relied on “the candidate’s ascribed aptitude for reasoned, rational, and 
intelligent participation in public and private affairs” (Menzies, 1998, 140).  
In contrast to Argentina, then, Canadian immigration proceeded through a system of dual 
streaming and management. The wide and cheap availability of land in settler-colonial Canada, 
owing to the state’s effective monopoly, meant that incoming immigrants, if given the freedom 
of political membership and rights, could all, with relative ease, acquire property in the state and 
establish a permanent presence in the Canadian landscape. Equality of political membership, 
then, needed to be carefully circumscribed and conditioned so as to maintain the stability and 
sanctity of the fabric that bound together the nation—whiteness. At the same time, given the 
consolidation and centralization of state fiduciary and bureaucratic capacity, the means through 
which to administer a broadly federal program of immigrant segregation and labour subjugation 
were much more readily available than in Argentina.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that to understand immigrant subjectivities, a focus on 
cultural adaptation and/or refusal (vis-à-vis hybridity) cannot provide an adequate picture in the 
absence of a sustained and material analysis of relations of power.  In fact, the concept of 
hybridity, as with many of the conceptual foundations of postcolonial theory, tends to take for 
granted—even fetishize—liberal individualism and pluralism. What is critically missing from 
theories of hybridity is an analysis of the unequal relations of power that promote or inhibit 
hybridity. It is ultimately through recourse to material analyses of power and production that it 
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becomes possible to explain how and for what reasons some subjects are constructed as frozen in 
their ‘difference’ while others are afforded the flexibility to adapt or assimilate. Furthermore, 
without such an analysis, it is not possible to ascertain whether hybridity will proceed as a matter 
of coercion, or whether it will proceed through a voluntary process of incorporation. With its 
focus on discourse and individual level analyses, postcolonial theory is not able to consider the 
wider landscape of power relations which give hybridity its content.  
Through my analysis of Argentine and Canadian practices of immigrant recruitment, I 
have shown that the uneven and combined processes of state formation in the context of 
indigenous dispossession influenced the form and extent of state and class power which would 
bear upon immigrant management strategies.  When it came time to activate a policy of 
immigrant recruitment, each state was endowed with differential capacities to recruit and retain 
immigrants and police the boundaries of the racial nation.  
In Argentina, the politics of policing racial purity entailed greater emphasis on 
assimilation. Rather than reading this emphasis as a product of the relative assumptions of 
‘civility’ attributed to Italian and Spanish, compared to Chinese populations, it is instead 
instructive to look to the material conditions that determined the scope of possible actions the 
state could pursue. Being unable to assert an effective monopoly on national territories, the state 
was forced to pursue an open door immigration policy, characterized by circular patterns of 
immigration from Southern Europe. This approach meant that the ‘protection’ of racial 
nationhood occurred through a variety of internal mechanisms of forcible integration and 
assimilation. Thus, the necessity of casting a wide net for immigration prevented the construct of 
racial otherness from outright foreclosing the possibility of assimilation. In Argentina, the 
‘environmental’ over the ‘biological’ construct of race more easily supported the economic 
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objectives of the state, and ‘white’ nation building proceeded through a positive pattern of 
eugenics. In Canada, where the extant property and class relations enabled a permanent 
settlement of migrants, the state sought to construct a legal hierarchy of immigrant groups, 
developing strategies of active expulsion and exclusion from the subject population in order to 
police the boundaries of desirable and undesirable immigration. In Canada, the existence of 
permanent forms of immigration along with the relatively greater state financial and bureaucratic 
capacity made the refusal of assimilation the preferred strategy for maintaining national 
‘whiteness.’ The relative proximity and possibility of permanence for racialized immigrants led 
to a favouring of ‘biological’ over ‘environmental’ constructs of race.  
These different strategies, furthermore, established and entrenched state forms inasmuch 
as the Argentine state continued to rely, predominantly, on the coercive apparatus of the state to 
enforce racial nationhood, while the Canadian state pursued these ends through a system of 
bureaucratic administration and official policies of legal exclusion. When examining 
developments of state form in the proceeding century, Argentina adopted the symbol of a 
‘melting pot’ (cresol de razas), whereas in Canada, later state forms came to embrace 
‘multiculturalism.’ These differences are not simply cosmetic, but point to very different state 
strategies to maintain the racial boundaries of ‘whiteness’ while officially denying its salience; 
the one ignores all that is different while the latter politically enunciates difference. These 
differences are consequential in that indigenous and immigrant populations in each state face 
different obstacles, and require different strategies to dismantle racial-colonial oppression. The 
implications of this differentiation will be more fully explored in the conclusion. The manner in 
which ‘hybridity’ figures into these state forms is not a neutral matter, and cannot be abstracted 
from these historical and material conditions.  
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Conclusion 
 
Following the achievements of the civil rights era, many Western societies gradually 
slipped into a comfortable, post-racial rhetoric. With the extension of legal rights and equality of 
political membership to racialized peoples, race, as with class, was assumed to be a thing of the 
past (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, 3). Official state policy and legal codes adopted race neutrality, while 
most whites claimed that they ‘did not see colour, only people.’ As official racial imagery 
declined in its representativeness of ‘the nation,’ it was replaced with imagery such as the ‘salad 
bowl of multiculturalism,’ and the ‘melting pot’ of assimilation. Liberal pluralism served to 
neutralize difference, though it did not mean the abandonment of exclusionary practice. Instead, 
difference was emptied of its political content and replaced with the relatively neutral and banal 
‘diversity’ (Bannerji, 2000, 18). As Glen Coulthard has shown, the politics of ‘diversity’ have 
served to reproduce the very real material colonial inequalities they were intended to resolve 
(2014). This is because the legacy of exclusionary and racialized practices is embedded and 
enduring. 
 As I have argued throughout this dissertation, racialized hierarchies of political 
belonging and/or exclusion have been central to the very constitution of the state, its institutions, 
and its bureaucratic, disciplinary, and policy proclivities. While overt racialized practices 
receded for a period, the institutions of the state have remained thoroughly racialized. The roots 
of these ostensibly liberal institutions have always been undergirded by illiberal policies of 
coercion and exclusion, which in the settler state are understood in racial terms. Because, as 
Patrick Wolfe notes, settler colonialism is a structure, not an event, these formative conditions 
must be consistently reproduced, as indigenous populations are never fully eliminated, and 
consequently persist in threatening the alien sovereignty of the state. 
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Throughout this study, I have argued that central to the constitution of racialized national 
subjectivities was the uneven and combined development of capitalist social property relations. 
Conceptually and theoretically I have advanced a defence of Marxist historiography through 
Political Marxism and the complementary insights provided in Trotsky’s theory of uneven and 
combined development. This defense was advanced in light of the proliferation of postcolonial 
studies and analyses which condemn Marxism for its ostensible universalist and homogenizing 
assumptions. As an alternative to Marxist ‘universals,’ the postcolonial school has launched a 
research program that emphasizes heterogeneous localisms through an analysis largely derived 
from the politically and economically emptied category of culture. The postcolonial gaze, in fact, 
generates much of the same racial (class, and gender) blindness we find in liberal pluralist 
constructs such as multiculturalism and the melting pot.  
In the first chapter, against the claims of postcolonial theorists such as Chakrabarty, I 
made the argument on a theoretical level that there was no need to assume that an analysis of 
inequity through Marxist historiography necessitates the assumed imposition of European norms, 
benchmarks, and political attitudes onto the colonized world. I argued instead that, when 
approached from the perspective of social property relations, Marxist analyses can shed 
considerable light on the formation of subjectivities in a manner that does not presuppose an 
inherent and automatic liberal, wage-dependent, politically equal subject. The work of Robert 
Brenner, Robbie Shilliam, Ellen Wood, and Larry Patriquin, all working from the standpoint of 
social property relations, reveals the so-called quintessential political subject of capitalism to in 
fact be an historical contingency—even an anomaly. I then argued that once set into motion, the 
liberal subject of England modified capital accumulation in such a way that it produced internal 
tensions and contradictions which required, as their solution, the broadening of the horizon of 
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capitalist social relations. Understanding how capitalist social relations were extended to and 
transformed non-capitalist spaces, including for our purposes the settler colonies, requires an 
analysis of societal transformations through the concept of uneven and combined development. 
Thus, I argued that capitalist social relations were adapted to uneven social arrangements, and 
when attempts were made to organize a national, globally competitive agrarian commodity 
production structure, they necessarily encountered and combined with radically different social 
class relations. In the end, novel substitutions were required to develop a political state capable 
of directing socio-economic transformations.  
In the second chapter, I gave this theoretical sketch more sustained historical 
examination. Specifically, I examined the trajectory from the erection of the so-called liberal 
political subject in England, to the centralization and rationalization of state institutions, to the 
crisis of accumulation of the 1840s, and finally to the resolution that was found in a 
transformation of the world economy and the colonization of temperate regions predominantly 
based in the Atlantic. I demonstrated how this colonialism was profoundly different from all that 
had come before, and argued that its impact on the development of global political economy was 
singular. With settler colonization came a fundamental drive to transform rather than command 
existing social arrangements, radically altering the relationship between social classes and land. 
These changes were the basis for generating the first globally competitive capitalist market, 
wherein the national organization of political economy became a central strategy of managing 
for competitiveness. Importantly, this chapter established the historical basis for the ‘Atlantic 
vector’ of uneven and combined development, arguing that, contrary to postcolonial critics, this 
deployment of Marxist historiography recognizes, indeed views as inevitable, the differential 
nature of capitalist transformations outside of England. The nature of the 1840s crisis, and its 
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resolution, transformed the global economy in ways that necessarily constituted different 
conditions for the transformation of non-capitalist spaces.  
In the third chapter, I argued that the transformation of global economic conditions, 
imposed on settler colonial spaces, had significant political consequences regarding the 
consolidation of the state. Whereas in England, the enclosures of common land to produce a 
structure of private property resulted in a population primarily dependent on wage labour, and 
the management and discipline of such labour led to a vast centralized system of state 
bureaucracy, the paths of settler colonies were profoundly different. In the first instance, 
dispossession was carried out against a population marked for elimination and exclusion. Rather 
than transforming the dispossessed into wage labour, the resistance of indigenous peoples and 
their ontological view of land as social, common, and inseparable from the body itself made 
them an inassimilable force which was targeted for expulsion, elimination and invisibilization. 
Second, the class context in which these processes occurred, and the class forces that effected 
indigenous genocide, created obstacles to political unification. In response, state builders sought 
to both justify indigenous extermination and bind together a political population over which and 
from which sovereign rule could be exerted, through discourses and practices of nationalism. 
Unlike in England, then, nationalism became the primary means for organizing and producing a 
version of capitalist social relations. In the context of a geographically dispersed and politically 
fragmented population, appeals to shared, ancestral whiteness were advanced to politically unify 
the colony of settlers. This argument was positioned in dialogue with theories of nationalism 
advanced by Anderson and Chatterjee, both of whom, for their own reasons, rejected the 
capacity of Marxist analyses to account for nationalism.  
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In the fourth chapter I addressed more pointedly the construction of racial nationalism, 
and the ways in which stratified, coerced relations of subjectivity are consistent with the 
capitalist mode of production. Thus capitalism is not simply the effect of capital and labour, but 
the effect of a politically constituted relationship between capital, labour and land. I further 
demonstrated how efforts to dispossess and racialize indigenous populations established state 
institutional and ideological developments which differed in both Canada and Argentina owing 
to the historical conditions of class reproduction. This chapter addressed itself specifically to the 
postcolonial preoccupation with the subaltern, a category that postcolonial scholars have argued 
can account for what Marxists allegedly miss: those who do not fit into the binary of 
capital/labour. The idea of subalternity has been cautiously taken up by some in critical 
indigenous studies to account for indigenous political status in settler colonial, capitalist states. 
This account, however, is lacking in that it a) buys into the myth of capitalism as a purely 
economic system, whereas the Marxist framework I have deployed accounts for capitalism in its 
totality of social, cultural, political and economic forces, and b) inscribes a form of universal 
subjectivity and vilifies all traditional cultural practices as colonial. In this way, the subaltern 
position misses what is central to the status and oppression of indigenous peoples in settler 
colonial states: access to and control over land. The relationship of indigenous peoples to land, 
far from externalizing them to the history of settler capitalism, is precisely that which is used to 
give form to the settler subject. ‘Whiteness’ and ‘civility’ constituted a decidedly non-indigenous 
approach to land. This is true both in the ways settlers imposed upon indigenous peoples, and in 
the ways that indigenous groups resisted and reacted against such impositions.  
In the fifth and final chapter, I turned to the racialization of immigrant groups and 
confronted the postcolonial category of hybridity. My goal in this chapter was to first counter the 
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utility of ‘hybridity’ as an analytical category, arguing that the heterogeneity of so-called 
hybridity is itself inscribed by socio-economic and political relations of power. As such, 
hybridity is a self-evident banality, which describes rather than critically analyzes or explains the 
variegation of political-economic and social subjectivities. In the second instance, my goal in this 
chapter was to situate immigrant and minority racialization in a shared conceptual framework 
with indigenous racialization, while nevertheless acknowledging the profound differences in the 
social relations that constitute each group’s exclusion. I argued that the ways in which 
immigrants were racialized and excluded, the models along which exclusion occurred and the 
state instruments that were deployed and/or developed to these ends, were themselves the 
product of the outcome of indigenous-settler relations, and the uneven and combined 
development of property relations within a global capitalist market. The degree to which formal, 
legal and bureaucratic mechanisms of segregation and expulsion—versus strategies of 
assimilation—predominated relied upon the differential balance of social property and class 
relations in the settler state.  
Where land was theoretically freely available for occupation, and state centralization was 
robustly and institutionally entrenched (Canada), legal policies of segregation and expulsion 
predominated. Thus the illiberal presuppositions of Canadian liberalism chiefly took form 
through juridical and bureaucratic practices. That is, named exclusions with a focus on isolating, 
policing, and deporting difference predominated. Conversely, in Argentina, where a landed class 
held a monopoly on land, immigrants were consequently temporary, and the state was 
institutionally weak. Here the illiberal presuppositions of liberal state formation were rooted in 
coercive and carceral strategies of assimilation, of making difference invisible, and of forcing the 
adaptation of ‘white’ values and behaviours. These measures were largely decentralized, taking 
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effect at provincial and local levels while being framed and directed by broader national 
objectives. 
The conclusions reached by the end of the fifth chapter point us to the contemporary 
relevance of this research. In Argentina, the contemporary language of race neutrality is 
promoted through an assimilationist model of political membership—the cresol de razas 
(broadly, melting pot). In Canada, however, a different model of race neutrality predominates in 
its celebration and solidification of ‘difference,’ which is translated into the politically neutered 
‘culture,’ and which finds form in multiculturalism. Historically, this difference pivoted around 
the perceived threat of shared social spaces; in Argentina, the long-term threat of shared social 
and political space was muted by the de facto transience of labour immigration. There was little 
concern that Italian immigrants, for example, would pose a permanent threat to racial purity. 
Rather, because of their temporary, non-citizen status, efforts were made to whitewash any 
temporary demographic deviation from the ‘white’ dream. Assimilationist training and education 
could achieve this dream by either hiding or transforming ‘racial deviance’ with the expectation 
that such norms could be passed on to future sojourners. In Canada, because the state possessed a 
monopoly on land and its cheapness made it potentially attainable by the so-called undesirable 
‘races,’ strategies of immigrant assimilation posed a real threat of permanent racial 
contamination. Rather than whitewash difference, then, the strategy of Canadian nation builders 
was to deliberately strengthen and ossify constructs of difference, and subject them to legal 
forms of exclusion.  
Now, during the latter decades of the twentieth century, a shift occurred throughout much 
of the world to present a formal policy of inclusiveness and non-discrimination. The 
discriminatory and illiberal foundations of liberalism have become much more elusive. However, 
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something of import remains. In Argentina, as in the past, there is still a focus on sameness, such 
that official statistics rarely record the racial makeup of the nation. In 2001, for example, 
government sources reported that Argentina was 97 percent white and three percent mestizo 
(HRDC, 2001). However, indigenous peoples alone are thought to make up at least four percent 
of the population, while the even more extensively (bureaucratically) eliminated Afro-Argentine 
population are not even recorded. In Argentina, the rights of full citizenship are heavily 
circumscribed by measures of assimilation, and within the span of the twenty-first century, 
policies have made school children wear white dust coats over their clothes (which could 
ostensibly mark ‘foreignness’), and even prohibited parents from giving their children ‘exotic’ 
names. The pervasiveness of the myth of white Argentina is such that any visible, non-white 
minority is generally understood to be ‘foreign’ irrespective of status, and as a result, their 
struggles, exclusions, and disadvantages are not a matter of state (Grimson, 2005). To fight for 
the institution and protection of minority rights, after all, requires that the state first recognize the 
existence of minorities within the national population.  
In Canada, difference has been enshrined in national law, but it has been largely 
translated into a politically vacuous category. While the right to linguistic and cultural equality 
and access to services that accord with those differences is necessary, it is not a sufficient means 
of addressing racialized inequality. At its core, racialized inequality remains a matter of 
politically and economically mediated status, which continues to impose limitations on and 
obstacles to the rights and opportunities of membership. The roots of inequality in Canada, 
predicated on race, continue to be based on conditions and practices entrenched in the 
Constitution and institutions of the state. While respect for indigenous culture may be formally 
recognized and can, in some spaces, contribute to addressing aspects of inequality, 
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fundamentally the issue at hand and the means through which subordinate subjectivity is racially 
inscribed and reproduced remains: that is, the foreign assertion of sovereignty over occupied 
lands (Coulthard, 2014, Pasternak, 2016). At the same time, for many racialized immigrants 
today, while an appearance (one that is quickly eroding) of inclusive and welcoming culture 
frames immigration, the continued legal forms of inclusion and exclusion tied to labouring 
occupations and racialized bodies remains (Ferguson & McNally, 2015; Walia, 2010). Even 
through this ostensibly benign ‘post-racial’ period, access to membership and the rights and 
protections of the state continue to be determined by racialized constructs of labouring bodies 
and the policing of their impermanence. 
However, in the twenty-first century, there appears to be a resurgence of the formally 
exclusive and at times violent models of statehood. My argument throughout this dissertation has 
been that such exclusionary models are constitutive of formal liberal equality, rather than an 
aberration from it. As such, my analysis points to the essential continuity of recent surges of 
illiberal politics, rather than their rupture with some pristine period of liberal inclusion. 
Importantly, the argument I have presented demonstrates that exclusionary practices are bound 
into the legitimizing project of nationalism and state consolidation in the service of capitalist 
accumulation. As the conditions for capitalist accumulation change, so too do the conditions 
through which state power and legitimacy can be stabilized. To this end it should be noted that 
recent surges in xenophobic, racist and exclusionary politics have been coincident with the 
financial crisis of 2007 and 2008.   
The examples of this violence and exclusion that I cite in my introduction must be read 
against the backdrop of the financial crisis, but not as a rupture in the liberal order. Rather, I 
would suggest that moving forward, it is important to attend to the ways in which the conditions 
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of global economic recovery have precipitated a reformulation of the content and extent of state 
power and sovereignty such that models of political membership and geopolitical organization 
have also been transformed. Current articulations of exclusionary population management, I 
would argue, are indicative of the renewed struggles and legitimizing practices necessary to 
secure state legitimacy in the interests of stabilizing liberal political regimes and renewing 
capitalist accumulation.  
Significantly, two changes in the global economy have generated obstacles to states’ 
recovery and development strategies which bear upon the reconstitution of subjectivities: the end 
of cheap food and the end of cheap fuel. Because both food (wage-goods) and fuel (productive 
inputs) are instrumental in determining the efficiency of production, the end of these cheap 
inputs has imposed severe limits on states’ recovery and future growth. In this light, two parallel 
strategies have served as the new ‘development and growth’ model; the substitution of trade in 
food and fuel for direct access to such inputs (often labelled land-grabbing) as well as a general 
shift from accumulation through productive activities, to accumulation through financialization 
(McMichael, 2013; Moore, 2010).  
 To secure non-market access to fuel and food resources, states and firms alike are 
increasingly engaged in large-scale land expropriation. Economic recovery and growth has 
therefore resulted in a new cycle of global dispossession (Ferguson & McNally, 2015; Moore, 
2015; Moore, 2010). States are thus faced with the question of how to legitimize such 
dispossessions, and then manage those made extraneous by so-called development (Pasternak, 
2016; Simpson, 2016). The question that should be posed moving forward is: how are the 
boundaries of liberal political inclusion being reconfigured today, and with what consequences 
for conventional categories of political membership? 
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